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CFE Group on Transfer of 3 Infantry Divisions

LD0103203991 Moscow TASS in English 1727 GMT 1 Mar 91

[Vladimir Smelov report]

[Text] Vienna March 1 TASS—A joint consultative group of the Warsaw Pact and NATO is continuing its work in the Austrian capital. It was created for promoting the attaining of goals and the fulfilment of provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, including the settlement of differences in interpretations, which can emerge in the process of the fulfilment of the treaty.

Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, head of the Soviet delegation in the consultative group, believes that the results of its work still leave much to be desired, since progress has been practically blocked by a discussion started over the article of the treaty dealing with the use of rules of calculating armaments and military hardware, which are subject to reduction.

Many delegations had questions dealing with the transfer of three Soviet motorised infantry divisions to coastal guard troops. Attempts were made to interpret this step as the violation by the Soviet Union of its treaty commitments. However, the motorised infantry divisions were transferred to coastal guard troops as early as in 1989. The Soviet Union decided to consolidate its coastal defence as part of the reorganisation of the Armed Forces in accordance with the defence doctrine. When ground forces were dramatically reduced, it became obvious that it was necessary to have specialised coastal guard units for defending coastal zones.

Burlakov on 1994 Troop Withdrawal From FRG

LD0503181591 Berlin ADN in German 1744 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] Berlin [no date as received] (ADN)—According to Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Soviet Forces, the Soviet Union is interested in withdrawing its troops from Germany by 1994. As Burlakov said at a news conference in Berlin on Tuesday, 25 to 30 percent of the forces are to be withdrawn from East German territory in 1991, up to 30 percent in 1992, 30 percent in 1993, and 10 to 15 percent in 1994.

Burlakov criticized the attitude of the Polish leadership, which will not let the Soviet troops pass through Poland. Hence the withdrawal has to be organized by air and sea. This route is twice as long and expensive. In spite of this, the set date will be adhered to. In all, some 500,000 people have to be transferred to the Soviet Union, along with their equipment and material supplies.

According to Burlakov, there are 388,000 soldiers and 184,000 family members in Germany. The army consists of 112 units with military equipment, including 5,000 tanks, 620 fighter aircraft, 790 helicopters, and 2.5 million tonnes of ammunition.

The withdrawal plan will be given precise form on a monthly basis and presented to the Bundeswehr Command East. Burlakov further announced that up to now 40 military sites worth 800 million marks have been handed over to the Bundeswehr. The colonel general said that the Soviets' sites in the former GDR are worth 10.5 billion marks. The Soviet side is interested in realizing the value of these sites, and using the revenue to build homes for the returning soldiers and officers.

Up to now, 152 members of the army have deserted, including 39 officers.

Ignatenko on Upcoming Visits by Foreign Leaders

LD0503154691 Moscow TASS in English 1516 GMT 5 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov, Aleksandr Kanishchev, and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—Mikhail Gorbachev will have a phone conversation with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl tonight, presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko told a briefing today.

They are expected to discuss the Soviet parliament's ratification of treaties between the USSR and Germany on Monday.

Speaking about the president's working schedule in the next few days and weeks, he said that Gorbachev will be busy at a meeting of the Federation Council discussing the draft Union treaty. On March 7 the president will take part in a special meeting marking the International Women's Day.

On Monday, Ignatenko continued, Turkish President Turgut Ozal is expected to arrive in the USSR. He will also go to Kiev, Alma-Ata, and Baku.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is expected to visit the Soviet Union in mid-March, probably on March 14-15 on completion of his Middle Eastern tour.

During the visit Baker would discuss a broad range of questions, including the entire range of problems connected with the Gulf situation and bilateral issues.

On March 18 German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher is arriving in the USSR on a visit.

In March or April Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi is also expected to come to the Soviet Union. The date of the visit is being finalised.

Ignatenko briefed journalists on Gorbachev's talks with British Prime Minister John Major today.

In reply to questions, Ignatenko stressed that Soviet positions in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East remain steadfast and the situation must be defined by the peoples living there. "We are for peace, tranquillity and order in the region," Ignatenko said.

At present the Soviet side works on its own plan of post-war setup in the Gulf, which must be integrated into plans of other countries.

Commenting on the results of yesterday's meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, Ignatenko noted that it was "keen" and many questions will be submitted to the Council of Federation, because many economic problems demand the participation of all republics and regions. He did not rule out that the wording of the question put to referendum on March 17 could be changed at the council. "We regard calmly" the refusal of some republics to take part in the referendum, Ignatenko continued. Labour collectives and organisations, irrespective of republican authorities, will be able to express their view on future union.

Asked about Gorbachev's attitude to the results of polls conducted in Estonia and Latvia, "especially to the fact that a large proportion of Russian-speaking population also voted for independence", Ignatenko replied: "The attitude is quite normal. The president sees it as a public poll. There is nothing unexpected in this. This has no legal importance. But it is useful for the Baltics and the centre to know what people feel today."

Yanayev Interviewed on Gulf War, U.S. Ties

OW0503142391 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1215 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Vice President Gennadiy Yanayev by Hata; place and date not given—recorded, from the "News 21" program; Yanayev speaks in Russian with superimposed Japanese subtitles]

[Text] [Yanayev] We expect that the president's visit to Japan will be a good starting point for future Soviet-Japanese ties. The president is ready to hold frank discussions on the pending issues. I think progress will be made in every field, including politics, trade, economics, arts, and sciences. His meetings [with Japanese officials] will be of importance to the security of the Asia-Pacific region.

I appraise the temporary cease-fire. I hope, however, that an agreement on a complete end to the war and withdrawal of the multinational forces will be achieved in the following negotiations. We could not stop the Gulf war, which created many victims. The Middle East will remain an "explosive warehouse" and we cannot expect a permanent peace as long as the important issues, such as the Palestinian issue, remain unsolved.

[Hata] It is said that U.S.-Soviet relations have started to move toward an awkward situation. How do you think the U.S.-Soviet relations will change in the future?

[Yanayev] We are facing difficulties in individual arguments, including disarmament negotiations. The Soviet-U.S. ties are, however, progressing favorably. Difficulties are unavoidable in any working-level negotiations. The Soviet Union, and the United States in particular, criticized the Iraqi invasion and demanded an immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. The fact that we could act in harmony with the United States when the United Nations adopted the resolutions proves that the Soviet-U.S. ties will develop in the future.

[Hata] Because of the disputes in the three Baltic states, many people in the United States are calling for a halt to the economic aid to the Soviet Union. Can you comment on that?

[Yanayev] The events in the Baltic states are domestic issues. It is a mistake to directly relate Soviet domestic issues to Soviet-U.S. ties.

[Hata] Some radical reformists think that President Gorbachev became a conservative and that perestroyka has ended. As a vice president, what do you think?

[Yanayev] It is not true that President Gorbachev became a right-winger. We will continue to promote perestroyka, which started in 1985. We have no other alternatives but to continue perestroyka in order to solve the problems.

More on 28 Feb Bessmertnykh News Conference

PM0603091391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[G. Alimov and G. Charodeyev report: "Bessmertnykh: We Welcome the Liberation of Kuwait"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA has already reported that USSR Foreign Minister A. Bessmertnykh held a news conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at which he made a statement about the situation developing in the Persian Gulf zone.

In his opinion several priority tasks are now emerging. First, it is essential to completely preclude any resumption of hostilities in the conflict zone. To this end contacts are now being established between the sides' military representatives which the USSR, for its part, is facilitating in every way. Second, it is extremely important to hold a sitting of the UN Security Council which will begin an expeditious and in-depth examination of the questions of a final political settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. We agree, the minister stressed, that the Security Council sitting will be preceded by a meeting of "the five" permanent Council members. Third, the international community faces the task of starting without delay the elaboration and coordination of the postcrisis order in the region, and the most important element of this must be the creation of a security system which would not only draw a line under recent events but would also guarantee to prevent future military clashes in this region.

The Soviet minister stressed: The cessation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf zone is a major and important international event. "We welcome the liberation of Kuwait, the restoration of its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and the return of its lawful government to the country," Bessmertnykh said.

The End of the War—Whose Victory Is It?

In the USSR foreign minister's opinion, the ending of the military conflict in the Persian Gulf zone is the result of the collective efforts of all the states which took part in the search for a settlement and which considered it possible to unite in order to prevent such conflicts and the seizure of some countries by others in the future. "Many states took part in setting this historic precedent, including the United States, other coalition members, and the Soviet Union, the last of which consistently pursued the line of a political solution. Every country that participated in this movement can lay claim to the success of its policy, while at the same time no single one of them should claim that it alone ensured this success," Bessmertnykh stated.

The Minister's View of Soviet-U.S. Relations

Bessmertnykh fully agrees with the assessment of these relations given by the USSR president in one of his speeches in Minsk. As is known, he defined them as containing elements of fragility. The USSR foreign minister explained what this means. The point is, Bessmertnykh said, that these relations, which have a solid objective foundation for their development, are at the same time sometimes exposed to serious and damaging intrusion by subjective factors. This is the fragility that M.S. Gorbachev was referring to. It is precisely this fragility, the head of the Soviet foreign policy department went on, that is unfortunately still present. In the struggle between the objective requirements of the stable development of Soviet-U.S. relations and subjective factors, the balance is sometimes disturbed. When subjective factors gain the upper hand instability appears in relations, and then the threat that they could be set back arises. The minister then remarked that at the same time he would like to express the hope and confidence that these relations will pass intact through the phase of struggle between objective and subjective factors and will withstand the test, as they did during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict.

Observers abroad and also in the Soviet Union think that in recent years Soviet foreign policy has suffered defeats. Is that so? To this question from a Greek correspondent the foreign minister replied:

"First, I am absolutely unable to agree with that. It seems to me that the time is passing when states sought at every turn to talk of victories, conquests, and successes, although a second habit still unfortunately persists in some places—that of reviling the other side's policy, likewise at every turn. We have heard statements of this sort in recent days, some from certain previously highly respected U.S. senators. In our country, too, there are some figures suffering from a peculiar political masochism who would prefer to revile their own homeland and their own policy for the sake of some sort of aims which are incomprehensible to me."

Bessmertnykh believes that all of this is possible in an era of pluralism. And yet in his opinion, when assessing such important and serious things as the country's foreign policy, it is necessary that the idea and also the declarations being made about it do not exceed the bounds of common sense.

Does the USSR Have an Interest in Saddam Husayn's Political Survival?

"We are dealing with Iraq, its people, and those leaders of Iraq the people put forward and support," the minister noted. "We think that to predetermine our attitude toward this or that leader, regardless of the sovereign right of the country's people, would be interfering in its internal affairs."

It is Bessmertnykh's view that our relations with the state of Iraq will continue to develop in the same way as with all the other countries not only of this region but throughout the world. A new era is beginning, Bessmertnykh said; new relations are emerging. We have all learned a serious lesson from this conflict, and it will be borne in mind not only in the context of the international efforts that we will all be making but also in the context of the bilateral ties that will be developed with particular states in the Persian Gulf zone.

'International Review' on Pact, Iraq, Japan

LD0403101391

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1230 GMT on 3 March begins carrying "The World This Week: International Review" with Boris Andrianov, announcer; Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the editorial board of ZA REBEZHOM; and Sergey Mikhaylovich Golyakov, political observer for NOVOYE VREMYA.

The first topic for discussion is the Warsaw Pact. Golyakov says the Warsaw Pact has done much to ensure East-West parity and stability. Therefore, not everybody thinks disbanding its military structure is good news. Some feel it is hasty. Golyakov notes that on the contrary, both sides have been slow to acknowledge the obsolescence of military blocs. He says "centrifugal forces" emerged within the Warsaw Pact and the only joint action by the Pact countries was the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, which "had nothing to do with defending our homeland." We are not really losing allies, since we "hardly had any" in the first place; we can, however, lose our "enemy," Golyakov adds. The Paris accords guarantee the security of the USSR, he concludes.

Andrianov says "The speed of change in the Warsaw Pact has aroused a certain anxiety, even among the NATO members." Golyakov says that is not without reason because NATO is not yet ready for change. Nor are they thrilled about taking in former members of the Pact. He says their joining NATO would "be against the legitimate interests of our own country"; the USSR wants "a buffer zone of neutral countries."

Volskiy switches the discussion to the Persian Gulf. He notes that a real and lasting peace has not been achieved. He says that Iraq, "in accordance with the Muslim way of thinking, went ahead deliberately sacrificing human lives. To fall in a fight with the infidels is the road to paradise." He notes that as a result of U.S. air raids there were more heavy casualties among the Iraqis. To the Americans, the issue of casualties in this war has become a political one. The low rate of military casualties on the battlefield has become an issue of prestige for Bush and the military. Volksiy gives a short account of the high-tech weaponry used by the United States, noting that it reduced the number of casualties inflicted on enemy civilians because of precision targeting and "surgical accuracy."

Andrianov agrees with Volskiy on precision bombing, but not with the "surgical accuracy" of U.S. military operations. He notes that the high technological level of the weapons that were used by the Americans has led to "overconfidence" and even "smugness" among its top brass. He says many foreign correspondents noticed this when complaining about the news blackout that was imposed on military operations in Kuwait.

Volskiy notes that the results of "the first and last tank battles in Kuwait" are not known. Did the U.S. forces manage to surround the Iraqi Republican Guard, or did they not? He notes anti-chemical warfare clothing did not stand the trial of desert conditions. He is not sure even now whether this chemical protection will have to be used again because Saddam Husayn still has chemical weapons and has promised to use them.

Golyakov notes that Iraq still has a stock of chemical weapons despite some of the plants having been destroyed by allied bombing.

Volskiy says international legal norms are considered by many people in the East to be a product of the West which can be ignored if necessity dictates. This includes chemical weapons. Yet life corrects this, he says, when the world witnesses the liberation of Kuwait, the Iraqi decision to comply with all UN resolutions, and the ceasefire. He quotes Saddam Husayn as saying: "We have reaped, in this mother of all battles, what we have sown."

Andrianov, citing the FINANCIAL TIMES, says children will be named after Saddam Husayn because he remains a symbol for Arabs and all Muslims for standing up to the United States, Israel, and the rest of the infidels.

Volskiy says he understands this claim of moral victory over the West, but he thinks that if anyone still believes in Saddam Husayn, it is not the Iraqis given all the terrible casualties they have suffered.

Golyakov states: "It would be interesting to know whether there is an alternative to Saddam Husayn at the present moment. We do not, however, know of any concrete figure having been named."

Volskiy replies: "A name of one of the present members of the Revolution Command Council appeared in the press, but it hardly means anything to our listeners and I don't think it is of any serious importance. What is

symptomatic is that an accent is being put, repeatedly and at length, on the statements made by the Americans on the military which helped Saddam Husayn come to power. It should not be forgotten that the U.S. forces are now 150 to 180 km from Baghdad. Washington, of course, is counting on exerting its infuence upon the future of Iraq. Its neighbors—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria—that is, the Arab countries that are taking part in the allied coalition, are also counting on this."

Golyakov continues: "Generally speaking, as I understand it, the time has come to think mainly of the future of not only Iraq, but of the whole of the region. One wants to hope the recurrence of war, of which you, Dmitriy Antonovich, gave a colorful scenario, will not be required. Other scenarios are needed—not of a chemical war—but of peace and law and order in the region. With regard to this, it is important the Iraqi entity be retained because there are plans to dismember it. Only on the basis of justice can lasting peace and order be guaranteed even to the defeated. Quite a number of such variants of a postwar order are being discussed in the press."

Volskiy then states: "This is so. I do agree with you that the scenario of peace—not war—is what is needed, but the danger of the recurrence of a new war cannot be completely ruled out and that is why vigilance should not slacken. The main thing is that peace should be guaranteed in the Persian Gulf zone after this, I may say, ill-fated war. The region should be free from an arms race. The peace process should, after all, be spread to the whole of the Near East region. The Palestinian problem should, at last, be resolved. The Arab-Israeli conflict, generally speaking, should be resolved as a whole. And what is important [word indistinct] here is that the mutual cooperation between our country and the United States and other developed states—and, of course, the nonaligned countries and the developing countries including the countries of the Near East—should be maintained."

Andrianov adds: "It should be noted that in this crisis, we acted independently. Sometimes we even generated criticism from our partners. But on the whole, we acted together with most of the members of the world community. I mean to say, and understandably, that we acted together on the diplomatic and the political scene, which had its implementation in the Security Council resolutions, including its latest decisions. A foundation for future cooperation has been built. It is beneficial to all sides that after the war for Kuwait, cooperation be strengthened and spread even wider."

The last topic of discussion is relations with Japan. Volskiy says Gorbachev's upcoming visit to Japan is seen on both sides as a chance to improve relations. Golyakov notes that the northern territories are a stumbling block. Andrianov adds that Tokyo insists on a peace treaty and any ultimatums by the Japanese can only harm the upcoming talks. Golyakov agrees, adding that flexibility is needed. Volskiy says the USSR is being honest and sincere. A solution is possible, given goodwill and a quest for compromise. Golyakov says it is time the Soviet Union officially admits the territorial issue exists. Andrianov adds that the USSR achieved "positive results" by showing goodwill in the border dispute with China and that patience is needed.

Article Comments on Role of NATO

PM0403142191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 91 Union Edition p 5

[Article by Vikentiy Matveyev under the rubric "Political Observer's Opinion": "Impossible To Be Two-Faced Janus"]

[Text] In recent months no less than half the U.S. troops billeted in the Western part of Germany have been moved with their weapons to the Persian Gulf region, and although these forces were stationed in the FRG under the slogan of collective defense against the threat of aggression from the East, their drastic reduction has failed to generate anxiety either among ordinary Germans or in Bonn's government circles.

This fact alone attests to the improvement in the political climate on our continent—just as it does to the gradual change in the role of NATO. Its leaders' statements last June that, proceeding from the desire "to create a new peaceful order in Europe," they were "extending a hand of friendship and cooperation to the Soviet Union and all other European states" was fundamentally new.

If, following this precept, the governments of the NATO countries had adopted a decision to transform their alliance into an exclusively political forum, it would be possible to speak even now of a fundamental change in NATO's functions. But serious political battles are developing around this question. The old does not readily give way to the new. In their officially coordinated statements the NATO leaders are still expressing themselves, although with less emphasis than before, for "the principles and advantages... which stem from collective defense, at the same time adapting the alliance to the new circumstances and opportunities." This formulation is contained in the communique of the NATO Council session in December last year.

"Collective defense..." The NATO leaders could launch this phrase with some success under conditions which no longer exist in Europe. The fundamental changes that have taken place in Europe in connection with the changes in East Europe, with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the countries of the region, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact military organization, and other changes are unanimously recognized on both sides of the Atlantic.

Moreover, some people in the West are even voicing regret over past times, since in the new situation it is becoming increasingly difficult to defend what brought considerable political and material capital to the supporters of the confrontational era.

It is not surprising that disputes and debates as to how to conduct matters in the future are not ceasing within NATO but are even intensifying. To judge by Western press reports, they are reaching a special pitch during the review which has begun of the alliance's military strategy. One of the most painful questions, according to reports, is the problem of NATO's participation in conflicts which may arise outside its geographical sphere of operation, that is, outside Europe.

Washington and London, REUTER has reported, would like the alliance "to play a leading role in maintaining peace throughout the planet (!), which would imply sending troops (by the NATO countries) to regions a long way from Europe."

In Paris, Bonn, and Madrid, this unrestricted expansion of NATO's sphere of operation is meeting with serious resistance.

As of today, these and other differences in NATO are still a long way from being settled. The military operations in the Persian Gulf have made them extraordinarily acute. Only after strong pressure from Washington did Bonn embark on sending Alpha Jet fighter bombers from the German Air Force to Turkey. Matters were even more complicated with regard to the dispatch of Bundeswehr subunits to this region to service the "Hawk" and "Roland" air defense missile complexes. Immediately there was a drastic increase in the number of young Germans who refused on the basis of clauses in the FRG Constitution (at the behest of their conscience) to take part in possible combat operations.

In France, as is well known, J.-P. Chevenement resigned as defense minister in protest against its participation in the war against Iraq.

Nonetheless the fact that a number of NATO countries have made their contribution to the multinational forces in the Persian Gulf formed under U.S. auspices has evidently prompted the U.S. representatives in NATO to go still further and to raise the question of the formal expansion of the alliance's sphere of operation.

In that case NATO's military role will not be reduced but will be intensified. This organization could be drawn into conflict situations in countries of the so-called "Third World" with unpredictable consequences for the peoples of these countries and for the fate of the world.

So far nothing definite has yet been decided in NATO. The debates there are continuing in a situation where an increasing number of influential figures and journalists in the West are voicing fears regarding the grave legacy of the war in the Persian Gulf. This primarily involves the intensifying alienation of the mass of Arabs and Muslims from the United States and West Europe, whose weapons brought down so much explosive power and fire on Iraq, as a result of which the civilian population also suffered.

Surely this "experience" is not pushing some people in the NATO leadership to impart to the alliance gendarme functions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America? What then would be the worth of the phrases from the alliance's leaders regarding a "new peaceful order in Europe?"

Under these conditions it is impossible to be a two-faced Janus. Either NATO's functions will indeed adapt to the new times and realities in the world, or else its very existence will increasingly contradict the positive advances in the international arena.

Bovin Views Effects of Warsaw Pact Disbandment

PM0403135991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Mar 91 Union Edition p 6

[Aleksandr Bovin "Political Observer Opinion": "Military Cooperation Ending"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The ending of the cold war, if that breakthrough is consolidated, creates favorable conditions for eroding the bloc structure of the political world, beginning with the military component, and for creating an all-European security system. Meanwhile, it would be expedient if the change of functions and role of the blocs affected the Warsaw Pact and NATO simultaneously. That has always been Moscow's position. However, in fundamentally new historical conditions when the Warsaw Pact's main opponents have proved to be internal rather than external, Moscow has had to change its position and—independently of the situation in NATO—step up the changes in the Warsaw Pact. We "simply" had no alternative.

In some capitals, people are wondering whether it might not be possible to leave the Warsaw Pact and join [primknut] NATO in some way. In Brussels such ideas are seen as far too exotic and clearly hasty. There they prefer the neutral option for Eastern Europe.

Attempts to create regional associations have not been ruled out. For example, a central European association (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) or a Danube-Adriatic association (Austria, Hungary, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia). Or possibly a Balkan association.

The present picture is like this. On the one hand there is a "full-fledged" NATO, self-confident and self-satisfied, and on the other there is a truncated Warsaw Pact, nothing but a temporary rump. What does that mean for the USSR's security? Has our strategic position not worsened?

If you work on the assumption that a conventional (not a nuclear) war is possible in Europe, our strategic situation has clearly worsened. But if you think that the likelihood of conventional war in Europe is close to zero, the level of our security has not fallen.

The second hypothesis seems more plausible to me.

UN Chief, Soviet Representatives on Chernobyl

LD2802213691 Moscow TASS in English 1517 GMT 28 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Maslov]

[Text] United Nations February 28 TASS—U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar received permanent representatives of the USSR, the Belorussian and Ukrainian republics Yuliy Vorontsov, Gennadiy Buravkin and Gennadiy Udovenko here on Wednesday.

During the meeting, the sides discussed how bodies and agencies of the U.N. system should accelerate the implementation of a resolution by the 45th U.N. General Assembly on international cooperation to ease and overcome the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

Perez de Cuellar told the Soviet representatives that the U.N. Secretariat takes adequate measures, and the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on Chernobyl is a priority matter in U.N. activities.

United States & Canada

Spokesman on Upcoming Baker Visit, Summit

LD0503134691 Moscow TASS in English 1335 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Mikhail Ivanov, Aleksandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev report]

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is expected to visit the Soviet Union in mid-March, probably on March 14-15, Soviet presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko told a briefing here today.

He supposed that during the visit Baker would meet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh. Other Soviet leaders would probably participate in these conversations.

A broad range of questions is planned to be discussed during Baker's stay in Moscow, Ignatenko said. It will possibly include the entire range of problems connected with the Gulf situation. "Other questions of bilateral relations will, naturally, also be discussed," the presidential spokesman said.

Asked about the new timeframe for the Soviet-American summit, Ignatenko said it may be held in spring, perhaps in May. "If Baker has some proposals to this effect, they will certainly be considered with interest," the spokesman said.

Baker Discusses Upcoming Trip to Mideast

PM0603113391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4

[V. Nadein report under the "Panorama of International Life" rubric: "James Baker Interview Prior to Near East Trip: Ray of Hope and the Inner Voice"]

[Text] Washington—One of the most chronic and involved conflicts in world history is under "threat of peace." A ray of hope has shot through the pitch blackness of Arab-Israeli confrontation, which has cast gloom over the whole world in the last 40-odd years.

But it is a very weak ray. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker even refused to give any objective data to bear out his own restrained optimism, which is accompanied by numerous reservations. In response to persistent questioning by the journalists interviewing him on Sunday's Meet the Press television program, Secretary of State Baker referred to intuition and his "inner voice."

Replying to the journalists, Baker used various expressions to stress that a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is first and foremost the task of the countries of the region and that any attempt to go there with a plan prepared in Washington would lead to its rejection out of hand and that no U.S. efforts will avail without the goodwill of long-standing rivals.

Yet the journalists did on one occasion draw out, as it were, the reserved diplomat. In reply to the question whether the United States had received information from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Arab countries, including Syria, that "they will be prepared to establish diplomatic relations with Israel after the war," Baker said:

"I think that it will be best to refer to my inner voice, which is all I have available to me. My inner voice tells me that this conflict is one which the two sides would like to see solved right now, after all that has happened."

Even if not diverted by such hunches, the agenda for Baker's upcoming visit to the countries of the region (excluding Jordan and, naturally, Iraq) is pretty busy and varied.

The main thing, as Baker stressed, is to find out "what they want from us in the Near East." The list of questions on which long-standing friends and partners will be interrogated is pretty extensive.

The first and most important one is whether the countries of the Gulf want the American troops to stay there for a prolonged period and, if they do, in what form. In the form of aircraft carriers and battleships constantly off the coast? In the form of air formations leasing runways at local air bases? In the form of an active (or token) presence of marine garrisons?

Reparations from Iraq are a big topic for the consultations. Of course journalists, in asking a question on this topic, stressed that it is the people of Iraq, who are themselves the main victim of the tyranny, who will have to pay. In Baker's opinion, the allies will adopt the approach that has already emerged in President Bush's speeches, namely that America will not give a dime to Iraq while Saddam Husayn rules there.

Even if the latter does want to flee into exile, there will still be an outstanding problem. The American leadership considers that no one can be pardoned gratuitously for international crimes. Saddam Husayn's Arab neighbors will scarcely demand special mercy be shown him, but the premature exit of the former bogeyman, local experts think, would not suit the coalition leader: While Saddam Husayn is in charge few insist on the immediate departure of the American forces.

The question of reparations has its unexpected side regarding the large-scale flight of Iraqi planes to Iran during the war. Now that hostilities are over, it is time to consider the return flight, but no: Iran has laid claim to this property as reparations for the preceding Iran-Iraq war.

What remains of Iraq's military potential? How damaged is that country's capacity to create and deliver weapons of mass destruction and what has been retained of it? By all appearances, these questions, which are of interest to the United States, worry Iraq's neighbors far more seriously.

The secretary of state stressed the particular importance of such items on the talks agenda as drafting agreements on regional security, arms reduction, the nonproliferation of weapons, economic coperation, "and so forth."

Not in this regard, however, but in reply to a particular question, Baker said that the Soviet Union "should continue to play an extremely important political role" in the region. In the secretary of state's opinion, a desire to deny by whatever means the Soviet Union's participation in the consultations concerned with drafting future agreements "would be mistaken."

In corroboration of this thesis Baker cited two, in his opinion, very important reasons. First: "All you need to do is look at what happened after 2 August (when Iraq invaded Kuwait—V.N.) regarding the Gulf crisis... I do not think that we would have been in a position to do what we did, the way we did it, when we did it if the Soviet Union had not stood shoulder to shoulder with us." And second: "They (that is to say, the USSR—V.N.) do retain a certain degree of influence on many of the key players in the region."

That assessment of the role and influence of the USSR is very important on the eve of an important period of international settlements. However, thoughtful analysts draw attention to the fact that there is not even a mention of the mechanisms of the postwar settlement in this statement or in the previous utterances of coalition leaders.

In the aforementioned interview the United States imperiously assigns itself the role of essentially the sole coordinator of the peace process in the Near East.

It is claimed that U.S. authority in the Near East is greater than ever. The influence of that country will indeed be able to break through the inertia of this chronic conflict.

Judging by Baker's statements, he clearly realizes the importance of soberly taking account of legitimate interests. However, the television interview indicates intentions; the outcome of the trip will indicate performance.

U.S. Reevaluation of Soviet Ties Seen

PM0603100191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Mar 91 Union Edition p 6

[A. Shalnev report: "What Will the Next Step Be? U.S. Administration Being Pushed Toward Tougher Foreign Policy Course"]

[Text] New York—The photograph THE NEW YORK TIMES published the day after the war in the Persian Gulf ended in unconditional victory for America featured eight men, laughing and very pleased with themselves.

President George Bush and his military-political council: Vice President Dan Quayle; Defense Secretary Richard Cheney; John Sununu, White House chief of staff; Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of State James Baker; Brent Scowcroft, assistant to the President for national security affairs; and Robert Gates, Scowcroft's deputy.

These are the President's closest and most trusted advisers.

The war has ended, and there seems to be no longer any need for the military council, but the "narrow circle" will certainly be preserved: The opinion of these people, their assessments, their analysis and forecasts are extremely important to the President, since these assessments led the President into necessary and correct decisions in the conflict with Iraq. Victorious decisions.

Almost all of these seven had been close to the President before, prior to the war, but the war gave organizational shape to this kind of presidential council, as it were; it consolidated its composition and lent it virtual official status not provided for either in the Constitution or in any other laws. This is the first point.

Second, the distribution of forces in this "narrow circle" has obviously changed. To judge from what informed people can be heard saying nowadays, Secretary of State James Baker, while remaining the President's closest personal friend, is no longer the first among equals in the group of presidential confidants. According to some reports, Baker is accused of manifesting a greater disposition toward seeking compromises in the conflict than he should have, including compromises with Moscow. The joint statement published on the results of the first official visit to Washington by Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, the new Soviet foreign minister, was almost unanimously scored in Washington's corridors of power as a manifestation of tractability, softness, and even shortsightedness by Baker personally, who was said to have allowed his Moscow colleague to drag him into positions in no way characteristic of the U.S. Near East policy. It is said that Baker, who provoked Israel's indignation and protests with that statement, received a serious reprimand from the President.

The loss of the secretary of state's status as unofficial prime minister or, as it is sometimes possible to hear, "deputy president for foreign policy" is leading to the result that the "narrow circle" of presidential advisers is beginning to be dominated by people who are known for their tough stance on foreign policy issues—above all, questions "bound up" with the Soviet Union.

Let us return once more to the photograph in THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Dan Quayle. He never concealed his doubts about the expediency of close relations with the Soviet Union; in his assessments and forecasts he is an ideologue of the Reagan type rather than a pragmatist of the Bush type; a supporter of the comprehensive development and realization of the "Star Wars" program.

Richard Cheney constantly questioned the sincerity of the reforms begun in the Soviet Union by perestroyka and, consequently, the wisdom of serious reductions in the U.S. military programs. His statements on this score have recently become still more assertive.

Robert Gates, former deputy director of the CIA and now the White House's leading Sovietologist, is so renowned for his totally uncompromising stand with regard to Moscow that Mikhail Gorbachev, meeting at one time with an official U.S. delegation, specially asked that Gates—a person who, as the USSR president put it, is trying to undermine relations with Moscow—be pointed out to him. Another remarkable moment in the service record of the deputy assistant to the President was the veto which Secretary of State Baker imposed on one of his speeches, which was excessively anti-Kremlin even by Gates' standards. But this was back in the time when Gates stood on the very distant approaches to the "narrow circle" of presidential advisers. He is now inside this circle.

John Sununu and Brent Scowcroft also belong to the category of those people at the White House who, to use the expression of the weekly U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, "make a tougher analysis of Soviet-U.S. relations than the Department of State, which is inclined to promulgate a benign viewpoint."

As for Colin Powell, he is a military man and so he stands somewhat removed from politics, avoiding categorical judgments in his public statements. However, he is close to Richard Cheney, and a very clear-cut and productive mutual understanding has taken shape between them which, it may be assumed, also extends to questions of Soviet-U.S. relations. Or at any rate to the military aspects of these relations.

In forecasting the way in which Soviet-U.S. relations will now develop it is absolutely essential, in my view, to bear in mind the distribution of forces within the group of presidential advisers, which, I will repeat, the war has essentially lent an official status by placing it not only on a par with but even above the cabinet of ministers, as well as above the National Security Council. Now that the conflict in the Gulf is over the administration will have to tackle these relations in earnest—relations which have been pushed into the background in recent weeks and months, unless, of course, you count those aspects of the relations which directly concerned the events in the Near East.

Sad though it may be to admit this, a turn for the worse is inevitable. This is already being stated openly: not only by commentators and political experts, and not only by members of Congress. It is also being said openly by prominent administration figures, including those engaged directly in formulating and realizing the United States's Soviet policy. Addressing a Senate subcommittee recently, Robert Zoellick, one of five or six key figures in the Department of State, bluntly declared that "very gloomy times await us." He tried to convince his listeners that the Soviet economic program "will almost certainly fail" and that the possibilities of "riots and violence are increasing."

Zoellick, who was recently promoted to deputy secretary of state, is known in the administration for his pragmatism—which is akin to that of James Baker—and so his predictions of a "difficult and gloomy" period in relations with the Soviet Union merit special attention insofar as they are not tainted by ideology, as are, let us suppose, the statements of Vice President Quayle.

Of course, what is now happening in the USSR comes as no surprise to the administration: Forecasts of the present events and phenomena were being made by U.S. Sovietologists, including government ones, months ago. What is new is that the administration, so it seems to me, has now approached the line of readiness—readiness to react with specific actions to the situation in the USSR.

The first steps have already been taken. I mean, above all, the decision to deal directly with the Baltic and other republics, bypassing Moscow—something that Washington previously tried to avoid. It is a question at present only of deliveries of medical supplies and equipment to the Baltic region and the Ukraine worth a total of $4 million. But, according to my estimates, this is only the beginning of the policy which Congress is actively trying to secure from the administration by demanding that Washington, as THE WASHINGTON POST remarked, more actively "assist the reformers to win the battles with the Communist Party and with the champions of a tough line among the military."

What is meant by such assistance is not only material assistance, for Republican Bud Shuster, an influential member of the U.S. Congress House Committee on Intelligence, believes that Washington must now recognize the Baltic republics' independence and deal directly with Boris Yeltsin by officially inviting him to meet with the President in the White House Oval Office.

Bud Shuster is far from alone. The euphoria created by victory in the war in the Persian Gulf, which, in the opinion of many Americans, has confirmed the United States in the status of the only superpower, serves as the backdrop on Capitol Hill to increasingly insistent calls for the United States to be ready to demonstrate its superpower status in other parts of the world too, and primarily in relations with the USSR. From the viewpoint of Congressman Henry Hyde, an element of such a demonstration could be a visit to Vilnius by one of the State Department's top staffers for talks with the Landsbergis government.

It is no secret that previously President Bush preferred to disregard demands of this kind, or at any rate he did not follow them. He made it known either himself or through his advisers that he considers "bypass" diplomacy inadvisable because it would threaten to undermine Mikhail Gorbachev's positions.

Bush is known for his steadfast honesty. It took him many months to make his choice in favor of Gorbachev and his reforms. Having made the choice he adhered to it, even if matters did go as far as backstage confrontations with Congress.

Does he adhere to it now? I think so. But some corrections are already being made. It would be strange if this were not so, taking into account the events occurring in our country. The correction process would have developed both faster and more obviously if it were not for the conflict in the Persian Gulf and the need to have the Soviet Union as a partner in the anti-Iraq coalition—hence, in particular, the outward restraint with which the White House reacted to the events in Vilnius.

The war is over, and many political experts here would like to see a less significant role for the Soviet Union in the disposition of forces now emerging in the Near East. It is also believed that the need of the Americans, whose influence in the region has undoubtedly increased and expanded, for our services and our assistance will be qualitatively different. Is this not a reason to revise the main parameters of Soviet-U.S. relations?

This is a rather cynical way of formulating the question, but this is precisely how it is now being put in America—both by politicians and among broad circles of the population. A public opinion poll just conducted by the ABC TV and THE WALL STREET JOURNAL revealed the following: The respect which Americans feel for the Soviet Union and its leader is declining. Of course, no two polls are the same. According to the data of other specialists who have studied public sentiments in the United States, Americans still advocate cooperation with the USSR. But THE WALL STREET JOURNAL sums up its poll as follows: "The attitude of U.S. inhabitants toward the Soviet Union is one of the casualties of the war."

The newspaper does not decipher that remark, but it may be assumed that the attitude has also changed, in particular, under the influence of the way in which our initiatives were presented in America—the initiatives which we undertook in the final hours before the start of the ground war and which many people here evaluated—I cite Congressman Hyde—as attempts to "undermine Bush's policy in the Gulf." It is now time, the congressman said, for Bush to stop worrying about undermining Gorbachev's positions.

However brilliant the victory in the war against Iraq, its impact, it seems to me, cannot be dragged out until the 1992 presidential election: By the time the voters set off to vote Bush will have to have to his credit something other than merely the routing of Iraq. And, to speak of foreign policy matters, the voters—particularly those originally from East European countries and the Soviet Union—will expect and demand of the presidential candidate a policy which takes greater account of the special features of the situation in and around the USSR.

Strictly speaking, the process of tuning into sentiments of this kind has already begun: Both the agreement on bilateral trade signed at the Washington summit meeting last June and the Paris agreement on conventional types of arms have virtually been frozen. The White House clearly does not now intend to submit them to the Senate for ratification. There is a serious question mark over the treaty on strategic arms, which was to have been signed back in December but which is still not ready. The summit meeting has been postponed.

What will the next step be? Secretary of State Baker's visit to Moscow, scheduled in the next few days, will evidently shed light on some things: The secretary of state will arrive in the Soviet capital after completing a tour of a number of Near Eastern countries.

Contrary to the forecasts which are already being made in America, I believe that "cold war" number two will, nonetheless, not come to pass. However, you have to be an irreproachable optimist to believe that our relations will be the same as they were just a few months ago.

Near East & South Asia

Belonogov Arrives in Tehran for Talks on Region

LD0603050191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0233 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Ravil Musin report]

[Text] Tehran, 6 Mar (TASS)—Aleksandr Belonogov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, arrived in the Iranian capital today on a visit at the invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. At Mehrabad Airport he was met by Mahmud Va'ezi, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In a statement to a TASS correspondent, the Soviet representative stressed that he arrived in Tehran in a positive, eager mood because an exchange of opinions with Iranian friends is always productive and frank. There is another reason that prompted him to respond to the invitation from his Iranian colleagues with such willingness; the natural need to exchange opinions on what is taking shape in Iraq regarding the crippling defeat of that country's Armed Forces. A qualitatively new situation has arisen that demands assessment, and furthermore, a balanced assessment based on a sober analysis of all the circumstances. The main thing is that an exchange of opinions is needed on how the situation will develop, mainly from the point of view of preventing the events of 2 August from recurring.

Practically all the countries in this region are feeling the need to set up reliable regional security, the USSR representative continued. Our point of view is that it is impossible to set up a reliable security system without the active participation of the United Nations. The United Nations, especially the Security Council, has

played a key role since the moment of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. The Security Council adopted 12 resolutions that became the basis for creating the conditions for the liberation of Kuwait and the return of independence and sovereignty to that state. It is completely logical to expect that, at present, following the completion of the military phase, the United Nations will do everything to get the region under control and set up a reliable security system. We also will discuss these issues with Iranian colleagues. I think the exchange of opinions will be mutually beneficial, stressed the USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs.

The present regional situation, Mahmud Va'ezi told the the TASS correspondnet, evokes many countries' concern, including those in the region, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Soviet Union. Close contacts aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement of the crisis were implemented between responsible figures in our two states right from the start. After military actions flared up, ways to end the war were examined during these contacts. Today, as new conditions have emerged in the region, according to the reports coming out of Iraq, the situation taking shape there evokes concern. The visit by the Soviet representative is taking place under these circumstances. In the course of the talks, issues will be discussed relating to the situation in Iraq, the preservation of its territorial integrity, the regional security problem, and the presence of foreign forces in the region, which we feel should leave. In these conditions, Iran and the Soviet Union are conducting the first contacts since the cessation of the war. We are exchanging opinions regarding what we can do jointly to return long-term peace and calm to the region, the deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated.

Commentary Urges Stable Government in Bangladesh

BK0503125591 Moscow International Service in Bengali 1300 GMT 1 Mar 91

[Commentary by Alesksandr Batev]

[Text] The parliament election in Bangladesh is over. Our correspondent Aleksandr Batev writes:

According to election results, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party [BNP] has won the majority by securing 140 seats so far. The Awami League has emerged as the second largest party with 34 [as heard] seats, while the Awami League-led alliance has secured a total of 95 seats. Former President Ershad's Jatiya Party has won 35 parliamentary constituencies, while Jamaat-i-Islami has wrested 17 seats. Some of the election results have been a surprise. First, no one expected Ershad's Jatiya Party to secure double the seats of Jamaat-i-Islami. [Words indistinct] about Jatiya Party. What is more interesting is that very few people expected Khaleda Zia'a BNP to win the election.

The election results have hit the Awami League alliance hard. The biggest alliance was confident it would secure the largest number of parliamentary seats. Awami League leader Hasina Wajed has alleged irregularities in the election. Such a statement by a defeated party, however, is normal. The foreign observer teams currently visiting the country to ensure a free and fair election soon will submit their report. But it is doubtful that there will be any change in the position of the two main rival alliances as a result of the observer teams' findings. There is a huge gap in the votes secured by the BNP and the Awami League.

The BNP undoubtedly will be invited to form the government. But the party is not in a position to form a government independently. Khaleda Zia's party probably will establish a coalition government with small parties such as Jamaat-i-Islami. In any case, the country's new government is expected to be quite stable. It should be emphasized particularly that a stable government in Bangladesh is very important after an era of political instability and crises. Political stability is especially needed to successfully deal with complicated problems such as eliminating poverty, lowering the unemployment rate, and raising the standard of living. Former military dictator Ershad's administration failed to solve these problems and this failure figured prominently in his downfall.

The people of Bangladesh, by assigning the responsibility of the administration to a democratically-elected authority, today hope the new government will be able to overcome these problems. The nascent democracy in Bangladesh will be endangered if this hope is belied. Aware of this responsibility, BNP Chief Khaleda Zia has called for cooperation among all democratic forces to stabilize the fruits of parliamentary elections. Let us hope that the call will not go unheeded.

East Europe

Yazov Interviewed on Troops in Eastern Europe

LD0403145991 Moscow International Service in Slovak 1800 GMT 3 Mar 91

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense, by Aleksandr Privakov; place and date not given; Yazov responses are in Russian fading to Slovak translation—recorded]

[Text] [Privakov] Foreign listeners asked us about reform in the Soviet Army and how to answer people who see in the Soviet soldiers a danger of return to a totalitarian regime.

[Yazov] I would like to say that the Army was created for peoples' protection. The Army will never take a stand against its people. Many people point out that it did so in Lithuania and Tbilisi. How is it possible? An action of a unit cannot be seen as an action of the whole Army. This is the first thing. Apart from this I cannot accept reproaches to the Army that people died as a result of weapons fired by the Army. Neither wounds nor pictures can show clearly who fired in the places mentioned. I

want to stress that the Soviet Army will serve the entire state and all its peoples. We have the wherewithal to defend and the wherewithal to protect against aggressors. The Soviet strategic means are in continuous state of combat readiness. Here I mean missile troops, nuclear submarines, and heavy bombers that are capable of using missiles with nuclear warheads. When we conclude the treaties, for example with the United States, we aim at excluding nuclear weapons. We know what they can cause and we how they can threaten all of mankind. The aim is to eradicate the stockpile of nuclear weapons and to guarantee a safe life to humankind.

There are also other means of mass destruction that also need to be eradicated. There are, for example, chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The Soviet Armed Forces are not a threat to any state and won't be in the future either. Why would they otherwise leave Eastern Europe and Mongolia? The USSR wants to have friends in the west, in the east, and the south. We have good relations with Iran, Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, and Britain. The world today is in such a state that we do not need to expect a great war. Naturally it is guaranteed that no state would succeed pushing a war on the world community.

[Privakov] What do you wish to all listeners around the world who have been listening to this bulletin?

[Yazov] Regardless of nationality, age, or sex, the greatest wish of them all might be to hear from a minister of defense, a military official, the wish for life and peace. Only peace can secure serenity, happiness, joy, and plentitude. A simple man, his family, and the entire world will not accept anything that leads to war. To live in peace means to achieve understanding and well-being. This will bring its fruit to all nations and to every individual family.

Czech Prime Minister Discusses Upcoming Visit

LD0503121391 Moscow TASS in English 1136 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Igor Shamshin and Anatoliy Shapovalov report]

[Text] Prague March 5 TASS—"I am gratified that my official visit to Moscow will be made at the invitation of the Government of the Russian Federation. I believe that Russo-Czech ties underlie Soviet-Czechoslovak relations," Petr Pithart, prime minister of the Czech Republic, told TASS on Monday.

Describing the aims of the visit, which will begin on March 6, the Czech leader described it as exceptional. "Historically we have had so many similar problems. This applies primarily to the economic transformation process during which destructive trends clearly manifest themselves," he said.

As regards prospects, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are now drawing closer together, not drifting apart, since complexities that have arisen in the economies of the two countries can be resolved only through joint efforts, he added.

Touching upon Soviet-Czechoslovak economic cooperation, Pithart said that the situation in this sphere was critical. "The main thing is to solve problems connected with mutual trade exchanges. To my mind, a transition to settlements between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in freely convertible currency was premature and ill-considered," he said.

Enterprises are unable to get dollars. Therefore, a desire to maintain trade on these principles is unrealistic, he said.

"We should think of exchanges of specific products. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union need each other. For example, we can satisfy a considerable part of Soviet market requirements for industrial goods, quite qualitative ones, although not as fine-looking as western-made ones," Pithart said.

"For our part, we need raw materials and other Soviet commodities," he said.

West Europe

British Prime Minister Major Visits Moscow 4 Mar

Pavlov Meets Major on Arrival

LD0403200191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1945 GMT 4 Mar 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 4 Mar (TASS)—John Major, the prime minister of Great Britain, arrived here today on a working visit at the invitation of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev. The high-ranking guest was met at the capital city's Vnukovo Airport by USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov.

Holds Talks With Gorbachev

PM0603110791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 91 Second Edition pp 1,2

[TASS report: "USSR President's Meeting With British Prime Minister"]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev personally acquainted himself 5 March with John Major, who has taken over Margaret Thatcher's tradition of new—frank, open, and benevolent—Anglo-Soviet relations. He confirmed his intention to improve these relations in mutual interests for the sake of Europe and the world. The president welcomed this as an important political statement.

It very soon became clear in the course of the conversation that the two leaders easily found a common language and reacted with understanding and respect to one another's approaches to highly diverse problems.

A considerable proportion of the conversation was devoted to the most pressing of these problems: those linked to the aftermath of the war in the Persian Gulf. M.S. Gorbachev provided information about the efforts that he made during the acute days of the crisis to prevent it from escalating and causing tremendous catastrophe for the whole world and to preserve the most valuable promising elements created in international relations over the last few years: trust, readiness to consider not just one's own interests, and joint responsibility for progress toward a new peaceful order. He voiced a high opinion of the contacts he has had in this period with leaders of many states and, particularly, the role which the new character of Soviet-U.S. relations and the personal mutual understanding between the USSR and U.S. presidents played in this most severe test for contemporary world politics.

They had a detailed exchange of opinions on immediate tasks connected with the ending of the war and Near East problems in general. They discovered a great deal in common. They agreed to maintain regular contacts at the Foreign Ministry level and do all they can to create the kind of security arrangements that would meet the interests of Arabs above all and other states here, along with the interests of the world community which merge in this key area of the world.

M.S. Gorbachev pointed out that world politics succeeded in passing the difficult test to a considerable extent due to the fact that fundamental decisions were adopted at the UN Security Council. At the present stage this approach alone will produce success. He emphasized in particular the inadmissibility of resuming the arms race here or of "competing" in an endeavor to get rich from supplying the area with fresh arms. That is ultimately fraught with the threat of another explosion.

While examining the disarmament process in Europe, they also examined the treaty on conventional weapons and armed forces. M.S. Gorbachev said that an intensive quest is under way for solutions to anxieties that have arisen. Touching on the prospects for the formation of all-European security mechanisms, he drew attention to signals that attest to an intention to reinforce NATO in every way possible instead of transforming it as promised. If we are talking about a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, military organizations must be viewed accordingly.

Answering J. Major, M.S. Gorbachev analyzed the West's reaction to events in the Baltics from the positions of the new thinking and with consideration for the profound changes in international relations which, one would have thought, necessitate a well-considered attentive approach—particularly when it is a question of a country like the Soviet Union, of fundamental democratic transformations, and of the series of major ordeals that the country is having to endure. At the same time, he appreciated the British prime minister's tact when speaking about processes in the USSR and his readiness to provide practical proof of his avowed support for perestroyka.

J. Major inquired about the present economic situation. He received detailed explanations, including with regard to the emergency measures being taken to stabilize the situation and ensure conditions for further progress toward the market in the course of profound economic reform.

Requests that emerged during the conversation on both sides will be duly examined.

The entire atmosphere of the meeting, the manner of the discussion, the sincere interest in one another, and the understanding of the role played by Anglo-Soviet cooperation make it possible to say that this first meeting between our leaders opens up good prospects for the future.

J. Major invited M.S. Gorbachev to Britain. M.S. Gorbachev suggested that the prime minister make an official visit to our country. He asked that very best wishes and an invitation to visit the USSR be conveyed to Margaret Thatcher, along with greetings to all Britons whom he has met and with whom he has cooperated.

Major Takes 'Firm' Stand

LD0503165291 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1614 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] Prime Minister John Major took a firm and aggressive line with President Gorbachev today when the two leaders met for four hours of intensive talks in the Kremlin.

Mr Major pulled no punches when he tackled the Soviet leader point blank on critical issues like the crisis in the Baltic states, and a suspicion that the Soviets were by-passing by unfair means the agreement on reduced conventional forces in Europe. The Soviet leader was more than a little taken aback by the tone adopted by the mild-looking prime minister, whom he had not met before. Mr Major's stance will almost certainly have increased his popularity at home and may well push up the Tory lead in the opinion polls to an extent that he may find a June election irresistible. On Thursday, the prime minister will have completed 100 days in office. And his performance today must rank, certainly in the eyes of the Tory party, as one of his most successful.

The prime minister later paid tribute to Mr Gorbachev, telling a crowded news conference: "He is a very formidable man, with a huge range of achievements behind him. I knew that before I came and I know it now." Mr Major, whose genial manner clearly disarmed Mr Gorbachev after the more boisterous style of Mrs Thatcher, agreed that although their discussions were at times intense, they were always enjoyable and not ill-humoured.

Earlier in the day, Mr Major held separate meetings with Moscow-based representatives of the Baltic states and with a group of so-called "influential liberals." The Baltic representatives claimed the Soviets were still using violence in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, but they all insisted they would seek independence through peaceful means. They pointed with satisfaction to the referendum each has held, which showed vast majorities of their populations wanted to break away. The liberals, for their part, were scornful about the way the Soviet Government was handling their economy. They said monetary policy was simply reduced to withdrawing high-denomination banknotes. Mr Major said he raised the issue of the Baltic states with Mr Gorbachev, and added: "I explained to him the dismay I felt and the West generally had felt about events in the whole of this region. I expressed also our hope that the way forward would be through negotiations." In response, Mr Gorbachev contested some of the issues raised about the Baltic situation, emphasising that he believed in resolving the matter in accordance with the Soviet Constitution.

During the meeting, Mr Major was no less firm on the question of reduced conventional forces in Europe. He suspects the Soviet Union has "switched" a large number of tanks from the army to the navy to ensure they do not count in terms of the Vienna agreement. There appeared to be no denial of this from Mr Gorbachev. The prime minister reported that the Soviet leader had agreed they must find solutions jointly "or there is no alternative".

The Middle East, however, dominated their discussions, and in particular the form of the post-war settlement in the Gulf. "The most encouraging point was the willingness of the Soviet Union to go on working with the Security Council in the coming days of the peace," Mr Major said. And Mr Gorbachev promised that if necessary he would help in securing the release of any British citizens held in Iraq.

Over lunch which followed the talks, Mr Gorbachev pledged that he was personally committed to continue with his reforms despite the setbacks and difficulties he has encountered. The prime minister invited the Soviet leader to visit Britain soon. Mr Gorbachev accepted, and reciprocated by asking Mr Major to return to the Soviet Union. Despite the intensity of the talks, Mr Major said he found personal relations with the Soviet leader easy. "I found it enjoyable as well as interesting, and I think we can say that the United Kingdom can continue to do business with Mr Gorbachev in a very satisfactory manner." The talks with Mr Gorbachev mean that Mr Major has in his brief span so far as prime minister met all the principal world leaders, including President Bush, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany and French President Francois Mitterrand.

Gorbachev Satisfied With Talks

LD0503123691 Moscow TASS in English 1217 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Lyudmila Shvedova and Andrey Pershin report]

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—A luncheon in honour of British Prime Minister John Major, on a one-day working visit to the USSR, was given on behalf of the Soviet president in the mansion of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow today.

Before the luncheon, President Gorbachev, answering questions from reporters, expressed satisfaction with the talk he had with Major. He said it was a candid and direct talk on a broad range of subjects. "We have used quite efficiently the time allotted for the talk," the president said.

The president was asked if the Baltic topic cropped up. As is known, outside the framework of his official programme Major met representatives of the Baltic republics today.

"We shall be conducting a quest for a solution that would be in the interests of the Union, of the Baltic republics and of all who reside there," Gorbachev said. The president said that this problem required special caution and a balanced approach. He said that the draft union treaty envisaged principles of self-determination of nations and a mechanism for their implementation.

Ignatenko on Talks

LD0503140991 Moscow TASS in English 1345 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Mikhail Ivanov, Aleksandr Kanishchev, and Leonid Timofeyev report]

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—Visiting British Prime Minister John Major was the first Western leader to hear President Mikhail Gorbachev's ideas on a post-war settlement in the Gulf, Soviet presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko told a briefing here today.

Speaking about the Soviet Union's participation in the Gulf settlement, Ignatenko noted that agreement has been reached on permanent contacts between the Soviet and British Foreign Ministries.

Ignatenko confirmed that the Soviet Union's position on the need to hold an international conference to resolve the problems in the Middle East, including the Arab-Israeli issue, had not changed.

The spokesman said that during the Anglo-Soviet talks and the working lunch today, Gorbachev and Major discussed European security and international problems.

During the lunch, Gorbachev told Major about the situation in the Soviet Union, including the situation in the Baltics. Ignatenko said the British premier had "received exhaustive answers."

Ignatenko said it was not strange that Major began his visit by meeting representatives of the Baltic republics. "It is normal. The prime minister of such a respectable country can meet anyone he wants," Ignatenko said. He added that Major's meeting with them was held beyond the framework of his working visit to the Soviet Union.

Ignatenko said the talks were "benevolent and sincere." "My personal conclusion is that relations between Gorbachev and Major are forming normally, and they may have already established very good relations," the spokesman said.

Pavlov Meets With Major

PM0603121391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 91 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] USSR Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov met with British Prime Minister J. Major in the Kremlin 5 March.

During the conversation, which took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding, their main attention was devoted to discussing the socioeconomic and political transformations being implemented in the Soviet Union and the prospects for developing Anglo-Soviet cooperation.

V.S. Pavlov described the tasks facing the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the urgent steps being taken by the government to stabilize the economic situation, improve the financial sphere, and shape new Soviet economic management structures geared to the market. Provision of social security for Soviet citizens is an indispensable condition for the implementation of reform. It was stressed that all this is closely linked with the creation of a renewed Soviet federation with the Union and republic governments consistently implementing steps that have already been agreed.

J. Major displayed keen interest in the processes taking place in the USSR. He confirmed the continuity of the British leadership's line of developing businesss cooperation with the USSR.

The sides noted with satisfaction the USSR-British partnership and broad cooperation in various spheres that are characteristic of the current stage of Soviet-British relations.

Yu.A. Kvitsinskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, and L.M. Zamyatin, USSR ambassador to Britain, took part in the conversation along with R. Braithwaite, British ambassador to the USSR, on the British side.

Yazov, Major View Security Issues

LD0503141191 Moscow TASS in English 1401 GMT 5 Mar 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov held a conversation with British Prime Minister John Major in his study today. Major is on a working visit to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet president, his first trip to the USSR as head of the British Government.

They discussed a broad range of international issues, above all their military-political aspects.

The sides examined in detail issues related to changes in the strategic situation in Europe, which is determined, specifically, by the termination of the activity of the Warsaw Pact's military organisation and the planned transformation of NATO's military strategy, which was announced by the NATO Council's London session in July 1990.

Yazov and Major exchanged views on the military-political situation in the Persian Gulf and possibilities of creating security structures in that region.

Major Meets With Shevardnadze

LD0603073891 Moscow TASS in English 0723 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—British Prime Minister John Major on Tuesday held a luncheon in the honour of president of the Soviet Foreign Political Association Eduard Shevardnadze.

They discussed the situation in the Gulf and a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East, including ways to create security structures in the region.

They also discussed the conventional arms in Europe treaty, the situation in the Soviet Union and international relations.

Major Holds News Conference

LD0503175891 Moscow TASS in English 1549 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and British Prime Minister John Major spent most of the day today discussing the Middle East and the post-crisis setup in the region, specifically, in the Gulf. Major made this remark at a news conference in Moscow saying it will be also the subject of further discussions.

Speaking in detail on some of the issues, the prime minister stressed the need to find solutions with regard to the forms of regional agreements, to ensure the interests of states in the region and their security.

Major opened the news conference by assuring the Soviet leader that allies were not going to keep their troops permanently in the Gulf.

Major also stressed that he and Gorbachev agreed on the desirability of preventing exports of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other types of weapons of mass destruction in the region.

President Gorbachev did not rule out the possibility of granting independence to the Baltics, Major continued.

The British prime minister said he set out at the talks with Gorbachev his personal and general disappointment in the West at the events in the Baltic republics in January this year and expressed hope that in future questions would be settled through talks.

According to Major, the Soviet leader disagreed with certain statements made in the West and pointed to difficulties which he encounters.

At the same time, Major pointed out, Gorbachev emphasised that he believes that the constitutional process would make it possible to solve these problems and that if these republics follow that path, independence may become a possible result. The British prime minister welcomed this statement by the Soviet president.

The position, which the Soviet Union held in the process of Gulf settlement, did not affect the relationship between Moscow and London and the governments of other allied countries that took part in combat operations against Iraq, Major said.

Asked if the Soviet peace initiative on the Gulf crisis had damaged Soviet-British relations, Major replied in the negative. He said British relations with the Soviet Union were not harmed. In all cases when the Soviet Union took part in the work of the U.N. Security Council, it supported its resolutions, including in the past few days.

Major said the nature of current discussions and the fact that he invited Gorbachev to visit Britain and Gorbachev invited him to come to the Soviet Union indicated that the two countries's relations were good.

Britain can continue to deal with Mr Gorbachev, while relations between the two countries may remain as cordial as they are today, Major summed up the results of his working visit to the USSR.

Speaking at the final news conference in Moscow today, the British prime minister described his programme of stay in Moscow as packed. He said he had two meetings with Soviet President Mihail Gorbachev, which continued for four hours, and also met Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov and Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov. In addition, he had a private meeting with representatives of Baltic republics in Moscow. After the news conference the British prime minister met former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

The key topic of his talks with Gorbachev was Middle Eastern settlement and the post-crisis settlement in the Gulf region. Major said the sides agreed that countries of the region should decide on the forms of regional agreements. He also added that allies were not going to keep armed forces permanently in the region.

Major said that he requested Gorbachev's aid in securing the release of prisoners of war in Iraq. According to him, the sides agreed on the desirability of retaining curbs on arms exports to the region, including nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons.

Speaking about the situation in the Baltic republics, Major expressed hope that in future questions connected with Baltic republics would be solved through talks.

Gorbachev believes that the constitutional process would make it possible to tackle these problems and stressed that if those republics follow that path independence can be a possible result, he said.

Major also said that he invited Gorbachev to visit Britain and received an invitation to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union.

Asked bluntly about Gorbachev's chances of survival, Major said Gorbachev was undoubtedly an outstanding man and politician who has achieved a lot. The British premier said he knew that before the visit and knows it now.

As for economic problems and perestroyka reforms in the Soviet Union in a broader plane, Major said he has no doubts whatsoever that Gorbachev advocated economic reforms. Of course, it would be a long, difficult road, and there will be undoubtedly setbacks.

The Soviet president's statement that he plans to implement these reforms sounds convincing, Major concluded.

Moscow TV Interviews Major

LD0503223991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2000 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Interview with British Prime Minister John Major by Vitaliy Ilyashenko on 5 March; place not given; all remarks in English with superimposed Russian translation—recorded]

[Text] [Ilyashenko] Mr. Major, when Margaret Thatcher was prime minister of Great Britain relations between our country were close and friendly, and relations between the leaders of both countries were particularly warm and confidential. Do you intend to carry on this tradition?

[Major] I hope that our relations will remain warm and friendly. I am convinced of this. This was one aim of my trip here. I have attentively followed the reform process taking place in the USSR. We welcome it and consider that this is exactly the direction to be going in. We consider support for reforms to be no less important. This concerns me just as much as it concerned Margaret Thatcher when she occupied the post of prime minister.

We will continue faithful support for the reform program, and as a result of this I hope that relations with the USSR will improve.

[Ilyashenko] Before leaving for Moscow you mentioned that you wanted to see with your own eyes what is happening in the USSR. Has your wish come true?

[Major] I have not seen very much, but I managed to talk about a lot of issues during my short visit. I had a meeting with President Gorbachev which lasted for approximately four hours. I had the opportunity to talk with the defense minister, with the prime minister and with representativs of the Baltic republics, as well as with radicals and liberals. Today I met Mr. Shevardnadze. These meetings have been very useful.

[Ilyashenko] I would like to ask you the following question. Your father once mentioned that when you were a boy you dreamed of playing cricket for the English national team, but you became prime minister instead. We know that you have great experience in the financial field. In your opinion, as prime minister, how could Britain assist the economic reforms in our country?

[Major] I think that economic reform is the key to perestroyka. If the economic reforms work, I have no doubt that they will produce results. Of course, there will be a very painful interregnum. There will be a transfer from a centralized economy to a market economy and of course there will be difficulties. However, the following point is important: If the USSR does not switch over to a market economy, then it will not be able to exploit its economic potential to the maximum. Your country will not be able to become what it could become, operating in a market economy. Therefore, this policy is correct. In the future, I can see many opportunities for setting up joint ventures between British companies and yours. We will facilitate this with technical consultations.

[Ilyashenko] Of course we must mention the subject of the situation in the Persian Gulf. In your view, what system of security should be created in this region? What does Great Britain intend to do to achieve this?

[Major] I think, in the first place, we need to determine what system of security the countries of the region themselves think they need. That's the first thing. One thing that is clear is that there will not be a permanent British or Western army in this region, although, of course, it is possible that troops from the Arab countries will be stationed there. I think that the five permanent members of the Security Council will discuss with the countries of the region how a general settlement can be achieved. Of course, this settlement must guarantee not just the security of the Persian Gulf states but it should also take the Palestinian problem into consideration.

[Ilyashenko] When you were elected leader of the Conservative Party and prime minister, you said that you were not the son of Margaret Thatcher and that you have your own priority programs. What are they? Would you mind telling us?

[Major] I have to tell you that I was a member of her cabinet. I agree with her policies and I remain a very close friend of hers. I admire her and I intend to go on implementing those reforms which she began. She followed a path of creating great opportunities for Great Britain, and we will follow the path which she followed for the previous 10 years.

[Ilyashenko] Very soon it will be 100 days since you came to power. This, incidentally, coincides with your birthday. What achievements can you congratulate yourself on as this jubilee approaches?

[Major] I do not really think that 100 days is a reason for congratulations. However, I do consider that during this time we have done quite a bit in the context of the European Community. We have lived through the war in the Persian Gulf, which loomed over all other problems. Now that the war is over, for all practical purposes, it is necessary to resolve other problems, such as the stabilization of the economy, the question of bank rates and so on.

[Ilyashenko] Let me congratulate you on your approaching birthday on behalf of Soviet television viewers.

[Major] Thank you.

Bessmertnykh on Importance of Visit

LD0503151491 Moscow TASS in English 1504 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—Responding to requests from journalists, Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh commented on British Prime Minister John Major's visit to the Soviet Union today.

The minister said that time came for the leaders of the two countries to reestablish personal contacts in order to preserve the atmosphere of good relations which took shape in recent years between the leaders of the USSR and Britain and are undoubtedly a stabilizing factor.

"Time is ripe for surveying all aspects of our bilateral relations, clarifying what need clarification and finding common approaches," the minister said. "Prospects are good, our opportunities plentiful, and much is being done to use them to our common advantage", he stressed.

Another aspect of the visit, no less important, Bessmertnykh pointed out, is European. Major arrived in the USSR on the day when the Soviet parliament ratified the first three treaties between the Soviet Union and Germany. "These documents," the minister stressed, "are the key link in the European process, a moment influencing the positive development of European affairs. This is why the significance of talks with the British prime minister is so great under conditions of major changes on the continent".

After German unification, many Europeans have begun to think about the fates of Europe and the fates of their own countries. We do so as well. We are becoming a European power more and more, and we seek to identify our own European interests," the minister said. He noted the stepping up of Soviet diplomatic efforts in recent months, especially in contacts with the Council of Europe and work with all East European countries.

"We are now at a stage of the European process when many lines have to be reconsidered and redefined anew". This calls for constant contacts between all major European powers, we must keep our clocks coordinated. In this respect, too, John Major's visit is most important," Bessmertnykh said.

Major Departs

LD0503195291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1921 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow, 5 Mar (TASS)—British Prime Minister John Major left the Soviet Union tonight at the conclusion of his one-day working visit.

USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov and other officials saw him off at the airport.

Visit Seen as 'Milestone'

LD0603115291 Moscow TASS in English 1312 GMT 6 Mar 91

[By TASS analyst Albert Balebanov]

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—To be sure, British Prime Minister John Major's one-day visit to Moscow was a milestone in the development of Anglo-Soviet relations.

Its outcome was expected: Major has, indeed, established good personal contact with President Mikhail Gorbachev, which is regarded as a continuation of the excellent relations that have existed between Soviet and British leaders over the past few years. This is bound to produce an important stabilising influence on world politics.

On the other hand, Major's visit allowed the sides to discuss a package of problems linked with the building of a new Europe. It is very important that the Soviet Union and Great Britain are prompted in their actions by feelings of mutual trust and readiness to bear reciprocal responsibility for the promotion of a new order on our continent.

These criteria were behind the mutual understanding displayed by the British premier and the Soviet president during the discussion of the Gulf situation and the Middle East issue as a whole. Their resolution to do their best to create a system of security in the region, which would satisfy primarily Arab interests, as well as the interests of other states in the region and the world community as a whole, is regarded in Moscow as a reassuring factor.

This is why Major's Moscow assurances that Great Britain does not intend to leave its forces in the Gulf are regarded as a positive contribution to the search for a peaceful, lasting and just settlement in the region.

The Moscow talks showed that the present British Government intends to support the ongoing reforms in the Soviet Union, that it has no intention to interfere with these reforms or to influence them. This is borne out both by the British prime ministers' pronouncements and the offic · statement made by Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hogg, made in the House of Commons when Major was completing his stay in the Soviet capital. True, the British prime minister linked British economic aid with the progress of Soviet reforms. But this can be understood. Nobody in the West wants to throw his money to the wind.

As to the events in the Soviet Baltic republics, which were discussed during the Moscow talks, it appears the British prime minister tried to approach them from positions of new political thinking. This can be judged from the statement made by permanent representative of the Latvian Council of Ministers at the USSR Cabinet Jan Peters after the meeting between Baltic emissaries and Major.

As reported by the ITN [Independent Television News] television company, Peters said the "British premier had the impression that we should seek a reasonable compromise through talks with Moscow".

It would be no mistake to say that Major's working visit to the USSR has laid the foundation, without which it would have been impossible to promote mutual understanding between the USSR and Great Britain. Now it remains to expound on the agreements.

BBC's Portrayal of USSR Criticized

PM0503141791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[A. Vladimirov article under the rubric "Beware: Disinformation!": "Whose Prompting?"]

[Text] British Prime Minister John Major's visit to Moscow is welcomed in the USSR. His country has always played a prominent role in world politics and so there is reason to attach hope to the British head of government's visit to Moscow. In the course of their talks the two sides will discuss a broad range of questions, and observers believe that the foundations will be laid for the further development of relations both in the political sphere and also in the sphere of mutually advantageous economic relations. It is perfectly natural to expect that there will be an in-depth study of the possibility of enshrining in international practice new

approaches based on the new political thinking and an examination of options for advancing along the path jointly elaborated by the European states last year and sealed at the Paris summit.

It is perfectly reasonable at such a moment to look at what view of our country and of Soviet domestic and foreign policy is developing on the foggy shores of Albion. Nowadays there is neither political nor technical jamming of Russian-language broadcasts by the BBC, the state radio broadcasting corporation. But if you listen to these broadcasts over a protracted period of time the question which involuntarily arises is: Is everything that is said about the Soviet state really the truth? How can we still be surviving and not have collapsed totally when we hear such "concentrated" information about how "the Union is falling apart," how "you can now call it a day for real reforms in the USSR," how there is "economic collapse?" Are the "vague hints" of the death of the Soviet state really going to continue to be dominated by so-called "black information?" Can the "broadcasters" from the BBC see no bright spots in our life? Why is it compulsory to hunt down information which prompts the listener to think that an apocalypse is inevitable? Not only prompts but openly inculcates. As just one example listen to the astonishing prediction made by somebody by the name of Chernova: "A civil war could begin in the Soviet Union, some people believe. It all depends on how the Army and the militia behave." There you have it, no more and no less. An "expert on the USSR," as BBC employee Malcolm Haslett calls himself, condemns the Soviet Government because Moscow is "playing with fire" in interethnic relations. Not to mention the carefully selected collection of people interviewed by BBC staffers—from "rights activists" and overt separatists to the inveterate liar and renegade Kalugin.

You involuntarily recall the 16 January PRAVDA article about the activities of British intelligence, "Skeletons in the Closet," which cites, among other things, the following SIS [Special Intelligence Service] revelation: "While making full use of our links with the press and the Foreign Office information and research department we must not abuse these channels and will have recourse more extensively to conventional propaganda organs for the dissemination of articles of disinformation..." You would have thought that in our time things like that should have become a thing of the past, should have disappeared. Oh, no! Perestroyka and the new thinking in the international information process have yet to affect BBC studios.

We remember Margaret Thatcher's kind words about our perestroyka and her wishes for success for our people. We hope that there will be no change in her successor's position.

The natural question is therefore: Are the differences between the BBC's approach to assessing processes in the USSR and the official viewpoint not too great?

Gorbachev, Kohl Discuss Treaty Ratification

PM0603105591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 91 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "M.S. Gorbachev's Discussion With H. Kohl"]

[Text] The president and the chancellor had a telephone conversation on the evening of 5 March. They exchanged opinions on the ratification of the Soviet-German treaties. H. Kohl voiced a high opinion of the USSR Supreme Soviet's ratification of three of these treaties. This is of tremendous significance for further progress in relations between our two peoples and two countries. M.S. Gorbachev described this act as an expression of common sense and of the understanding that these documents enshrine the new quality of our relations. Ratification reflects people's belief in the durability of the totally new historical phase in cooperation between Germany and the USSR.

They also touched on questions linked with the ending of the Persian Gulf war and certain aspects of bilateral economic ties.

Yazov, German Official Praise Treaty Ratification

LD0503115291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1030 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Oleg Moskovskiy report]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Mar (TASS)—Marshal of the USSR Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense, held a meeting today at the Defense Ministry in the Arbat with Vice Admiral Hans Joachim Mann, inspector of the FRG Navy, who is now in Moscow on an official visit.

It was stressed during the conversation that the ratification on Monday by the USSR Supreme Soviet of three of the five treaties between the USSR and the FRG, concluded September-November 1990, is extremely significant.

"The ratification of the treaties in the Soviet Union is a logical reaction to the large complex of problems posed by the process of German unification," Vice Admiral Mann stated in an interview to a TASS correspondent after the conversation with the USSR Defense Minister. He added that the USSR and the FRG have an excellent chance to "bring new meaning to another chapter in the history of German-Soviet relations."

According to Hans Mann, the ratification of the treaties has given both the Germans and the Soviet people "a historic chance finally to confirm their choice in favor of goodneighborly relations and cooperation." To waste this chance, according to the Vice Admiral, "would be senseless and dangerous. It would put the future of our children and grandchildren in jeopardy."

"I am glad that the right choice has been made, for it has determined the possibilities of a broad political and

economic cooperation between the FRG and the USSR", Vice Admiral Hans Mann stressed in conclusion.

Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chernavin, the Soviet Navy Commander in Chief, and Dr. Klaus Blech, FRG Ambassador to the USSR, were present at the discussion.

FRG's Genscher on Soviet-German Ties

LD0603135891 Moscow TASS in English 1325 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Mikhail Stepovik report]

[Text] Bonn March 6 TASS—"The ratification of the Soviet-German agreements is a historical event not only for Germans, but for all the nations of Europe," German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher told the Westdeutscher Rundfunk broadcasting station today.

"We have lately heard frequent pessimistic statements that Soviet foreign policy is beginning to change and the process will continue in the future," he noted. "However, it can certainly be said that President Gorbachev is firmly adhering to the course he initiated and does not intend to deviate from it. This is confirmed by the Soviet parliament's ratification of the Soviet-German agreements."

Asked whether the fact that the Supreme Soviet has not ratified, but merely approved the terms of the Soviet army's stay on German territory and the deadlines for its withdrawal, Genscher expressed the conviction that the Soviet Union would honour the fixed time limits.

"I believe we must not dramatise the changes now occurring in the Soviet Union," he noted. "We must realise that the Soviet Union has embarked upon the road of democratisation. Therefore, the discussions and sometimes even clashes over domestic and external policies are perfectly natural.

"Formerly we regarded the Soviet Union as a monolithic bloc without any leeway for free exchange of views. Today we must not evaluate this process as an expression of weakness. The main thing is that leading Soviet politicians, primarily Gorbachev, are firmly resolved to continue the started course.

"This is why there is every ground for asserting that the Soviet Union's foreign policy will remain unchanged," Genscher said.

German Response to Treaty Ratification Noted

PM0603141391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Mar 91 Union Edition p 5

[S. Guk report: "There Are No Losers; FRG Reaction to Ratification of Soviet-German Treaties"]

[Text] The "concern" generated by the "keen debates" in the USSR Supreme Soviet was replaced with a "sigh of relief" when the report came in of the ratification of three of the five treaties submitted for approval. Naturally, the most important thing for the Germans was the treaty "on a definitive settlement with regard to Germany," which draws a line under the past war and guarantees full sovereignty for the FRG.

"A message of hope and peace for Europe" was how Chancellor H. Kohl described this event. Henceforth, he stated, there are every grounds for hoping that the peoples of the two countries can build their relations in the future as good neighbors and partners.

It was thanks to the policy of reforms pursued by President Gorbachev that relations between East and West have undergone profound changes and the unification of Germany has become possible, FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher stressed. At the same time the minister noted that the USSR president's forward-looking policy is encountering resistance and criticism from conservative forces in the country.

This motif can also be heard in German press commentaries. We shall cite just one statement: "The keenest critics are some deputies with the rank of colonel; because of their massive objections, the agreement on the withdrawal of troops has been only 'approved.' Their intention can be clearly discerned: It should be improved technically and possibly also financially," an ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG commentary says. And nonetheless "in foreign policy Mikhail Gorbachev remains a known quantity. The problem-free ratification impressively confirms that the decisive word in Moscow—counter to pessimistic forecasts—belongs to the president" (RHEIN-ZEITUNG).

The ratification of the treaties is assessed in the FRG as "an act of historical importance." "The Supreme Soviet," SUEDWEST PRESSE writes, for instance, "has done the most sensible thing under the conditions of the new situation in Europe, placing relations with Germany on a normal, equitable basis." In which, let us add, we are no less interested than the Germans.

Well, after 45 years in the former GDR the Soviet troops will return home and the West will strengthen its positions still further? By no means: "The withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the reduction of the bundeswehr's numerical strength will be synchronized. Mutual interests have always been the best mutual guarantees of security"—that is the opinion of the newspaper HESSISCHE-NIEDERSAECHSISCHE ALLGEMEINE.

There is scarcely anything to be added to that statement.

Western Group Commander on Withdrawal Process

LD0603105491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0036 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Vyacheslav Katyayev report]

[Text] Moscow, 6 Mar (TASS)—The USSR has a firm intention to proceed along the road of full implementation of the treaties and agreements which were signed with the FRG in 1990, including the provisions on the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from the territory of the former GDR. It is a complex task—a total of 388,000 servicemen are to be withdrawn in a four-year period, a total of 500,000 people together with members of families, and 112,000 items of military equipment. This was reported on Tuesday by Col.-Gen. Matvey Burlakov, commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Forces [WGF], at a news conference in Berlin.

He stressed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops has already started and is being carried out in line with the plan that was worked out. In particular, 30 percent of WGF personnel, 32,000 armament units, as well as 700,000 tonnes of supplies are to be relocated to Soviet territory, mainly to the regions of the Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, and Volga. Similar scales and rates of Soviet troop withdrawal will be ensured in 1992-1993.

The German side, on the whole, has a constructive approach to the tackling of the problems linked with troop withdrawal. The mechanism of interaction in tackling legal, property, transport, ecological, and other issues is being improved within the framework of the work of a joint Soviet-German commission. Cooperaiton with federal and laender authorities in the FRG, its population, and the "Vostok" Bundeswher command is being carried out on a businesslike basis. Open days which are held regularly in Soviet garrisons help to strengthen mutual understanding and the spirit of good-neighborliness. A department for public relations work has been set up in the Western Group of Forces for establishing closer ties with German public and mass media.

At the same time, noted the commander in chief, the implementaion of the planned withdrawal of Soviet troops is encountering major problems. The first of these is the refusal by the Polish authorities to permit the withdrawing Soviet military units and subunits ito pass through its territory. The Polish side is demanding the payment of huge sums of money for this and is setting other conditions. Burlakov stated that for our people this stance is simply incomprehensible, if one recalls that over 600,000 Soviet sons and daughters laid down their lives for the liberation of Poland from the fascist invaders. For this reason the withdrawal is having to be carried out by sea and air, where much depends on weather conditions. This requires 1.5-2 times more financial resources.

The second problem lies with housing. According to a treaty with the FRG, the Colonel-General noted, the German side pledged to build 36,000 apartments in the Soviet Union for Soviet servicemen due to be withdrawan. However, in order to satisfy fully the need for housing, an additional 19,000 apartments are also required as, for example, 55,000 soldiers and warrant officers of the WGF have no roof over their heads at all in the Soviet Union. The money received as compensation for the movable and immovable property of the WGF handed over to the German side as stipulated in one of the treaties, could be used for construction. All in all, the Soviet Army built 21,000 different installations with a total cost of 10.5 billion marks in what was the GDR. To date, the WGF has already put at the FRG's disposal 40 military cantonments costing 800 million marks. But the West German authorities are in no hurry to compensate for expenditure in this area. In order to assist this, a section is being set up in the WGF to sell movable and immovable property.

The commander in chief went on to voice the hope that the German side would also demonstrate a constructive approach in resolving such matters as: the protection of Soviet servicemen from unlawful actions by certain members of the German population, in particular from attacks on sentries and patrols, including with the aim of seizing weapons; and also the return of Soviet servicemen who have gone absent from their units without leave for various reasons.

Belonogov, Austria's Mock Discuss Gulf

LD0503210391 Moscow TASS in English 1949 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Vladimir Smelov report]

[Text] Vienna March 5 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Belonogov met Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock here today.

The sides discussed the situation in the Gulf, prospects for post-war developments in the region and the situation in the Middle East. They pointed to the important role played by the United Nations in restoring justice and international order and in returning sovereignty and independence to Kuwait.

They stressed that the U.N. and the Security Council, chaired now by Austria, are called upon to take active participation in turning that explosive area into a zone of stability, good-neighbourly relations and advantageous cooperation.

The earliest possible settlement of the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict, together with the final solution of the Kuwaiti crisis, should be an important element of a future security system in the region.

Supreme Soviet

KGB Chief Addresses Supreme Soviet

LD0503160991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1427 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow, 5 Mar (TASS)—The text of the address by Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the USSR KGB, at the [5 March] USSR Supreme Soviet session, follows below:

First of all, allow me to express my gratitude to the USSR Supreme Soviet for finding it possible, despite the heavy agenda, to submit the draft law on state security bodies in the USSR for examination in the current session.

There is great need for this law. We professionals need it and society needs it. The state security bodies cannot work without firm foundations for their activities laid down by law. In the conditions of building the law-governed state to which we aspire, adopting such a law is an important guarantee of observance of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens. I am sure that with the adoption of the law the effectiveness of the work of Chekists will be enhanced and the country's state security will be more reliably reinforced.

Perestroyka has cardinally changed the work of KGB bodies; it has demanded reinterpretation of many directions of our activity and had led to considerable organizational and structural transformations.

However, radical restructuring of the legal regulation of their activity in conformity with the principles of the socialist legal state, while ensuring the supremacy of the law and guarantees of the protection of the interests of society and every individual, is necessary at the contemporary stage.

The functions of the KGB bodies up to the present time have been determined by the statute on the Committee for State Security, approved in March 1959 by the USSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee. However, that statute and the majority of norms adopted subsequently do not correspond to the spirit of the time, to the new tasks that the state security bodies are called upon to resolve.

It should be noted in particular that the statute and the majority of normative acts issued in accordance with it are of a secret nature. At the same time, everybody understands that the activity of the KGB bodies, as of any law enforcement body, touches upon the rights of citizens when need be. Consequently, such activity may be regulated only by law; moreover, by a law that is public for all.

The absence of a law defining the powers of the KGB bodies, of full and objective information about their competence, is giving rise to negative social repercussions and creating grounds for unsubstantiated attacks.

The draft law that has been presented for examination is the result of the labor of a large number of specialists.

Members of a number of ministries and departments, of the Council of Ministers, as well as of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, took part in its preparation. Significant assistance in our work on it has been given by members of many committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, law-enforcement bodies, and academic establishments. Also, it has been examined in a number of Union republics.

While the attitude to the law has on the whole been positive, a number of remarks and suggestions have been received. For example, some comrades voiced their doubts concerning the appropriateness of adopting a law on state security bodies, since, according to the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 15 February 1990, the Ministry of Justice, together with the departments concerned, is currently elaborating a draft law on the state security of the USSR. Do we need two laws in one and the same area of administration?

Such a question has also arisen at the current session finalizing the agenda. Our opinion is that we do need them.

The law on state security bodies in the USSR and the law on state security carry social and legal emphases that differ in their level and tendency.

The law on state security of the USSR should juridically reinforce the concept and principles of guaranteeing the country's security and the whole system of measures linked with tackling this task and should create a legal foundation for interaction between all those involved in guaranteeing state security, starting from the supreme authority and ending with the bottom levels of management. As for the law on the security bodies, here legal regulation is more local in nature and is linked with strengthening the place and role of the state security bodies in the mechanism of a socialist, law-governed state.

According to one opinion, laws should not be adopted on the security bodies, the militia, on state secrets, and other matters until an all-embracing concept of the country's security has been drawn up. In this connection, I would like to say the following.

Esteemed deputies, no one is disputing the importance of and need for such a concept to be drawn up scientifically. The scientific research subdepartments and other subdepartments of the KGB have recently been tackling this problem. The main tenets of the theses of the security concept prepared by the group of USSR people's deputies were taken into account when the draft law on the state security bodies was being drawn up. Furthermore, if the norms of the draft currently under examination are compared with the aforementioned theses, then one can state that the draft law not only does not

contradict the preparatory concept set forth there, but is indeed fully in accordance with its fundamental positions.

The whole question, however, lies in the fact that drawing up such a concept and, in particular, finally acknowledging it, is a long-term process. Years will be needed here, not just months. But one must take action today, decisive action, in the conditions of the most grave crisis in the country. Can we really restrict ourselves to waiting for theoretical developments, avoiding taking urgent measures to achieve the tasks of strengthening legality and law and order that have been laid upon us by parliament, the president, and the government of the country?

There is another idea, too, comrades, which is in greater degree a moral and psychological order. One cannot fail to take account of the fact that the mass repressions in which the security bodies were involved during the period of the cult of personality cast a shadow upon our time, too.

This burden of the past is being acutely felt by the new generation of Chekists. We constantly stress that the Soviet people must be convinced that similar lawlessness will not be repeated either today or in the future. But serious though they may be, these are only words. It is the law that must give reliable legal guarantees and clearly define the mechanism of accountability of the bodies of state security and of the constant monitoring of their activity.

Allow me now to dwell on some clauses of principle in the draft.

First of all I would like to note that the draft law, it seems to us, covers all the basic aspects of the legal regulation of the activity of the state security bodies, taking into account the peculiarities of the current development of our society and the demands arising from the principles of constructing our socialist, law-based state. For the first time a law that will be published lays out the main lines of the activity of the state security bodies and their obligations and rights.

All this will give our officials the opportunity to act on a firm, legal basis and remove the elements of uncertainty that have inevitably arisen as a result of the lack of legal regulation of many sides of their work. The new law will give Soviet people the chance to have a clear idea of what the state security bodies are called upon to do and what actions by their officials are lawful. That is nothing other than public control: In this way the status of glasnost in the activity of the state security bodies will become something legally established rather than something done for effect.

The genuine legal protection of officials of the state security bodies or persons giving them help, and their close relatives, is of no small importance in the matter of improving the efficiency of the state security guarantee and of the fight against crime. These questions too have been reflected in the draft law.

In the process of implementing such an important and highly specific state function as the security guarantee, one comes up against a multiplicity of secret forms and methods of intelligence and subversive activity by special services. Naturally, in combating these, our intelligence and counterintelligence cannot get by without the use of special methods. Nor can one get by without such methods in uncovering particularly dangerous state crimes and in the fight against organized crime and corruption.

It must be noted that the state security bodies, as bodies of inquiry, have already been given the right to use technical methods by the criminal procedure legislation in criminal cases that are being brought to trial. As for the special methods and means used in operational investigation activity, well, comrades, without them it is simply impossible to conduct an effective battle against the special services of foreign states and corrupt and criminal organizations.

We already discussed earlier the secret helpers of the state security bodies in the USSR Supreme Soviet and in the media. I must say that quite a number of outstanding Chekist operations, which many of you know about from books and films, were carried out with their cooperation and participation. The efficient functioning of our intelligence and counterintelligence services would be inconceivable without the support of our citizens' help. I am in agreement: This is an issue of some delicacy, but I must speak of it, in the same way that I must speak of the patriotism of those, risking a great deal, who offer assistance to the Chekists. This is helping the state and society in the battle against the most serious crimes. The adoption of this law will eliminate the fabrications about secret helpers put out by some of the media, fabrications that have nothing in common with the true state of affairs in this area.

It must be noted that the establishment and the functioning of the special services and their use of secret work methods, and in particular the institution of secret helpers is not an invention of our age.

With the development of state-political structures and the broadening of political, military, and economic rivalry and confrontation between states, special services and the methods and means that they use have developed and improved.

The special services that today are working against us possess the necessary covert apparatus and a huge arsenal of up-to-date technical means developed on the basis of the latest scientific achievements. The right for the special services of almost all countries of the world to make use of various covert methods and means is controlled by special laws, and they make no secret of this from their citizens. Quite the reverse, the laws of many countries make it incumbent upon citizens to do

all they can to assist the special services and in doing so to keep secret any information they may learn.

I cite just a few extracts from British, FRG, and U.S. legislation.

Great Britain's 1985 law on the interception of communication lines, while generally prohibiting the interception of dispatches in transit through the mail or by other means of communication, does allow such interception if necessary: "in the interests of national security, to prevent or detect a serious crime; or to protect the economic welfare of the United Kingdom."

The 1968 FRG law "on the limitation of the secrecy of correspondence, postal dispatches, and telephone communications" allows the federal and land departments for the protection of the Constitution, the directorate of the Bundeswehr security, and the federal intelligence service, to open and look through correspondence protected by the statute on the secrecy of correspondence and postal dispatches and to listen to radio-telephone conversations and record them on a sound recording medium."

The U.S. law on the observation of activities of foreign intelligence agencies, defining the right of special services to carry out electronic eavesdropping, states that "no postal service, its functionary, official or agent, home owner, watchman, or any other person has the right to reveal the fact of the interception of information or of observation, or of the presence of a device by means of which information is intercepted..." "Any violation of this paragraph...will lead to civil liability in accordance with the legislation of the United States."

I think that the above proves convincingly enough that the draft law that has been presented conforms to the demands, as the saying goes now, of international standards. It is another matter that an effective mechanism of control [kontrol] over the use of special resources should be elaborated to ensure that they do not inflict damage upon society and do not encroach groundlessly upon the honest person's legitimate rights and freedoms. The draft law provides for the clear legal foundations for the sanctioning and use of such means.

The draft law contains a separate section on monitoring the work of the state security bodies by representative organs of power and government, the procuracy, financial agencies, and other state and public structures.

Comrades! The project gives a prominent place to consolidating the ideas of the sovereignty of the USSR and of Union republics. A system of state security bodies is defined, with distribution of functions between the USSR KGB and republican bodies on the basis of the principles of federalism.

Ensuring the security of a union state requires that a unified state policy be conducted, which in turn should create favorable conditions for guaranteeing the rights and interests of USSR citizens, whatever corner of our federation they may live in, and for protecting them from arbitrariness based on regional interests that we have regrettably been coming across of late.

The most important thing is to find a sensible combination of centralization in provision of state security and of giving the necessary rights to the entities of the federation. During the drafting of the new Union treaty, the experts of a number of Union republics who were taking part in the talks approved of the idea of the delegation of part of the powers in guaranteeing state security to the Union bodies. At the same time, the republics keep the right to decide independently on a wide range of problems affecting the interests of their security.

With these circumstances in mind, the draft law distinguishes between the powers of the USSR KGB and the republican state security bodies, singling out groups of issues that are under the jurisdiction of the USSR KGB, under the jurisdiction of the republican bodies, and under the joint jurisdiction of the center and the provinces.

I must mention the fact that during work on this draft alternative versions were considered. All that was valuable and rational in them was taken into account in the final text of the draft presented to you. One can say without exaggeration that the draft law on the state security bodies is the product of collective work and has absorbed the progressive views and approaches that are incorporated these days when new fundamental normative acts are drawn up.

In our view, the draft law on the state security bodies in the USSR presented for your examination corresponds to the spirit of the processes under way in our country. Its adoption will be a serious guarantee of the protection of the interest of the state, of society, and of its members, and will promote the strengthening of legality, discipline, and law and order.

Kryuchkov Answers Deputies' Questions

LD0503233491 Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian 1939 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Remarks by Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, chairman of the USSR KGB, in reply to deputies' written questions at the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow on 5 March; from the "At the USSR Supreme Soviet" program—recorded]

[Text] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak: Does this new law stand in the way of various political parties setting up their structures in the state security bodies? No, it does not stand in the way—we proceed from this. Of course we are referring to parties that have been officially registered.

What is your personal attitude to the fact that some border guards are posing the question of dividing the functions of the state security bodies and the border troops?

The question has been formulated vaguely. I have not heard of the border guards having posed the question of leaving the state security bodies as a system, or as a committee. I think that we are complementing one another well. Moreover, we will become weaker immediately. The efficiency of work will decline.

It will be cheaper for the state only if we start breaking up into parts.

I know that on this score there are various points of view. The overwhelming majority of the letters we receive does not welcome the idea of a division in the state security bodies as a system or as an organization.

Article Six proclaims the impermissibility of violating citizens' rights and liberties on the pretext of ensuring state security. In this case, is the legal protection of citizens' rights from a possible violation of this provision envisaged? What is the court's operating mechanism in this case? Is it guaranteed access to KGB materials? What are the possibilities of the lawyer? Should these issues be regulated in the law in question? Ryabchenko.

Comrades, all our country's legislative acts, including criminal law and criminal procedures law, apply to staff members of the state security bodies. What is more, when we speak of staff members' duties and rights, I wanted to stress the following: rights also involve responsibility—and not a small one—because all this is being regulated within a certain framework. That is why I think that fears are unfounded here.

How do you view handing over to the Ministry of Internal Affairs the functions of combatting crime, protecting the Constitution, and others which the KGB did not have previously? Why does the KGB need troops?

Well, first, as regards combatting crime. You know that the Supreme Soviet has instructed us, for instance, to engage in combatting economic sabotage, and we are now vigorously engaged in this. Another matter: its efficiency is so far insufficient. It seem to me that there are crimes, and then there are crimes. What do you think: the deal, some call it the deal of the century, regarding the exchange of dollars for rubles—140 billion rubles—does this affect security interests, or not? I must say that this is not the only case occupying us of late. What is more, the fact is that organized crime is growing. Entire groups of criminals are being formed covering not just individual regions but several regions, and go beyond the borders of the Soviet, beyond the boundaries of the territory of the Soviet Union, with the state security interests of our state as a whole being affected, because huge economic damage, let alone moral damage, is being inflicted.

I think, therefore, that it will never be too late to reject the state security bodies' engaging in the fight against crime, and especially against its most dangerous forms. When we embark on the phase of peaceful law-abiding life, when we are not so much troubled by crime, it may be possible to decide to return to the question, but the state security bodies have always handled the fight against individual criminal acts. It is now terrorism, smuggling, currency operations, and so on.

Why does the Committee for State Security need troops? Well, as you know from the draft law, a proviso is made there concerning the presence of troops. What is meant? There are border troops—some 218,000 men. There are government troops to handle communications. There are engineering and technical troops, and there are special purpose troops. The point is that at present we are confronted by a situation that we did not have previously. Take the situation on the border. We never had a situation where tens of thousands of our citizens illegally crossed the borders into a contiguous state; and on the other hand, tens of thousands of people have crossed over from there, at the same time, into the territory of our country. This creates a very dangerous situation—not only in the border strip directly, or in the border zone, but also in more extensive areas. I will say that last year, for example, we experienced very dramatic moments. If, let us say, our border troop comrades had not held firm, a lot of blood might have been shed. We held firm, although there were losses. There were losses on our side.

So what is to happen now? At present, the position is marked by very intense conflict over interethnic relations. They are assuming a sanguinary character. You know, not a single day goes by without our receiving a report from somewhere about the killing or wounding of people living in particular regions. These situations may slip out of control one fine day, and take on a very dangerous scale. Special troops are needed for this. We maintain them. Moreover, their activities are regulated by a decree of the president of the Soviet Union. We have long operated together with the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and I think that the legislative enactments regulating their activities fully ensure their legal functioning.

As for the system—that is, what sort of law is needed first, one on a global security system, or one on the state security bodies?—I think this is, of course, a serious matter, and it deserves attention, but I must tell you bluntly that, if we were to act like that today—that is, with a global law on the state security system first and one on the bodies later—I think that we would not have a law on the state security bodies for some years hence.

I will cite the example of Western countries. In the United States of America, a law on national security was adopted in 1947. Two years later, a law on the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency was adopted, or rather several modifications of it and its development as a system. After that, the president of the United States of America and the Congress issued more than one document on the security system. But they have still not created an in-depth, thorough, broad, and global law on the security system of the United States of America because it is an incredibly complex matter.

Deputy Ryzhkov has spoken here and specified a number of aspects that form part of a system of general security. I can specify dozens and dozens more that have to be taken into account, to say nothing of the fact that that global law will touch on the activities of not only the Committee for State Security, but also the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and all the departments, local bodies, and so on. I must say that probably more than one comradely team of lawyers and non-lawyers, economists, and other scientists will be working on this concept, so that if we were now to set off along that road, I assure you that sooner or later, and probably sooner rather than later, we would return to the law that we are discussing today.

On depolitization and departization [removing CPSU cells from various organizations]. You know, there is Article 16 of the law you have adopted. We believe this was a just law and a just article. We proceed from this article, and are guided by it. Therefore, if you, say, adopt another law, abolish Article 16 or alter it, we will act differently. But in my view we are also in this case dealing with human rights. After all, who deprives an individual of the right to be member of a party, to work, say, in the Ministry of Defense, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security Committee? You have not deprived the individual of such a right. Consequently, we act accordingly.

Incidentally, I draw your attention to a feature of our draft law on state security. In it, for the first time in the entire history of our jurisprudence, in the entire history of state security bodies, human rights and the interests of the individual have been given a central place, a top priority. We proceed from this.

I would like to say several words about the Union-republican nature of our law. This is a very serious issue. From the very start we have had a Union-republican draft. I think that (?Aleksandr Aleksandrovich) will not be offended, but I will say now that we had a conversation once to the effect that, ultimately, our Union needs certain Union-scale pivots. The idea emerged of developing a law on security bodies of Union importance, vertically, from top to bottom, and from bottom to top. Many comrades came out with this idea; we pondered upon it for a long time, and thought it was correct. But when we started working on a new draft union treaty, when that span of sovereignties being proclaimed started, and when we entered a new phase in our development, we came to the conclusion that perhaps we should stick to the line of Union- republican system of state security bodies, and we went along it.

But you have noticed that we have established a fairly strict subordination, and a strict delimitation. We have Union powers—take intelligence and counterintelligence—that cannot be solved without a Union body. Then we have joint powers, and we have separate republican and local powers. In my view, we have managed (?to carry this out). True, there are certain repetitions there, and you have noticed them. But I think that perhaps we will not manage without repetitions in this area. Well, in any case, we should ponder preserving the Union aspect of state security bodies, after all. Therefore we believe that there should be a single budget. Finally, for our state it will be the same amount of money, but if we divide up the budget, the result will be bad. Further, sometimes local bodies try to help us materially, with money. We refuse to accept this on principle, wholly apart from issues of social and domestic provision, because here, too, there is a very serious issue. Therefore one must absolutely have certain values.

How can the system of state security bodies be inscribed within the Soviet state? I think this is a very important issue, and I think that the promulgation of this law and some articles of this draft law solve this problem to a degree. But indeed we have yet to enter the system of Soviet statehood, and we must do this both by this law and by corresponding legally binding enactments.

There is yet another circumstance, which is the control that has been mentioned very much here. Control over state security bodies is necessary. It should be daily, it should be along the government's, the Cabinet of Ministers', along the Supreme Soviet's line, naturally, while observing secrecy measures. We welcome the establishment of a subcommittee for the issues of intelligence within the system of the Defense and State Security Committee. We have experience of the work of such subcommittees in a number of captialist countries, and I think it is not so harmful as to be unfit for use.

Chambers Discuss Enterprise, Consumer Laws

PM0603102591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1,2

[A. Stepovoy and S. Chugayev report from the Kremlin: "Law for Entrepreneurs Under Preparation"]

[Text] To all appearances, the usual routine legislative activity was going on within the walls of the Union parliament 26 February. The deputies, who had split into their separate chambers, were, with very few exceptions, discussing the draft Law on the General Principles of Enterprise in the USSR in fairly placid tones. There is no doubt that this will be remembered as an important day in USSR Supreme Soviet history. For on this very day our deputies made the first serious attempt to move from ideological arguments to direct action in organizing our country's transfer to a market economy.

For many decades, "entrepreneur" was a term of abuse in our country. The only legal act to mention the concept of "private property" was the Criminal Code. Now enterprise is being given the status of legal activity.

So what is in the draft of the document, whose principles, in the words of USSR First Deputy Prime Minister V. Velichko, have fundamental economic, political, and social significance?

First, freedom of enterprise is an integral part of market regulation mechanisms. Second, this legal act will make it possible to guarantee the implementation of the general policy to develop democracy in our country, when the individual, his rights and freedoms are of paramount importance in all relations. Third, developing enterprise gives people tremendous opportunities to make fuller use of their knowledge, skill, and willingness to work and secure normal living conditions.

The draft law defines the basic characteristics of enterprise. Thus, enterpreneurial activity aims to saturate the market with various types of of goods and services. Citizens themselves engage in such activity on their own behalf, at their own risk, and assuming full material liability.

This legal act has been drafted in such a way as to offer entrepreneurs broad options when organizing their activity. They can work independently or involve other workers; they can use their own property, or property obtained and used on a legal basis. An entrepreneur can form an enterprise, whereupon its activity is regulated by the USSR Law "On Enterprises in the USSR." Or he can refrain from acquiring status as a legal entity and simply register as an entrepreneur.

Entrepreneurs will be able to use hired labor. They enjoy the same rights as all other participants in economic life. Not only can they organize their own affairs and set up an enterprise, but they can also acquire assets from other people, including state enterprises. After registering, they can open bank accounts, engage in various kinds of transactions, and freely dispose of any profit remaining after tax. They have access to the state social security and insurance system. Likewise, they can appeal to the courts in the event of state or other organs infringing their rights and interests.

Naturally, there can be no rights without obligations. The entrepreneur is answerable to citizens working for him on a hired basis. A contract or agreement must be concluded between employer and employee, and state insurance must be provided. The entrepreneur is obliged to make state social insurance contributions at levels fixed by Union and republic legislation, and to observe all the demands and rules pertaining to working conditions and labor protection.

The law stipulates the entrepreneur's full material liability for his actions.

Entrepreneurial activity cannot be halted by administrative procedure. There are only two ways of halting operations: Either the entrepreneur winds up his business himself, or this can be done by the court.

The Soviet of the Union's discussion of this draft law was interesting and constructive. Only a few of the 22 participants rejected the idea of this document outright, and then mainly for ideological reasons.

P. Bunich, deputy chairman of the Committee for Economic Reform Questions, set the tone for the discussion. In particular, he tried through concrete examples to dispel fears surrounding such "capitalist" terminology as "the hiring of labor" and "the exploitation of labor." The deputy noted that these concepts are by no means synonymous. Puerto Ricans, Yugoslavs, and Turks work in many countries where the hiring of labor in fact runs parallel—if not coincides—with the exploitation of labor. There are countries where to hire labor does not necessarily mean to exploit it. It is simply that the enterprise director must have a specific minimum number of workers to justify his own elevated director's wage. For example, a marshal who expects an easy life at the expense of his platoon of soldiers would, given the high salary he receives, be exploiting them. However, a marshal who does his job and commands the army is just as vital to the army as the army is to him. To be constantly associating the "hiring of labor" with "exploitation," P. Bunich said, is to remain a prisoner of archaic and totally unfounded norms.

A. Boyko also dedicated a significant part of his speech to those with lingering doubts who feared an increase in the exploitation of people. Marx' main idea was to stop workers being alienated from the means of production, he said. In our efforts to solve this problem, we mistakenly introduced state ownership across the board, which has proved not to be the way to overcome alienation but the contrary, in fact. The practise of recent years (whereas we still think of capitalism as it was 100 years ago and in Marx' time) reflects a marked evolution toward amalgamating workers with the means of production on a mass scale. Through small business and enterprise, tens of millions of people have become masters of their own affairs. And many of them do not have their sights on becoming capitalists or acquiring other enterprises; they just prefer to run their own affairs. On the other hand, large-scale buyups of collective property can be seen. This is also a way of amalgamating, as are mass shareholding schemes. The deputy concluded: Capitalism is evolving in exact accordance with Marx—it is inclining toward amalgamation. The time has come for us to seek such forms for amalgamating all workers with the means of production, and not just in words but in deeds.

Yet again the two-man band from Kharkov—N. Ternyuk and L. Sukhov—made their views known to the session. This time they rejected fairly sharply the very idea and logic of adopting the said law. Deputy N. Ternyuk is convinced that the Supreme Soviet is setting in motion yet one more "channel" for crime, as was the case with the cooperatives. However, Deputy L. Sukhov, saying there was no need for this law, stated the following as his main argument: Today some people already imagine that they will have servants and people to look after them....

Deputy S. Kalashnikov responded quite convincingly to those who have this kind of mentality. Let's stop screaming those fine words: We will protect the people

from hired labor! And he suggested: Let's go to "McDonald's" and ask any of the young people there if he wants to leave. After all, this is a hired laborer. This young lad will explain everything to you immediately. The people who work there have made a free choice to do so, and neither you nor I have the right, as has been the case for the last 70 years, to decide for these people—to tell them how to think.

The Soviet of the Union resolved that the law should be approved on its first reading and, after being honed in conjunction with the Cabinet of Ministers, should be submitted for its second reading in March.

In the evening of this same day, a Soviet of Nationalities session discussed the draft Law on the General Principles of Enterprise in the USSR.

Remarkably, almost all the deputies who spoke gave a positive evaluation of the proposed draft law, noting the need for such a document to redress the existing economic situation in the country. A notable exception was the speech by O. Chernyshev, who stressed the draft law's political character and expressed the following opinion: This document, like a number of other economic laws adopted in recent times, reflects a tendency despite our Constitution to bring the ideas of private property and hired labor into general circulation. The rest of the speakers examined the problem exclusively from the point of view of the economy, working people's rights, and the protection of their interests in new economic conditions. Meanwhile, as Deputy V. Kirillov informed the participants, a communist parliamentary group meeting held the previous evening had heard a senior CPSU Central Committee official explain to the audience how the draft law they were due to examine legalizes hired labor.

The theme uniting the session participants' speeches was a fear that the draft law under examination will be highly unlikely to work once it becomes law. Just like many other legal acts adopted by the Supreme Soviet.

Deputy G. Lisichkin drew the attention of the session participants to the very real danger existing today of inflation not only in the money supply but also in the number of laws. In adopting this legal act, the speaker said, we must take this problem seriously so as not to discredit lawmaking activity. The deputy advanced two basic reasons why in his opinion the law on enterprise will be unworkable.

The deputy stated that the main reason is that enterprise cannot exist without money, and in our state it is being systematically and skillfully destroyed. Enterprise cannot develop on such a primitive basis as the barter system. Yet there is a real chance of improving the money situation. Soviet academics have devised internationally recognized plans. They propose a swift rehabilitation of money. The question needing urgent consideration, G. Lisichkin stressed, is not requisitions and taxes in kind but the introduction of a money reform similar to the one effected in our country at the beginning of the 1920's.

The speaker believes that a second obstacle on the road to implementing the law on enterprise is the extremely defective system of labor remuneration.

G. Lisichkin noted that it had been right to raise the question of a price revision. The proposal is for prices to alter for all goods apart from the main one—labor. The deputy believes that the price of labor in our country is zero or a minus value. Yet cheap labor is the most dangerous and least efficient. It is destructive because it has no sense of responsibility. The deputy stressed the need to seriously consider altering the price of labor in our country.

Deputy M. Bronshteyn believes that apart from that there should be no further delay in beginning work on concluding an economic agreement between the republics, as the law on enterprise can only be really effective in conditions of a unified economic space.

After the discussion, the members of the Soviet of Nationalities approved the draft Law on the General Principles of Enterprise in the USSR on its first reading by a majority vote. The draft law will be revised in the parliamentary committees and commissions, taking due account of the observations and proposals made.

On 27 February the Union parliament worked in separate sessions. In the morning the Soviet of Nationalities, chaired by R. Nishanov, embarked on a first-reading examination of the draft Law on Protecting Consumer Rights.

The draft submitted contains a number of new normative provisions defining and specifying the state's role in defending consumer interests proceeding from actual economic and social conditions and the development of market relations currently under way. The draft pays particular attention to the questions of simplifying the procedure for resolving complaints made by citizen consumers about faulty goods and work they have paid for.

After a keynote report by V. Sychev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Output Quality Control and Standards, and a report by V. Petropavlovskiy, chairman of the Commission for Questions of the Development of Industry, Energy, Equipment, and Technology, there was a short discussion. It resulted in the adoption of a resolution approving the draft Law on Protecting Consumer Rights on its first reading.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Meets With Regional Party Leaders

PM0603115191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 91 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Conference at CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] A conference of first secretaries of Union republic Communist Party central committees and party republic committees, obkoms, and kraykoms [oblast and kray party committees] was held yesterday at the CPSU Central Committee. Opening the conference, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, gave his impressions of his recent trip to Belorussia and described his meetings with the republic's working people. The Soviet Communists' leader devoted considerable attention to the coming referendum on the fate of the Union and to attempts by destructive forces to fan the situation in society on the eve of this event and incite working people to strikes and other destabilizing actions.

This requires that party organizations step up their efforts to defend the country's unity and the fundamental interests of all working people. Communists' participation in strengthening the executive and resolving urgent economic questions meets with working people's support. People see that the party's course is the course of democracy and stability, economic recovery, the cessation of fratricidal interethnic strife, the quest for civil accord and peace, and the overcoming of the crisis.

The following spoke at the conference: A.M. Zaytsev, first secretary of Kemerovo CPSU Obkom; V.G. Stupin, first secretary of Ivanovo CPSU Obkom; Yu.N. Prokopyev, first secretary of the Yakut republic party committee; A.I. Seleznev, first secretary of Kursk CPSU Obkom; S.A. Markarov, first secretary of Khabarovsk CPSU Kraykom; V.S. Romanov, first secretary of Samara CPSU Obkom; N.A. Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee; B.V. Gidaspov, first secretary of Leningrad CPSU Obkom; and I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee.

Deputies on 17 March Referendum

PM0503170691 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 7, 17-24 Feb 91 p 7

[Feature incorporating statements by Yuriy Blokhin, USSR People's Deputy, co-chairmen of the Soyuz group, and Galina Starovoytova, member of the coordinating council of the Inter- Regional Deputies' Group: "'Yes' or 'No.' No Other Choices?"]

[Text] The March 17 referendum is worded thusly: Do you think it is necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renovated federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedoms of individuals of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed?

Yuriy Blokhin, USSR people's deputy, co-chairman of the Soyuz group: Back at the 4th Congress of People's Deputies, the group Soyuz spoke in favour of the referendum and supported the question exactly as it was formulated by the Supreme Soviet. It's a fundamental issue, and each of us should respond to it. What's at stake is the basis of our state system and equal rights for all people living in this country.

Not everywhere do governments - even legitimate ones - reflect social sentiments. Why not ask the people themselves what they think? After all, referendums are commonly held abroad. Why don't we do the same?

Of course, three years ago no one would have ever though that the Soviet Union's integrity would some day be called into question. But that's what is taking place right now, and nothing is done to stop it, while at the same time it can't be forgotten. Years of Soviet power and centuries of living together have passed without leaving a trace. Every sixth marriage in the Soviet Union is a mixed one. Breaking apart would mean cutting the people to the quick.

I'm convinced that Lithuania won't gain much if it secedes from the Soviet Union. Why does Landsbergis want that so badly? Lithuania is now in a more advantageous position than West European countries. It doesn't have to export raw materials and fuel from across the world; in fact it has everything it needs near at hand. If they want to live better, they should simply work hard and make the utmost of their abilities.

The referendum is expected to determine the people's attitude to several major issues. What is meant by a Union? What is its federative basis all about? The results of the referendum are unpredictable. As I see it, the majority of the Russian Federation will vote for the Union to be preserved, since the mentality of people living in provincial areas hasn't changed much. In Moldova, the rural population still remembers Romanian rule and doesn't want it back. In Estonia and Latvia the population is divided in half, and everything there will go more or less smoothly. It will be more difficult in Lithuania.

On the whole, the referendum promises to be a success. It is not expected to resolve the question of secession from or entry into the Union - it's only to test the general feeling in the country.

If the majority gives a positive answer, that will give great impetus to the work of our legislative bodies.

A four-sided agreement between Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan has every chance to make our Union stronger. In that case we welcome this agreement. If it seeks the opposite, then we are opposed. Speaking of republics' sovereignty, we shouldn't forget the sovereignty of the Union itself, strengthening its

vertical government structures. With party structures abandoning their positions, we need something else to replace them with. Soyuz expected much from the President. But so far presidency doesn't work. The Centre is always late with its moves.

Galina Starovoytova, member of the coordinating council of the Inter-Regional Deputies' Group: As a sociologist, I would say that the question proposed for the coming referendum has been formulated incompetently. Whatever the results of the vote, they are unlikely to give a clear-cut picture of the popular mood. That the question contains many contradictory notions, some are even opposite in meaning ("preservation-renewed", "federation- sovereign", "socialist-human rights"), proves in my view that that has been done intentionally. The initiators of the nationwide plebiscite want not so much to know what people think about the country's future, as to get their consent for unpopular (or to be more precise, antipopular) actions taken by the highest power, that are likely to occur because of that rather confusing question.

Neither several republics' refusal to conduct the referendum nor the huge expenses involved, which incidentally could be put to better use in the devastated country, has shattered the Union leadership's resolution. Perhaps the Centre places too much faith in the referendum. Thus the great responsibility that the republics have to take in elaborating their stand on the referendum.

Russia, for example, could not reject the idea of a referendum simply because it is very popular among the autonomous republics. That's why the Russian parliament decided to take the opportunity to combine the referendum with a vote on specific Russian problems that haven't been resolved by its Congress of People's Deputies.

The questions to be proposed by the Russian parliament are currently being discussed. In order to be included on the voter's form, the question has to be approved by 356 deputies. Two questions have already gained the required number of deputies' support: should the Russian Federation be preserved in its present form, and does Russia need its own president?

The second question seems crucial from the point of view of building adequate government structures in a new sovereign Russia. However, there is a strong tendency today to substitute Russian structures with federal ones, and to leave Russia with a weak parliament whose head has very little power.

It would be worthwhile to try to find out via the referendum the general level of people's trust in the highest authority, as formulated by the following question: "Do you approve of the activities of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and of the Soviet President?" I believe that the President himself badly needs to know what people think about his policies.

I do not support the idea of boycotting the referendum, as this creates greater opportunities for falsification. In this regard the voting should be held under strict public control. I appeal to all people living in the Russian Republic to take part in the referendum and make a conscientious choice.

Draft Treaty Finished

LD0403181691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 4 Mar 91

[Text] Shepitko, IZVESTIYA'S own correspondent reports. The work on the draft Union Treaty was, on the whole, completed yesterday. It has been signed by the plenipotentiary representatives of 27 republics including eight Union republics. The representatives of Azerbaijan were present as observers. The Baltics, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia did not take part in the elaboration of the draft treaty. The draft reads: "The republics, constituting the Union enjoy the full weight of state power and independently determine their state system, administrative and territorial division, and the system of bodies of power". However, questions of the organization of defense, the administration of the armed forces, border troops, and defense enterprises remain in the exclusive competence of the Union. This basic principle, indeed, along with the attitude to ownership, laws, the formation of the Union bodies and a number of other issues were not accepted unequivocally by the representatives of the republics. At least two important articles were not included in the draft. They are the ones dealing with the status of former autonomies and their right to participate on an equal footing with the others in shaping state policy. The opinion of a number of republics, including the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, is: "All the sovereign entities must enjoy equal rights." No agreement has been reached on these articles so far. On 6 March a meeting of the Federation Council is expected to take place, at which the draft Union Treaty signed by the plenipotentiary representatives is to be discussed.

Republics Fail To Sign Treaty

AU0503193991 Paris AFP in English 1928 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow, March 5 (AFP) — Only eight out of 15 Soviet republics, as well as 18 autonomous regions have signed a draft treaty outlining the future relationship with the central government that is to be submitted to the top federal council Wednesday [6 March], the unofficial INTERFAX news agency reported Tuesday.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia did not sign the draft.

Azerbaijan did not sign. Its position was not clear.

The three Slav republics—Russia, Belorussia and the Ukraine—and the five Moslem republics—Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan all signed.

The draft Union treaty to be presented to the federal council in which regional leaders are represented stipulates that the Soviet Union will be a "Democratic Federal Sovereign State".

Several other drafts had been published over the past months.

Republics termed "full-fledged members of the international community" will be able to establish diplomatic relations with foreign nations on condition that they "do not violate international engagements undertaken by the Union."

According to the draft, the Union would be open for other nations to join. It also authorizes republics to secede "freely" under conditions set by the treaty.

Matters of defence, state security, peace and war, military industry and space research, foreign affairs and economic policies are to be decided by the central government but constitutional amendments and customs duties could be decided by both the central government and the republics.

INTERFAX said republics will also have a say in their share in the federal fund of gold and precious stones.

A Constitutional Court will rule if any disputes arise.

Pavlov Interviewed on Coal Mining Dispute

LD0503222791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Interview with USSR Prime Minister Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov by station commentator Aleksey Krutov; place and date not given—recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Krutov] Valentin Sergeyevich, with the advent of spring, the concerns of the Union government have increased. Miner's strikes have just begun. In various regions the strikers are pursuing different aims. Could you tell me, how realistic are their demands?

[Pavlov] Well, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, I must say that we would like to increase everyone's wages 2.5 times tomorrow as the miners are asking or demanding, but it only remains to reply emphatically to this question: Where is all this to come from? Over the last few months, we have reduced industry's productivity by 5 percent, the production of meat by 13 percent, of milk by 12 percent, and so on. Draw your own conclusions from this. Can we raise wages today? Moreover, as has been stated, today, we must first protect those who can no longer, or are still not able to protect themselves. We have announced a social program and we are carrying it out. Therefore, the answer lies, I would say, in such a sphere...on the one hand the working sphere, on the other hand, in the sphere of justice.

[Krutov] The miners believe that their demands are just.

[Pavlov] It has always been a most difficult and, generally speaking, very heavy type of work in what could be called permanently extreme conditions, and the social sphere has frankly been neglected. Therefore, it would probably be untrue to say that there are no problems there today. Yes, the whole country benefits from the labor of the miners, the metallurgical industry, the power industry, and everyone right down to you and me. But the miners also benefit from the labor of doctors and teachers, of public service and transport workers, workers in metallurgy. Everything should be measured on an equal basis.

If someone simply demands something today in a loud voice...economic questions are simply not resolved this way. I apologize if I have interrupted you, but the fact of the matter is that, strange as it may seem, a lot of people who in my view have nothing to do with this issue are trying to get involved with this issue. It is not they who evaluate this work, or organize this work. Strictly speaking, they are not answerable for the outcome of this issue. I would say that those who are directly involved in the work and who are responsible for the results should tackle everything.

[Krutov] I agree with you, but there is just one thing I cannot understand. Why is it always necessary to wait until the storm breaks?

[Pavlov] We began our activities w th the very matter of examining the problems of the coal industry. First of all, we wanted to define, in essence, what the problem here is and how it is a problem, and then what needs to be done and how it should be done. I think that the country should know. It is probably no secret to anyone that over the last three years, we have lost 75 million tonnes of coal, including, last year alone, 37 million tonnes, and this is in spite of the fact that we have changed the system of organization; we made agreements but, nevertheless, the yield of one worker there has gone down to 65 tonnes from 69 tonnes.

[Krutov] What is the Union government doing?

[Pavlov] Every region needs to be examined and investigated. What has been done has been done. We should tell not only the miners, but the whole country what we have done, and what we have not done. Then we need to define exactly what we will do, when we will do it, and how. I believe that we should fulfill the 608th [resolution]. Since the past government, or whichever one it was, since they have signed it, as they say, in this we need to observe continuity. The country's government is the country's government; it must execute this resolution.

Regarding new commitments, I think that in this sense we cannot now undertake any new commitments. I say this quite frankly, although we are going halfway to meet them and we will study questions of reform of remuneration of labor and we will start, of course, primarily with the basic industries, including the coal industry. At the same time we will create conditions so that people can earn.

[Krutov] The Union government has a program for getting out of the crisis taking shape in the coal industry, and now it is counting only on the mutual understanding of the mining collectives.

[Pavlov] Only in the unity can we resolve our problems. Confrontation adds nothing. It only leads to a further fall in production. If we rock the economy now, we rock the sowing, but you yourself understand what rocking the sowing means. It means saying already in the spring that the country will be without bread. So, what can we count on then? Therefore I am saying all this precisely so that the miners, too, somehow realize that it is not their enemies who sit in the government, but it is simply necessary to soberly and realistically assess what we can do and how and when we can do it and come to an agreement. That is what I would like, generally speaking, to get home to every mining collective today.

[Krutov] Thank you.

[Pavlov] My pleasure.

KGB Leadership Reportedly Reshuffled

PM0503165691 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 7, 17-24 Feb 91 p 4

[Nataliya Gevorkyan report: "KGB: A Reshuffling at the Top"]

[Text] There's been no official information about personnel changes in the leadership of the USSR State Security Committee, commonly known as the KGB. This is possibly because, unlike the chiefs of the Interior Ministry and the Procurator's Office of the USSR, KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov has not lost his chairmanship. On the contrary, as analysts observe, following the reshuffles in the top echelon of the government department led by him, Kryuchkov's position has actually been reinforced.

As a matter of fact, today as five years ago any analysis of the situation in Lubyanka (the KGB's headquarters) is like variations on an unknown theme. The only difference is that today it is publicly possible to engage in guesswork, whereas the degree of its authenticity, much to our regret, still depends solely on this secret agency itself.

Thus, Kryuchkov's first deputy, Filipp Bobkov, has left. He is now a consultant at the Ministry of Defence. As the former head of the 5th (ideological) Department, Bobkov was considered one of the few professionals in the KGB leadership. When leaving the committee during the sixth year of perestroika, this fighter against dissent remained loyal to his Department's ideals to the end: "...Proceeding from present-day re-evaluations, one can say, of course, that there were some whom it was not at all necessary to call to account. But I don't catch myself thinking that we have dealt with someone unlawfully. Still less I can say that there were people whom we artifically made answerable under the law" (from an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Dec. 28, 1990).

Simultaneously with Bobkov, Vladimir Pirozhkov (both are 66 years old) vacated his place as deputy chairman. The latter dealt with personnel. The importance of this post can be gauged at least from the fact that, prior to his appointment as Chairman of the KGB, Viktor Chebrikov, one of the former first persons in the CPSU and the state, was also the deputy chairman in charge of personnel.

They have been replaced by Viktor Grushko, 60, and Gennadiy Titov, nearly 60. The former was in the past an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter is a cadre official of the KGB (and has been in the security system since the age of 18). Both worked abroad many years. Titov once worked in Norway. His name flashed in the press in connection with the sansational "Treholt case", a high-ranking official of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry accused of collaborating with the KGB. It looks as if the scandal broke out after the revelations made by Oleg Gordiyevskiy, a double agent of the KGB and the CIS who had defected to Britain. In his recent book which appeared in the West, the latter also mentions Grushko, formerly the first deputy chief of the intelligence service who headed the Scandinavian and British departments.

Thus, Grushko has become Kryuchkov's first deputy, and Titov, chief of counter-intelligence.

In the view of Mikhail Lyubimov, a former station head in Denmark who once worked with both, they are close to Kryuchkov. The latter can fully rely on them.

Viktor Grushko in an interview with Pravda last year said: "...All security people welcome the interest the Soviet people are showing in their work". Well said, especially considering that security people satisfy this interest to the extent they consider necessary.

Alksnis Stands by Newspaper's Interview

PM0503170491 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 7, 17-24 Feb 91 p 5

[MOSCOW NEWS editorial office statement: "Alksnis: 'No Claims Against Moscow News'"]

[Text] On Friday February 8, 600 Seconds host Aleksandr Nevzorov, notorious for his TV sequence entitled "Ours", reported on another "slovenly deed" by the democrats: according to him the newspaper Moscow News published an alleged interview with Colonel Viktors Alksnis, that in fact never took place! He claimed the Colonel could not possibly have given the interview.

Here are some of the relevant details for MN readers:

At 9 a.m. on February 4, our correspondent met with Colonel Alksnis, a people's deputy of the USSR, to get him to initial the text of the interview held the day before. The Colonel had just returned from Riga. In the

course of the interview, he told the correspondent (in great detail) that in the early hours of February 3 Nevzorov proposed to him a plan to check whether cars of the OMON special police squad were shot at in Latvia.

The MN issue that carried the interview and the information was released on Wednesday February 6. There were no telephone calls of amendments of protests from Colonel Alksnis on Wednesday, Thursday or Friday. Then came Nevzorov's hysterical statement late Friday night in Leningrad during the regular 600 Seconds newscast.

On Monday February 11, MN made a phone call to Colonel Alksnis' room in the Hotel Moskva. He told us that he did not refute the contents of the conversation. "It's a pity," he said, "that I was not given the information to sign, or I would have somewhat amended the thrust. I would have replaced the word 'adventurism' during the interview. "Apart from this, I have no claims against MN, were his exact words.

Let this statement be the final one.

Interior Ministry on Joint Patrol Progress

LD0503192491 Moscow TASS in English 1858 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Alexander Borisov report]

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—Over 27,000 offences, including 222 criminal offences, were stopped since the time the order by the Soviet interior and defence ministries on the joint patrolling of militia and troops in cities came into force (February 1, 1991).

According to the latest data of the Soviet Interior Ministry, joint patrolling was in force in 488 cities and other areas of the country on February 28. In addition to militia officers, 13,962 troops participate in patrolling or 54.9 per cent more than on the first day the order was issued.

Under decisions by republican legislative and executive bodies, there is no joint patrolling in Armenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Estonia and Moldavia.

Shenin on Need for 'Energetic Actions'

PM0503133191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 91 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Oleg Shenin, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee: "Energetic Actions Awaited From the Party"]

[Text] This year will evidently be a decisive year in our socialist fatherland's destiny. Many people in the country are now perturbed by the question: Is there a way out of the prevailing crisis situation, are there any forces capable of halting the state's and society's slide toward the danger point. The Political Statement by the January joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission contained an accurate appraisal of the situation and expressed the firm conviction that there is a possibility to get out of the critical situation in which Soviet society finds itself, and that this possibility will be determined to an enormous extent by our party's actions.

The party, drawn into an internal crisis, has been through a difficult year. The preparation for and holding of the 28th CPSU Congress and the congresses of union republic communist parties, the report and election campaign which dragged on in many places and was held in two and even three stages, the substantial renewal of cadres at all levels and the apparatus' perestroyka, and several negative internal party processes which developed largely under the influence of frenzied antiparty propaganda—all this snowballed and predetermined a situation whereby the CPSU's attention was focused on internal problems.

But we know that our party will be unable to live up to its historical mission if it turns its back on the problems which perturb people and prevent them from working normally and living a calm life. Nobody needs such a party. And now, having been through a hard time and preparing for equally hard times to come, the CPSU is called upon to more energetically face up to society's urgent problems, organize collaboration within all its structures, strengthen party discipline, and, working within the democratic norms of the new statute, master the new experience of political actions.

The disposition of political forces is becoming increasingly clear today, and one can see more and more clearly who is who and who wants what. Political objectives, which were not named but only hinted at, are becoming increasingly obvious. It may be that we are making an excessively frequent use of the word "choice." But the time to make a choice is really upon us now. We have arrived at an historical crossroad, when movement in one direction or another inevitably means movement toward one sociopolitical system or another. In these conditions the party must cast off the underestimation of its own potential and its own political strength, it must finally extricate itself from the state of moral depression.

The priority measures to overcome the critical socioeconomic and political situation prevailing in the country, as proposed by M.S. Gorbachev, president of the country and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and approved by the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, are now coming to the forefront of practical work.

Figuratively speaking, the party must put its shoulder to this program. It is important to ensure that Communists are familiar with it and pool their efforts with those by people's deputies to implement all the plans. It must be borne in mind that society's further democratic development will be impossible without economic and political

stabilization. It is necessary to display will and staunchness to withstand the pressure of groundless and false accusations that the party has "recoiled" from democracy. Without changing its course of reform, the party can and must do a lot to strengthen order in society and, in this basis, to give a fresh impetus to democratic processes free from totalitarianism in any form and from humiliation of human and national dignity.

Recent events have developed in such a fashion that many party committees, beneath the banner of abandoning executive economic functions, have given up the urgent problems of economic life, while the Soviets are still not fully involved in them. This is one of the reasons why the situation in the country has become more complex.

At union level, many republics are taking measures to organize economic ties and ensure food supplies for the population. The 1991 state plan and union budget are designed to provide, to a certain extent, guarantees that the national economy's integrity and the finance and budget system's unity will be preserved, and that the state will meet its commitments to its citizens and to other countries.

It is important to support the actions by the president and the USSR Cabinet of Ministers which are aimed at financial recovery and the consumer market's recovery, at boosting output and putting an end to illegal activity in the sphere of distribution of goods and trade with them, at safeguarding citizens' peace and safety. In the prevailing situation, these actions meet the demands by society and the majority of Soviet people, but they do give rise to sharp opposition by those who are not interested in stabilization.

This is no accident, it reflects the already shaped aspirations aimed at "desovietizing" the country, changing the social system, and creating conditions for infinite enrichment of the few at the expense of the majority of the population. Using as battering rams people who are driven by irrepressible ambition and wearing the tattered clothes of people's champions through which one can clearly see the immorality and total political license they preach, they are prepared to destroy the state and fan the flames of civil war, hoping to build their prosperity on its ashes.

It is necessary to repulse them everywhere, to perceive and expose for everyone to see the real face of those who are most diligent in this work and the forces behind them, which are trying to catch a political goldfish in the stormy waters of the people's difficulties, to oppose them by means of well organized and effective work to implement the decisions by state organs.

In today's situation, the economic sphere offers a vast space for activity by party committees and primary party organizations. People must be told the truth about the situation in the country and in partner collectives, they must be encouraged to seek a way out of the prevailing situation.

Special attention must be given to enterprises which find themselves on the brink of closure due to inefficiency and economic mismanagement. The public presentation of their problems on the party organizations' initiative is politically important, as is the struggle to strengthen discipline and organization in production. Communists' example here could prove decisive in many cases.

The party has invariably supported and still supports the transition to market relations in the economy, perceiving them as an efficient means for boosting the incentives for labor and competition. The principled stance that has been elaborated must be translated into specific actions to create a mixed economy

Party committees must give utmost assistance to working people, within the framework of adopted laws, to exercise their right to economic initiative through leasing, creating collective and joint stock enterprises, setting up individual business, and so on. Most thorough attention must be given to the implementation of land reform and the creation of conditions for effective operation by different forms of ownership and economic management in the agrarian sector.

Special party support is needed by measures to put an end to all breaches in the distribution of goods, to organize the activity of workers' control, and to strengthen deliveries discipline.

I do not want to be misunderstood. The party does not intend to reclaim the power functions, they certainly must be vested in state organs. But the CPSU has accumulated considerable experience in organization and mobilization, and it must be passed on to the soviets. The quicker this gets done, the better. Whenever the work of party, soviet, and economic organs is governed not by confrontation but by collaboration, this invariably has an effect on practical results, people's moods, and the political situation.

Party committees must resolutely advocate that vertical ties operate properly and that the country's laws and the president's decrees are implemented. It would be useful to have party committees holding meetings with Communists who are leaders of soviet, economic, and law enforcement organs for the purpose of enhancing their personal responsibility for the organization of practical work to support stabilization measures and to strengthen discipline and public order.

We must struggle against all attempts to diminish the role and importance of soviets in our life. The misfortune is rooted not in the soviets' nature but in the way that specific individuals, who have now joined these organs, perform their functions of power. Many party committees have lost their links with soviets, let the initiative there slip out of their hands, and are playing the part of impartial observers. This is not to their credit. It is of course necessary to properly organize the work with Communist deputies, coordinate uniform positions in upholding the party line, and really streamline this work.

The Central Committee Politburo has already expressed its stance on this issue by endorsing recommendations for the creation of party groups (factions) in the soviets. The strengthening of ties between party committees and deputies' groups does not hamper the latter's independent and autonomous work. The voters must sense that a mighty force—the CPSU—stands behind each Communist deputy. It is important to find points in common with other constructively minded deputies, to learn the art of compromise and of forming blocs with other political forces, and to actively develop experience in parliamentary work and the skill of pursuing the party line through the soviets. This is perhaps one of the most important tasks which must be practically resolved by all party committees. It is planned to consider this topic in greater detail at the next CPSU Central Committee plenum.

Vast and difficult tasks have to be resolved by party committees with a view to concluding the new Union Treaty. The Congress of USSR People's Deputies firmly advocated the Union's preservation as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, which will fully guarantee the rights and freedoms of people of all nationalities. Opinion polls in the country indicate that a stable majority of the population is in favor of the Union.

Thus, there is a perfectly sound base for the work of party organizations in favor of the Union Treaty's conclusion. But it would certainly be utopian to rely on an automatic solution to this question. We are aware of the tragedies which ensue whenever separatism comes to the fore. Any republic's isolation from the Union will be fatal primarily for its own integrity. Each Soviet republic was created and developed on a multinational basis, and the attempts to give millions of people of so-called nonindigenous nationality the status of second-class citizens and to trample people's political and civic rights are fraught with the danger of social shocks of tremendous destructive force.

Interethnic conflicts remain a source of tremendous tension in society. The Central Committee's attention is constantly focused on the conflict around Nagornyy Karabakh, the situation in the Baltics, Georgia, and Moldova, the refugees, and other acute problems. The Central Committee perceives their solution via organizing the work done in legislative organs by Communists who are USSR people's deputies and members of the Union government. But it is also necessary to boost the support given by party organs at local level. There is need for a joint quest for solutions to accumulated problems, for compromise.

There is no need to emphasize the large role played by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] in the Union's cohesion. We advocate a sttong Russian Federation and its state sovereignty. But this sovereignty can be exercised only in conjunction with the sovereign rights of the Union as a whole and of its republics. It is important to bring this perception to the knowledge of the broad masses of Russian working people, people's deputies, and members of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. It is necessary, and not just in Russia alone, to explain the fatal nature of the idea of a truncated union of republics without a center. It is necessary to openly discuss, using sound arguments, the destructive position of figures who are looking for the slightest opportunity to discredit the USSR and, blinded by ambition, are prepared to demolish all its structures. Yesterday they found the USSR Council of Ministers and its chairman unsuitable, today they are openly calling for the overthrow of the constitutionally elected president of the USSR. Adhering to a perverse logic with unwavering cynicism, they are attributing to him their own covert actions—deception of the people for the purpose of usurping power. They find totally unsuitable the disappointing fact that—as a result of their organizational bankruptcy, political infantilism, economic helplessness, and frenzied extremism—they have lost a large proportion of the social credit they had gained through democratic self-advertising and loud criticism of real and imagined sins by the center.

The referendum on the question of preserving the USSR, scheduled for 17 March, will be a serious trial for party organizations and the entire party. Campaining for a renewed Union and the USSR's unity is now the priority sphere of activity for all party organizations, for everyone who really considers himself a Communist.

It is fundamentally important and in the interests of the whole of society to ensure that the CPSU and all its organizations, including primary organizations, actively pursue a policy of national and civic accord and cooperate with other movement for this purpose.

There are, however, forces with which the CPSU cannot and never will cooperate: the nationalist, separatist, and mafia forces. A series of social groups, whose sole objective is confrontation with the CPSU, are now consolidating themselves. They style themselves "democratic" but this is a democratism of a special kind: Anything that does not suit their aspirations must be ruthlessly and peremptorily extirpated. Time and again we witness attempts at so-called depoliticization and departyization of labor collectives, law enforcement organs, the Army, and education establishments. Moreover, everyone is well aware that there is not and there cannot be a political vacuum, that this is nothing but yet another camouflaged step toward squeezing the CPSU out of the political arena. Party organizations must be firmer in countering these unlawful and unconstitutional attempts.

All practical work by the party must be conducted with reliance upon labor collectives. Party organizations must show concern for ensuring that the role of labor collectives is not diminished and that socioeconomic policy focuses on them. The working class and the working peasantry, united by common economic and political interests, are the main sphere of the CPSU's activity. It is also important to have a base within the mass movements which unite millions of people. These are the

peasants' and women's movements, the trade unions, the Komsomol [Communist Youth League], and the veterans' organizations. They are traditionally close to the party, and this is why they are being attacked. It is necessary to learn to collaborate with them on a partnership basis and to help the Communists elected to these organizations' leadership organs.

Relations with some new forms of the workers movement in some regions are still encountering complications. A series of this movement's leaders have taken graphically expressed antiparty positions and are establishing contacts with representatives of anticommunist organizations both inside the country and abroad. The Communists on the new organs of the workers movement are displaying a passive and at times even unprincipled attitude. Life has proved that we must not lose the initiative in the workers movement, especially since there is already a certain disappointment over adventurous actions by some newly emerged leaders. Quite the contrary, it is necessary to ensure that the workers movement organizations are joined by energetic and influential party members who are esteemed by labor collectives and are capable of upholding the working class' interests in deed.

It is hard to imagine the party's meaningful activity and its normal functioning without broad support for party policy by the intelligentsia. A serious redeployment is now under way in this environment, with special pressure being exerted upon those who support the party line or whose opinion differs from the position of so-called radicals. This is why it is especially important to support the workers in science, culture, and art who are committed to the socialist idea, whose talent and civic energy are dedicated to preserving and augmenting society's spiritual wealth. More attention and specific assistance is expected from local party committees by the party organizations of scientific and artistic collectives, creative unions, and higher educations establishments to overcome the perplexity and ideological confusion which often reign there.

The fanning of intolerance, blind anticommunism, and reciprocal hatred is, unfortunately, widespread. The campaign to discredit the Soviet society, which has been launched by a series of mass media, is especially unacceptable.

The fact that many mass media today have taken the path of confrontation with the CPSU are are waging a struggle against the socialist ideals has to be admitted as a serious political loss of ours. The party press and the journalists working in party publications are having a difficult time. Their material backup is much worse than that of workers in so-called "independent" publications, and they are subjected to tremendous moral pressure. (And not only moral, as proved by the shots fired recently in the Kaluga Oblast newspaper's editorial office.) It is necessary to help the party press by all means, to organize both centrally and locally a mechanism for collaboration between party committees and mass media, and, in exercise of the founder's right, to define the press organs' political line.

At a difficult and crucial time in the party's life, at a time for profound analysis of the processes occurring within society and for elaboration of the long-term action program, theory, and topical issues of the CPSU's contemporary policy, we need utmost mobilization of our entire scientific and creative potential. This is the task facing all party committees and party cadres. It is important to promptly and critically consider all the questions of party life which perturb the mass of Communists and party workers.

The question of mutual relations between central and local party organs must be included in this list. Recently the CPSU Central Committee has been receiving a large volume of letters, telegrams, and meeting resolutions expressing support for the CPSU Central Committee's position, including its position on events in the Baltics. At the same time, the nature of a sizeable proportion of letters and addresses indicates that Communists still do not know enough about the work of the CPSU Central Committee and of its Politburo and Secretariat. Many Central Committee documents are held up in party oblast and kray committees and fail to filter down to even rayon aktiv members.

The solution is to better organize the information system within the party. It cannot function as a single organism unless this is done. It is necessary to resume the holding of regular information meetings with party committee secretaries all along the line and, with due consideration for the situation, to duplicate individual Central Committee decisions at local organ level so as to ensure that they reach the primary party organizations.

This is especially topical in view of the fact that our primary links are, unfortunately, slow in boosting their work. Some organizations fail to hold party meetings over long periods and have not discovered ways to influence production. Now it is very important to boost party members' strength and confidence and help them to organize their work in compliance with the CPSU Statute's requirements. It is important to make our presence better known through socially important deeds, to revive the spirit of party comradeship and collectivism, to resolutely act against anticommunist pressure, and to uphold the socialist choice in society's development—this is a far from complete list of primary organizations' paramount tasks.

Rayon and city party committee must start showing more initiative in their work. Many of them spent virtually the whole of last year conducting the report and election campaign, their cadres have been significantly renewed, and there have been cutbacks and reorganization of their apparatus. Now that all this is over, the time has come for energetic and purposeful actions. They will largely determine the creative renewal of party work along all its avenues and the stepping up of Communists'

influence at places of residence. It is necessary to make more active use of voluntary principles in party committees' work.

In line with the January plenum's decision, party meetings and party committee sittings must be held to discuss the results of work in 1990 and measures for the organizational and political strengthening of party organizations. Such a conversation must be held in every party organization, at conferences of city and rayon party committee secretaries, so that this topic could become the focal point at zonal conferences of primary party organization secretaries.

The CPSU's membership fell by approximately 14 percent last year, but it is perfectly obvious that our political opponents' hopes have not materialized. Neither the organized demonstrative resignations from the party with the extensive publicity given to such actions, nor the direct pressure on Communists in many places have led to the CPSU's collapse. The party's foundations and its roots have proved healthy and firm, it remains a mass organization exerting a determining influence on the country's political life.

One of the main conditions for enhancing the efficiency of the party and all its links is to strengthen Communists' conscientious discipline. Unfortunately, our ranks contain quite a few "temporizers," some kind of "observers" who neither pay their dues nor obey orders. But party discipline is not the antipode of democratization of internal party life, it is one of its components. It would probably make sense to conduct individual interviews with some Communists to clarify their attitude toward the statute's requirements.

At the same time, it is necessary to galvanize the work on admission to the CPSU. There were 108,000 persons admitted in 1990. The absolute majority are convinced fighters for the party's cause. It is important that there are quite a few young people among the party's supporters in these difficult times. Party organizations must continue to actively seek like-minded people among the workers, peasantry, and intelligentsia, bearing in mind that the reinforcement of party ranks is one of the determining factors for the efficiency of the organization's work. Nor should we close the doors to those wishing to return to the CPSU.

The January plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission determined a common approach toward the solution of the difficult problems facing the party. Much work remains to be done, and this is why it is necessary to more swiftly get down to immediate tasks without losing sight of the long-term perspective. Today we need, more than ever before, public accord, stabilization of the economy, firm state power, and an active and cohesive Communist Party.

CPSU Disciplinary Problems Viewed

LD0503220691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1316 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Igor Gvritishvili and Andrey Surzhanskiy report]

[Text] Moscow, 5 March (TASS)—Yevgeniy Makhov, acting chairman of the CPSU Central Control Commission, has explained the necessity of adopting decisive measures to strengthen party discipline. Speaking today at a news conference in the press center of the CPSU Central Committee on the results of the plenum of the Central Control Commission, which came to a close yesterday, he reported that last year alone, 1.8 million people left the ranks of the CPSU throughout the country.

Having stressed the importance of strengthening discipline in order to avert the collapse of the lower party organizations, Yevgeniy Makhov said that the point of this is not to revive the discipline of the period of the administrative system, which was based on the unquestioning carrying out of commands, but rather, first and foremost, about strengthening party unity.

In the words of Yevgeniy Makov, there are about 10 tendencies and platforms functioning in the CPSU today. The political and ideological aims do not always coincide with the positions of the party leadership and the majority of its members. The center actively cooperates with some of them; however, they do not accept the positions of such organizations as the Edinstvo union, which supports neo-Stalinist slogans.

Yevgeniy Makhov stated that the CPSU is ready to enter into dialogue with any political party or organization that puts forward constructive programs for transforming Soviet society.

Responding to a question from TASS journalists about the relations of the central bodies of the CPSU to the communist parties in the republics, first and foremost those which are difficult to govern, Yevgeniy Makhov replied that the CPSU Central Committee is prepared to offer them assistance. In his words, the Communist Party of Georgia finds itself in a particularly difficult position. There is an unhealthy situation arising in the republic around it, and a mass exodus of communists form its ranks can be observed. But, we will not leave our Georgian comrades to their misfortune, Yevgeniy Makhov emphasized.

Ex-Premier Ryzhkov on Yeltsin, Economy

PM0503145091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 91 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with N.I. Ryzhkov, former chairman of USSR Council of Ministers, by Nikolay Krivomazov at Ryzhkov's home after his release from hospital, under the rubric "Portrait in a Domestic Interior": "Carved on His Heart"]

[Excerpts] This time it was true—I would not have been so lucky, but bad luck helped out... I had arranged to meet and talk with our prime minister approximately a year ago. But it was only on the 57th day after his heart attack that we finally met, to talk about "nothing in particular." How can you have a serious discussion with a man who came out of hospital only yesterday? [passage omitted]

About B.N. Yeltsin

[Krivomazov] Tell me how you worked with B.N. Yeltsin in the Urals. Why was it that your collaboration worked in the Urals, but not in the ancient capital?

[Ryzhkov] I must disappoint you. In the Urals, I seldom met him.

[Krivomazov] In that case, tell me, in whose time was the Sverdlovsk party obkom [oblast committee] building, probably the highest in the country, built?

[Ryzhkov] In his time. He also destroyed the smallest building.

[Krivomazov aside] (The reference is to the hut in which the czar's family was shot.)

[Krivomazov] Now, please tell me how this confrontation with the center looks today.

[Ryzhkov] It is hard for me to talk about it. People like him cannot be trusted with power. I realized this a very long time ago... He is not the kind of man who can use power sensibly. We have now seen this. Today, at rallies, he shouts about the apparatchiks, yet he is an apparatchik himself. When was he honest? He could do a lot of harm, that man. He does not have what it takes to be a major leader. I think he is an opportunist who rose to the top of a wave. But people will see through him. Sooner or later—they'll see through him.

[Krivomazov] Yes, but when the bosses fight, whose hair gets pulled?

[Ryzhkov] The people's. If it only affected five or 10 people, you could fight it out. But you cannot do that, because some 300 million people are standing next to you. How can you pursue such a policy? Everything is staked on confrontation. Everything he has done in recent years, he did it all for negative reasons. He did nothing constructive. [Ryzhkov ends]

"Were You Rocking the Plane Just for the Hell of it?"

A crow is flying in a plane, and pecks at the window. A bear comes up to him: "What are you doing, crow?" "I'm rocking the plane..." The two of them—the bear and the crow—start rocking the plane. Then an elephant comes and joins in... And they rock the plane, they knock it off course, out of control—and they're falling. The crow says: "Hey, can you guys fly? No? So what were you rocking the plane for, just for the hell of it?"

While the television crew were changing the video cassette, we had a break, exchanging anecdotes. And naturally, little by little we approached the question: How soon will those who believe in perestroyka start reassessing their faith?

"I think it could happen," N.I. Ryzhkov goes on. "In my 25-minute speech at the last congress I tried to some extent to give an analysis of my view of perestroyka. I thought about it for a long time. It was not very easy for me to say it to the man who started perestroyka in 1985. We were together. We went into it deliberately. When I said that perestroyka, in the form we had conceived it, had failed—that was not easy.

Economic

Kuzbass Miners Continue Strike Action

Demands Termed 'Political'

LD0503134491 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 5 Mar 91

[A. Kolpakov report; from the "Television News Service" program]

[Excerpts] [Kolpakov] As distinct from the Donbass, the miners of Kuzbass have shifted their emphasis to political demands, at the heart of which lie the resignation of the government and also support for Boris Yeltsin's policies in his fight for the sovereignty of Russia. The focus of events on 4 March was Prokopyevsk, where 10 of the 15 mines stopped work and a large strike meeting was held on the town's main square. [passage omitted]

By evening 27 mines were on strike. The beginning of March has shown that the workers' dissatisfaction is growing, and it could take the form of more strikes at any moment. [passage omitted]

It transpired this morning that six mines in Novokuznetsk have not ended their strike; the miners have decided to strike until their demands are met.

[M. Shchadov, USSR Minister of Coal Industry] We are saying bluntly that anyone who does not work will not get paid. We will not make any amendments to the plans and anyone who does not work today will be punished at the end of the month with the loss of seniority.

Strike Committees Meet

LD0503135191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] Our correspondent Gennadiy Kondaurov has just reported from Donetsk that four mines of the Krasnoarmeysk Coal Association are on strike for the fifth consecutive day. Among them are largest mines in the Ukraine—the Stakhanov mine and the Lyumanskaya mine. According to the information of the monitoring

service of the Donbass coal industry, four more enterprises have stopped work. They are the Chelyuskintsev and Oktaybrskaya mines in Donbass and the Voroshilov and the Artem mines in the town of Dzerzhinsk. Miners are putting forward economic demands including salary increase and expansion of the list of mining professions entitled to a privileged pension. Strike committees are holding meetings in a number of Donbass towns today.

Most Kuzbass Coal Mines End Strike

LD0503145791 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] I said at the beginning of the broadcast that the horoscope for today is very favorable indeed. Now I would like to add another prediction to those I have already mentioned. Today is a favorable day for embarking on almost anything, but collective work will be most successful. It may be that it is this circumstance precisely that influenced the decision of the Kuzbass coalmining enterprises. Most of them stopped the political strike today. Seven enterprises of over 100 mines and opencast collieries of the oblast stopped work completely and 11 of them stopped work partially. All others worked normally. The daily plan for coal extraction and unloading of fuel has been fulfilled.

Judging by the information our correspondent obtained in the oblast soviet of people's deputies only two mines in Novokuznetsk have not resumed work—Polosukhinskaya and Yubileynaya.

Karaganda Coal Miners Support Strike Action

LD0403221491 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 4 Mar 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Following an appeal from the Karaganda territorial council of the coal miners' trade union, the majority of mines in the Karaganda coal basin stopped work on 1 March.

[Reporter] Only vital services remained at the place of production, and the participants in the strike gathered at the miners' palace of culture to discuss their demands with the republican state commission. [video shows vital services, miners gathered in street, cuts to Ye. Yezhikov-Babakhanov, Kazakh SSR state counsellor, addressing miners' meeting]

[Begin Yezhikov-Babakhanov recording] The demands are pressing, correct, but there is a certain hotheadedness, impatience. The law on indexation is currently being examined by a commission of the republican Supreme Soviet; it will be adopted at the spring session. The law on compensation, a mechanism for implementing the retail price reform, will also be published in a few days. As concerns raising pay, we are also ready to look at this issue, linked to the overall production situation, to a rise in labor productivity, a rise in the volume of commodity production, and in output. [end recording]

[Reporter] The conversation in the hall dragged on nearly all day, but it still did not prove possible to reach mutual agreement. An appeal was adopted to labor collectives to prolong the strike. [video cuts to interview with G. Ozorovskiy, co-chairman of oblast workers' committee]

[begin Ozorovskiy recording] The first demand of the Karaganda miners is the signing of a union treaty on terms that are mutually advantageous for the republics. However, we still think that there must be a single policy and a single methodology for prices, and a single taxation policy, and we stand by that. We are fed up with the disagreements that are allowed to occur between the president and the parliaments of the republics. Yes, this strike means huge outlays; we ourselves oppose these outlays; for this reason, for a long time, beginning with the second miners' congress, we tried to sit down to negotiate with the USSR Government, to talk about pay, approaches, food supplies to the coal regions, housing, and so on. To date there has been no such understanding, the USSR Government has not sat down at the negotiating table, and so we renounce the responsibility, or the damage, which we are inflicting by the strike; it is the government alone that is guilty of this. I think that a representative of the USSR Government should be sent here immediately to resolve the issues that the miners are raising. [end recording]

[Announcer] Our correspondent reported by telephone today that since the government has begun examining the miners' demands, the strike has been suspended until 30 March, but if specific measures are not taken, the territorial council of the coal miners' trade union retains the right to rasise the question of continuing the strike.

Strike Called Off

PM0403141691 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

[V. Ryzhkov report: "'No More Striking! Let's Work!'"]

[Text] Karaganda—The miners' strike in the Karaganda coal field has ended. It was announced earlier as a 24-hour strike, but on the first day of the strike a miners conference adopted a decision to extend it until 4 March. Not all the miners supported this call. Many mines continued to extract fuel and carry out maintenance work. An appeal to the oblast's population was issued by the oblast soviet ispolkom [executive committee] and the Kazakh Communist Party obkom [oblast committee] bureau. It noted that the demands put forward are unconstitutional and will entail a drastic destabilization of the sociopolitical situation. The party and soviet organs called on the people of Karaganda to show restraint and prudence and not allow the enterprises to be halted.

Meanwhile a commission to study the miners' demands was at work. Representatives of the republic government and the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry accepted a number of them for more detailed study. One of the miners' main conditions was met. A territorial council of coal industry workers decided to halt the strike at midnight on the night of 2-3 March.

What are the results of the miners strike? One thing is clear: At a difficult time for the country, it is a grave blow against the economy. That is how the strike was assessed by many miners who did not support it and workers at Karaganda's plants and factories. There are also concrete "results" from the strike: In the 36 hours of the stoppage, 117,000 tonnes of coal were lost, or 3.6 million rubles. The "Karagandaugol" Association, which began the year well, found itself virtually without any above-plan fuel.

Reactions to Pavlov Economic Sabotage Allegations

Officials Comment

PM0503163091 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 8, 24 Feb-3 Mar 91 p 4

[Feature citing officials on Prime Minister Pavlov's allegations of Western plans to sabotage Soviet economy: "Premier Pavlov's Mysteries"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] **Why Has No Alarm Been Sounded by the State Bank?**

Yuriy Balagurov, head of the USSR State Bank's Money Circulation Department:

Q.: Recently you said that the rumours about the sum of Soviet roubles accumulated abroad running into the tens and even hundreds of billions were ridiculous. And even that the figure of seven billion was greatly exaggerated—it could only be a question of a mere two to three billion. Hasn't your opinion changed after the Prime Minister's recent statement in the press?

A.: No, it hasn't. I believe I have a right to have my own opinion.

Q.: Do those foreign two-three billion roubles present a serious threat to our economy?

A.: No, they don't. Even assuming their one-shot dumping on the Soviet market, such an insignificant sum will not affect our already disarranged money circulation.

By the State Foreign Economic Commission?

Ivan Ivanov, Vice-Chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers:

The Official purpose of the recent exchange of 50-and 100-rouble banknotes was to "burn" the roubles accumulated abroad. Yet it's no secret that the cash taken out by tourists and emigrants mainly consists of 10-rouble banknotes. And secondly, the main mass of money abroad is in cashless form—in cheques for large sums, issued by our enterprises and banks (mostly provincial ones). These cheques are illegally taken abroad and sold to banks at an extremely low exchange rate. At first glance, it appears that there is a danger that these cheques will be used when we start selling land and privatizing enterprises. But it is already difficult to cash them due to special instructions from the USSR State Bank, and soon—when the Law on Currency Regulation in the USSR has been adopted—it will be altogether impossible to do so. Thus Pavlov's words about "financial warfare" against us are overstated.

By the Customs?

Sergey Ilyushin, head of the press and propaganda group at the Main Administration of State Customs Control under the USSR Cabinet of Ministers:

According to the figures he gave MN, during the past five years (1986-1990), i.e., the particularly intensive period of trips abroad, customs people confiscated a little over 50 million roubles, five million being confiscated during entry. It is not easy to curtail this kind of contraband. As estimated by the customs house, it manages to stop only one-tenth of the Soviet money smuggled in and out.

From the preceding it follows that during the entire five-year period of the most active contact with foreign countries not more than 450 million roubles have been taken abroad—a figure, incidentally, close to the one cited by Viktor Gerashchenko, Board Chairman of the USSR State Bank. [passage omitted]

Academician Attacks Allegations

PM0503163491 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 8, 24 Feb-3 Mar 91 p 5

[Academician Nikolay Petrakov article: "Political Sensations To Introduce Change of Course"]

[Text] I was not surprised to learn that Valentin Pavlov's accusing the West of planning to undermine the Soviet economy by means of certain financial operations caused a sensation, since his statement differs greatly from the political course pursued by the country since the start of perestroyka. It was a powerful blow to the policy of new thinking announced by Mikhail Gorbachev in April 1985. Can trust between West and East or any cooperation between them be possible if one side harbours plans for a "quiet and bloodless annexation" of the other side?

However the reasoning Pavlov offers to prove his thesis about alleged preparations for subversion by financial means doesn't hold water. Any professional economist can clearly see that the supposed act mentioned by Pavlov can be no more than fanciful imagination. Such a plan would be impractical and meaningless. Pavlov mentions an "infusion" of merely a few billion roubles, but it would take the introduction of hundreds of billions to make his warning about the price of a box of matches

reaching a hundred roubles a reality. This opinion of mine is shared, according to reports from around the world, by many a financial expert. It very much seems like this sensation hurled at society had a political purport. If this is the case, then does Pavlov's announcement indicate the Soviet government's intention to make an about-face in its course towards integration into the world's economy, a course which has always been, and I'm sure still is, favoured by the USSR President?

The Cabinet head not only "lifted the veil" shrouding secret plans harboured by our enemies (to use his own words) , but also expressed general scepticism concerning Soviet economic cooperation with the West. It suffices to recall his denigrating remarks about Western partners in joint ventures. But let's consider why important Western companies are not in a hurry to offer their services to this country. What's all this talk about evil designs worth when the Soviet government has done its best to make big business extremely wary of investing in the Soviet economy. It's like Lewis Carroll's Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: they agree to play chess with us only to discover later that the game is croquet. Incidentally Pavlov, as Finance Minister, largely contributed to the constant changing of the rules of the game, where the operation of joint ventures is concerned.

My impression is that the Prime Minister doesn't approve of broad international cooperation. Judging by the reaction from Western financial circles, their attitude toward his announcement is the same. However they don't associate his position with that of Gorbachev so far.

What's more, the Prime Minister is aiming to change not only the country's external economic policy, but also the internal one. Regrettably, the Main Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy are too vague and leave too much freedom for interpretation among those who are to realize this concept. But even compared with the Main Guidelines, the plans promoted by the new Prime Minister are evidently a step backwards, towards a centralized and administered economy.

Notably, in pledging his adherence to the course towards a market economy, Pavlov avoids all mention of the foundation of that economy: market infrastructure. He doesn't speak of a stock exchange, banks, securities, etc. Instead he offers a comprehensive programme of modernization of heavy industry. Reading all this, it occurred to me that it's no different from the concept of "intensification" which was already a fiasco in relatively recent times. But Pavlov seems to be oblivious of that unfortunate experience. He sounded perfectly convincing saying that heavy industry suffers from from a lack of capital investment but rather from its inability to benefit from scientific and technological progress. Does that mean that we are going to once again emphasize the "introduction of scientific achievements into the economy"? But that would be useless since the situation in the economy, including heavy industry, cannot be changed without introduction of the market and the competition associated with it.

But the head of the Soviet government doesn't even mention the word "competition", which is a key notion for a market. I don't think this omission is unintentional, because no competition on the foreign markets could be possible after the proposed change of economic policy. What about competition on the domestic market? According to the Prime Minister, the upcoming privatization of the economy mustn't transcend certain rather rigid boundaries. He prefers not to explain this, only saying that "privatization must be done in the form of issuing shares to cover the state property, some part of which will thus turn into collectively-owned property. This, in my opinion, is the only way".

Thus, everything we have discussed and admitted to be obvious is simply forgotten now.

In this connection, I have a few questions. Is the Prime Minister, who is not even head of the executive power in the current structures, authorized to change as he wishes the nation's economic course taken by the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR President? Is he allowed to take such responsibility? Can he ignore the Republics' much more radical plans? Can the head of the Cabinet use the result of guess-work of a doubtful nature as substantiation for his own plans, and pass himself off as the savior of the nation because of it?

U.S. Expert on Allegations

PM0503163291 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 8, 24 Feb-3 Mar 91 p 5

[Interview with Michael Claudon, Director of the Geonomics Institute, by Yuriy Bandura; place and date not given; first paragraph is introduction: "Rouble Fantasies"]

[Text] MN New York correspondent Yuriy Bandura interviews Michael Claudon, a prominent expert on international finance and credit, Director of the Geonomics Institute and consultant to various US government and international agencies.

[Bandura] The Soviet Prime Minister has alleged that a number of privately-owned foreign banks were illegally buying billions of roubles. How could such a transaction, involving among other things the smuggling of roubles out of the USSR, be accomplished?

[Claudon] There is no practical way to accomplish such transactions. Since the Soviet currency is inconvertible it is impossible to hold rouble-denominated bank accounts in the West. As such, it is impossible to transfer roubles electronically from Soviet banks to Western banking institutions.

The only way to accumulate rouble holdings outside the USSR is to physically smuggle actual rouble notes to the West. It takes ten million 100-rouble notes to total one

billion roubles. Could case after case containing millions upon millions of rouble notes leave Soviet ports (sea and air) without being detected by Soviet customs and security officials? I think not.

Nor is it possible for Western banks to make such purchases secretly: banks are subject to detailed reporting requirements.

[Bandura] But perhaps holding huge sums of roubles outside the USSR promised Western banks tremendous gains?

[Claudon] No. No Western financial institution would willingly purchase an asset for which no market exists and the value of which is almost certainly going to fall, as is the case with roubles.

Suppose a bank considered buying one billion dollars worth of roubles. Invested in the West, those dollars could earn, say, 9 per cent per year. Thus, in five years, the one billion dollars would grow to 1.54 billion dollars. Therefore, besides engaging in illegal smuggling and having to falsify its accounts, buying and holding roubles for five years would cost this bank the opportunity to earn over half a billion dollars at no risk.

[Bandura] Nevertheless, Valentin Pavlov has alleged that the aim of such purchases is to destabilize the USSR's economy and political system, to overthrow President Gorbachev and thereby to allow radical reformers to take power so that they could auction off state assets at dirt cheap prices.

[Claudon] Such a scenario is not even conceivable. Suppose, by some magic, foreigners held 10 billion roubles outside the country. Even such a huge sum would only amount to 0.5 per cent of the Soviet GNP, and could in no way destabilize either the Soviet economy or government.

As to the alleged intentions of "plotters" to cause economic disaster in the USSR and to use this catastrophic situation for buying privatized enterprises "for nothing", I can see no logic here. Even assuming they could effect economic destruction, they could not spend their roubles twice! Once they have used their rouble hoards to cause collapse, they would have nothing left over to buy out the remains of the Soviet economy. And why would they want to buy the remains of a destroyed economy?

[Bandura] What sums of money in roubles, by your estimation, do foreign banks have outside the USSR?

[Claudon] I would be very surprised if the total from all non- government sources added up to one billion roubles.

[Bandura] What do you think our Prime Minister meant by saying that preparations were being made to "flood the country with roubles"? What could the actual method of such "flooding" be?

[Claudon] It's a total mystery to me. Especially because under current Soviet law, no Western organization can "quietly" purchase state enterprises or Soviet land. As Mr. Pavlov, who was involved in his own joint venture Inforcom, knows very well, all such transactions require many licenses and must overcome complicated bureaucratic obstacles.

[Bandura] And yet the head of the Soviet Cabinet claims that such conspiracies have been used "in many regions of the world when somebody wanted to change the political system or to change unsuitable political leaders". Do you know of any such examples?

[Claudon] No, I do not. Certainly there are no examples among developed economies of using such a tactic during the 20th century.

[Bandura] What then might be the motive behind such allegations?

[Claudon] In fact these claims appear in the West as an attempt to use the West as the scapegoat for the inability of the government to achieve real economic reform since 1985. I read Mr. Pavlov's allegations as a sign of the dangerous political struggle being waged inside the Kremlin.

Observers Note Lack of Economic Progress

LD0603062591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1407 GMT 5 Mar 91

[By TASS observers Boris Grishchenko and Boris Shestakov]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Mar (TASS)—There is a line, a border, which, after crossing, sees society become an ungovernable crowd and the state become some abstract geographical expanse or territory. We have drawn close to that line, dangerously close. Everyone needs to be aware of that and to make a final choice. The moment of truth is possible only when one is not building illusions or hiding behind well-padded formulations, but is calling things by their proper names, no matter how bitter or painful that may be.

We are sure that most of those who attended the Union Cabinet of Ministers session last Monday held under the chairmanship of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev must have found it hard to draw the conclusions that determined the choice of agenda. The economic agreements of the USSR and the republics, adopted at the beginning of the year, on the stabilization of the stabilization of the socio- economic position within the state and on supplies during the current year of food and agricultural raw materials are "working" with minimal effectiveness. The slump in production is continuing, and the country and society find themselves in an extremely difficult position.

To a greater or lesser extent, we all realize what the reasons are for this slide into crisis. That is why there is

no need to waste time on excursions into history and a detailed description of our difficulties. That was the approach taken by the two dozen or so specialists who spoke at the cabinet meeting. On the basis of a specific and harsh enalysis of the situation, they set themselves the task of finding an answer to the main question: What specific measures must be taken to overcome the fall in production and to stabilize the country's economic situation?

The floor was requested by people who have something worthwhile to say on this topic. The majority of participants in the meeting possessed solid, practical experience in economic management. They included leaders of the governments of Union and autonomous republics, ministries, and departments, and authoritative representatives of a number of public organizations. An analysis of the actual situation in different industries, regions, and the national economy as a whole led to a conclusion with which all the participants in the discussions agreed: The implementation by the republics of contracts that they themselves have signed and the realization by the center of its obligations toward the republics are proceeding unsatisfactorily. For this reason, the goal of the extreme measures taken by the head of the Soviet state at the end of last year, above all the strengthening of economic ties among enterprises on the basis of two-way contracts, has not been achieved.

A paradoxical situation has come about in the country as a result. Enterprises, which are supposed to be free producers, are being given orders by the center, the republics, the oblasts, and rayons on to whom they should deliver their goods. This is simply intolerable. Many speakers stressed that at the present time far more people in the country are involved in the distribution and partition of material wealth than its production.

Life is particularly difficult for the small republics in this situation. As was noted, the bigger republics are signing contracts that are detrimental to the smaller ones' interests. They are trying to form new, parallel structures alongside the existing central bodies. The imbalance in the financial system is intensifying against a background of deteriorating working conditions for industry and other branches of the national economy.

What about customs barriers being erected by supporters of economic separatism within the country? What about "primitive barter," the export to foreign countries of many types of products of which we ourselves are extremely short? Is this not contributing to the collapse of the internal market? The list of contraband goods, smuggling of which has been nipped in the bud of late, includes not only consumer goods but also ore, copper, and other raw materials. This is happening, the participants in the session said, at a time when enterprises in the textile and light industries are coming to a standstill because we cannot supply them with imported raw materials. Output of agricultural machinery and trucks is falling for the same reason.

Similar dependence is being felt in many other spheres as well. The habit, developed over many years of "eating our way" through revenues derived from the sale of oil and gas, has obviously had an impact. Alas, the time has come to forget it once and for all.

We can only rely properly on ourselves, Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov said. When times are difficult for the family, it gathers itself together. This gives it extra strength. That is why, today, the belief in the possibility of solving pressing economic problems in isolation is one that has no prospects. It is dangerous and, at times, goes beyond the bounds of what is sane.

What we have to do is to jointly find the most rational ways of administering the processes involved in implementation economic agreements. We have signed them, but we have not created an organizational mechanism. For this very reason we are trying to approach a new concept while using the old methods. We have to create a permanent body that is capable of uniting the interests of the republics.

Summing up the results of the session, the USSR president acknowledged that he himself took a gloomier view of the economic situation than the majority of participants in the exchange of views. Formidable danger is visible on the horizon, M.S. Gorbachev continued, but even so, certain people hope to extricate themselves from the situation in isolation, relying only on their own potential. This disease has taken on the nature of an epidemic.

If we do not take account of realities, this inertia cannot be overcome. It is not inertia that we need now, but the dynamic momentum of a society, of a Union that is renewing itself. Everyone who is participating in this exchange of views is sincerely concerned by the fate of our country and its peoples. They expect specific assistance and support from us.

We intend to live together and to extricate ourselves from the crisis situation together. The fact that social tension in society has reached a dangerous level cannot be overlooked, either. Our present decisions must match the level of responsibility required. In these conditions we cannot do without a center that works in the interests of the republics.

This must be a new center. The country needs it. Then the process of links with the republics will be filled with new contents. Let the republics take more on their own shoulders; after all, this means that they will also be taking upon themselves a greater responsibility than before. A redistribution of powers, rights, and responsibilities is taking place. This is a natural, living process.

One frank revelation followed another, as the saying goes. The session took note of a statement by the leaders of the republics that obligations as regards deliveries of food, goods, fuel, and energy will be unswervingly met. The extremely specific conversation also made it possible to define joint approaches to the questions of

finance, budget, and funds for the stabilization of the economy, and to bring positions closer together on price-setting.

The committee on stabilization of economic ties, headed by First Deputy Premier Vitaliy Doguzhiyev, which was formed during the meeting, has been given a total of 10 days to settle outstanding questions which are impeding the implementation of the package of economic agreements.

Military

Yazov Visit to Germany Surprises Bonn

LD0503182591 Berlin ADN in German 1748 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The federal government today confirmed reports that the Soviet Defense Minister Dimitriy Yazov visited units of the Soviet Armed Forces in Thuringia last weekend; however, it declined to comment on this. A spokesman from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in reply to an inquiry from ADN that it was correct that Yazov had been on the territory of the former GDR. The federal government was not informed of this in advance; however, the government has learned about it. The spokesman would not answer a question on when the federal government learned about it.

The daily newspaper "DIE WELT" reports in tomorrow's edition that Yazov visited Soviet units in Jena, awarded medals, and delivered a speech to party cadres. The newspaper reports that government circles reacted "in a surprished fashion" to this event because it would have been "good manners" to inform Bonn in advance about such a high-ranking visit from the Soviet Union.

Shlyaga Addresses Belorussian MD Party Meeting

PM0503165591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Colonel A. Smolyanko report: "New Facets of Party Concerns"]

[Text] A party conference has been held in a Belorussian Military District large strategic formation. Delegates from unit party organizations discussed the situation in the country and the party and resolved organizational questions connected with the elections of the party committee and delegates to the district party conference and the All-Army Party Conference.

Colonel S. Posokhov, chairman of the organizing committee and the main speaker, and the Communists who spoke in the debate—Col. S. Kuznetsov, Captain S. Pokrovskiy, Lieutenant Col. V. Mikushev, and others—pointed out that life confirms the correctness of the policy of reforming political and party structures in the Armed Forces and spoke of sore points in the activities of party organizations and the life of military collectives.

Under conditions of the acute political confrontation in the country and the growing politicization of personnel, the speakers emphasized, it is important to enhance the role of party organizations in arming people with ideological and moral guidelines. Various kinds of political "hypocrites," who sow nihilism, discord, and confusion in minds and disorder in souls, cannot be allowed to set the tone.

The conference participants devoted appreciable time to problems of strengthening military discipline, vigilance, and Communists' personal example in mastering combat hardware and weapons.

Col. General N. Shlyaga, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and V. Semenov, first secretary of Grodno Oblast Belorussian Communist Party Committee, participated in the work of the conference and addressed it.

Baltic Republics

Gorbachev Says Baltic Polls Lack 'Juridical Force'

LD0603123791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 6 Mar 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] President Gorbachev has described the polls held in Latvia and Estonia as useful. This was reported by Vitaliy Ignatenko, head of the presidential news service. The president repeated, however, that the polls have no juridical force.

Paper Views Baltic Republic Polls

PM0603135191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 5 Mar 91 p 1

["Our Commentary" by L. Nikitinskiy, commentator on legal affairs, under general headline: "Baltic Region: When 'Yes' Means 'No'"]

[Text] The results of the public opinion poll in the Baltic region is on the whole, not sensational. No one doubted that Letts and Estonians in their majority would, like the Lithuanians before them, vote for the sweet word "freedom."

But the main and principal result, in my view, is that the majority of the people of other nationalities living here have also, judging by the percentage results of the poll, gone along with the indigenous population. This was precipitated, in my view, by the gross interference of the Armed Forces in the political life of the region. The question as to which of the "Russian speakers" are really occupiers and which are Baltic patriots was to a significant degree revealed under the barrels of tanks and assault rifles.

As has been stressed many times, including by the organizers themselves of the public opinion poll in the three republics, its result have no juridical, that is to say binding, significance. However, even the result of the 17 March referendum will not directly produce any legal consequences (more on this theme in a forthcoming issue of the newspaper).

From the political viewpoint, however, it is important today to get the emphasis correct. In voting unambiguously for independent sovereign republics the multiethnic population of the Baltic region in no way voted against the possibility of a renewed commonwealth with other republics, including Russia, as the opponents of independence are trying to make out. The "no" was given only with regard to attempts being made by the center to build this renewed commonwealth from above rather than from below, by authoritarian rather than by democratic means.

It is a great pity that the Baltic republics have taken the course of boycotting the 17 March referendum. This places them in the ambiguous position of states claiming autonomy but not confident of their strength, and allows opponents of Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian sovereignty to challenge the results of the preliminary poll which in the opposite case, I think, might have been confirmed 17 March.

Views on Latvian Poll Results Reported

PM0603134391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[Irina Livinova report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Contradictory Poll Results"]

[Text] Riga—Figures—this time during a republic poll—have again divided the inhabitants of Latvia.

Some 87.62 percent of those who have the right to vote under law came to the polling places to answer the question: "Are you in favor of a democratic, independent state of Latvia?" True, in the days prior to the poll parliament had introduced legislative changes which deprived part of the population of the right to vote. Some 64.44 percent of those entitled to take part in the poll voted in favor of a democratic, independent state of Latvia. In rural areas this figure was higher, up to 90 percent, while in the cities, including Riga, it was lower, falling below the 50-percent mark in places.

The opinions of Supreme Soviet deputies on the results diverged.

"The poll results would not allow the republic to 'secede from the Union,' if it wanted to, in accordance with established legislative procedure," Deputy G. Morozli of the Equal Rights faction, said.

"We consider that the people of Latvia have demonstrated once again their will and self-determination," is the opinion of Ya. Dinevich, chairman of the People's Front.

Viewpoints on whether legislation had been violated during the poll also diverged. A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, thanked foreign observers for participating in the poll. In their opinion, the poll was conducted in accordance with international standards. S. Dimanis, chairman of the Equal Rights faction, holds a different view:

"In the statement which we issued to parliament and the foreign observers we noted a very large number of violations committed during the poll. All cases of violations were logged. This documentation was delivered to G. Blums, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, on 2 March. Despite this, the chairman continued to claim at a news conference held the next day that no violations had been registered."

Two Overnight Explosions in Riga Reported

LD0603085291 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0800 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] This morning men on duty from the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that explosions had again rumbled in Riga and its vicinity.

The first one occurred at the housing complex of the Ministry of Internal Affairs located at 10 Koku Street. The explosive device there is said to have been placed at the entrance.

Serious concern is caused by the explosive devices also being placed near dwellings.

Shortly before 0400 an explosion occurred at 22 Ezermalas Street. The explosive device was placed in the elevator and exploded between the 10th and 11th floors.

The third explosion occurred on the bridge across the Gauja at Adazi.

There have been no victims of casualties. An investigation is currently under way.

MOSCOW NEWS Profiles Latvia's Rubiks

PM0503164291 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 8, 24 Feb-3 Mar 91 p 11

[Georgijs Celms article: "Resistance Fighter From the Politburo"]

[Text]

Biographical Particulars

1. Rubiks Alfreds Petrovich.

2. Born 1935. The youngest communist leader in the Baltics.

3. Place of birth: Daugavpils - the centre of Latgale, kindred connections with which have always afforded an additional chance for career-making. A CPSU member from Latgale used to be considered kind of twice member of the CPSU. Until recently this poorest of regions, where Russian is heard more often than Lettish, used to be the source of many leading personnel, which nonetheless didn't prevent if from growing increasingly poorer.

4. Nationality: Lett. But as he is fond of saying about himself lately: "I'm neither a Lett nor a Russian. I'm a Soviet".

5. Education, background. Graduated from the Riga Polytechnic, but worked less than a year in his speciality.

6. Place of work. Secretary of a factory YCL Committee; deputy department head at the CP Latvia Central Committee; First Secretary of a district party committee; Minister of Local Industry; Chairman of the Riga City Executive Committee; unemployed; First Secretary of the CP Latvia Central Committee; and Politburo Member of the CPSU Central Committee.

7. Was he ever put on trial? So far he hasn't been. But inasmuch as the Lithuanian Procurator's office is going to institute criminal proceedings against Juozas Jermalavicius, liaison officer of the National Salvation Committee, this possibility must not be ruled out. Their doings are similar.

Outer Appearance

Short, balding, youthful beyond his years, agile. It may be presumed that in his outer appearance he patently falls short of the only recent leading standards, lacking inborn aristocratic and stately looks (like those of Yanayev, for one). This circumstance, I believe, didn't at all hinder his career. It looks however, as if Rubiks has learned to overcome his "innate shortcoming" - if need be, he knows how to look stately and even monumental, which, considering his essential qualities, calls for no small amount of artistry.

Character

Prior to perestroika all the functionaries looked like two peas in a pod. After all, the invariable rule was not to stick out. So Rubiks did his best to not stick out - a typical "leader of the youth", quite at home in his own circle, of course - Finnish baths, seminars with booze in the open air, and the like. When times changed however and asceticism came into vogue (Andropov's times), Rubiks immediately became an ascetic and declared war on hard drinking and other abuses.

It is then that the main traits of his nature came to a head for the first time: passion, lack of restraint, and readiness to risk and to stake his all. Plus the unquenchable thirst for power. As for career, things did not go right at first.

Rubiks constantly used to outrun everybody. For example, in violation of all the apparat rules, he openly informed the correspondent of a central newspaper of the facts of the unlawful construction and occupation of a building for higher-ups. Demonstrating his high level of principledness to Moscow gripped with perestroika, Rubiks staked his all and nearly lost it all - he didn't estimate how greatly irked his immediate patrons would be.

In Riga Rubiks fell into disgrace, but in Moscow the chief editor of one of the most influential newspapers promised him his patronage. And he carried his scheme through: he started firing incompetent bosses, many of whom were his friends. He did this without much regret.

Taking risks on more than one occasion later on, Rubiks again made big stakes. For example, he wrote a letter to the Politburo about the "spinelessness" of Jan Vagris, the then First Secretary of the CP of Latvia Central Committee, accusing him of "not meting out due rebuff to the nationalists". Incidentally, he managed to break

the bank in that game: Vagris was retired on a pension and Rubiks took his place. But prior to that he was out of work for some time.

Destiny

Rubik's destiny is a lesson for democrats. A person mustn't be "driven into a corner" even if he is your worst enemy.

As Riga's Mayor Rubiks quickly earned prestige. His furious energy and organizational grip served the city well. For the first time Riga acquired a caring leader. But as ill luck would have it, the idea of building a metro originated at that time in high republican circles. Rubiks accepted it with delight—his ambition was flattered by the thought of being the mayor of a real megapolis. the citizens of Riga, for their part, especially Letts, were of a different opinion on this score. They were terrified by the prospect of an invasion by a horde of outsiders who were to build the underground. They also feared for the safety of the old city. Confrontation set in. Both the CC and the Council of Ministers backed away from the crazy idea. Even more so because there was no money with which to build the metro. Rubiks however stubbornly stuck to his guns.

He may well be considered to be the godfather of the Popular Front—this movement sprang up to life and took shape right in the heat of the metro-building controversy. With all of his subsequent activities Rubiks contributed to the growth of extremism in the movement: extremes always spawn extremes.

Before the battle for his post people unanimously supported Rubiks in his opposition to the bureaucrats from the CP Latvia Central Committee. After the battle he became their enemy. Rubiks was constantly pursued by pickets with insulting posters. His effegy was burned at the stake. The renewed City Soviet, elected mostly from among Popular Front supporters, immediately fired him, serving a notice of this by mail: "Your services are no longer required". In short, he had every reason to feel vexed and hurt. And whoever knows Rubiks also knows that he maintains grudges.

On becoming unemployed, Rubiks drew ever closer to the interfront. Resounding even louder in his speeches were the words "internationalism", "socialist choice", "single, indivisible union", "party", "communism", etc. In an interview with a journalist Rubiks' sister asked in bewilderment: "What did Fredis see in communists? After all, he has always been a reasonable person."

Drama

Sometimes I think that were it not for the metro affair Rubiks might have become a Popular Front leader. In that case, given his nature, he would have turned into the most maniac separatist.

The city in which he has spent a large part of his life and to which he has given no small effort now sees Rubiks as an enemy. On Riga's barricades in January he was depicted in the image of Pinochet. One of the slabs in the barricade was made to look like his tombstone. He was forced to "go underground". On New Year's he even visit his mother in the peaceful setlement of Aizkraukle exorted by "black berets" (special-purpose police).

The opinion polls carried out even before the bloody events indicate that Rubiks patently takes the lead among those whom Latvians mistrust most of all (his runners-up are the Interfront zealots Lopatin and Alekseyev).

Forecast

What lies in store for this person? What can be expected from him?

Astrologists predict Rubiks' early move to Moscow. Well, maybe the stars don't lie: in Moscow there is always a comfortable place for bankrupt party leaders.

Nor can it be ruled out that Rubiks will find himself in court. He has blood on his hands. He didn't shoot, but the call for a coup d'etat issued by him resounded like a command for provocateurs.

It is quite possible that, should presidential rule be declared, he will become the President's vicegerent. But no matter who becomes the vicegerent, especially such an unpopular one, this will guarantee civil disobedience, and hence civil war.

To cut the story short, no matter how you look at it, the situation has no way out. And most likely Rubiks has long ago considered all these hopeless variants—which makes him particularly dangerous. After all, he has nothing to lose. And he is not one of those who quietly leave the stage. It means that once again he will stake his all.

Estonian Committee Chairman on 'Uninational' View

LD0503165391 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1500 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] Tunne Kelam, chairman of the Estonian Committee, said today in an interview to the Baltic News Service that the Estonian Committee has not altered its position—adopted before the referendum was carried out—in respect of the independence referendum. The Estonian Committee's reservations with regard to the referendum decision are well known. First, the decision was taken without a consensus, without the consent from a string of political organizations and the Estonian Committee; second, the referendum was organized according to Gorbachev's rules of play, so to speak; third, for the first time those people also could have a say in the fate of Estonia who are not citizens of Estonia, explained Mr. Kelam.

Our aim is to restore Estonia as a uninational state; should the zero version of the citizenship law, or anything else similar, be adopted, we will indeed arrive in

the Republic of Estonia but not in a uninational state, said Tunne Kelam. All human rights and wide-ranging cultural autonomy must be ensured for non-Estonians, but political control over the fate of Estonia must remain in the hands of the indigenous population.

Yeltsin Awarded Estonian Literary Prize

LD0503150391 Moscow TASS in English 1450 GMT 5 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloverian]

[Text] Tallinn March 5 TASS—The Eduard Vilde price has been awarded to Russsian President Boris Yeltsin.

The prize, named after a classic of Estonian literature, was instituted by a collective farm bearing his name and is usually conferred on men of letters proclaimed writer of the year in Estonia.

Although Yeltsin's book "Confession on a Pre-set Theme" has been translated and published in Estonian, the distinction is awarded to the author is not for its literary merits but for "the mission", expressing gratitude to the Russian leader for helping reduce tension in Tallinn, which spiralled after the tragic events in vilnius, during his visit there in January.

Yeltsin signed on behalf of the Russian Federation a treaty on the fundamentals of inter-state relations with Estonia.

The treaty was welcomed by champions of the republic's independence. Representatives of the non-indigenous population were critical of the treaty which, they said, provided no guarantees of civil and political rights for them in an independent Estonia.

Estonia, Finland Sign Agricultural Agreement

LD0403155991 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 1 Mar 91

[Summary] Today a Finnish-Estonian agricultural cooperation protocol was signed at the village of Saku. According to this agreement, 10 million Markkas have been allocated to developing Estonian agriculture. Ago Koop, deputy economy minister, said that the agreement set down in writing that the economy to be implemented within the next five years will produce goods that can be sold for money. Both the Estonian and Finnish Agriculture Ministries will cooperate in the implementation, with individuals appointed in charge of specific programs.

Denmark To Draft Cooperation Accords With Baltics

PM0503123691 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Feb 91 p 6

["OD/mik" report: "Denmark Wants Further Baltic Cooperation"]

[Text] Denmark will draft cooperation protocols with each of the Baltic countries in which the Danish Government will confirm Denmark's 1921 recognition of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

The protocols will also set new targets for the cooperation between Denmark and the Baltic region, including the desire to establish diplomatic relations.

This was announced yesterday by Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal) after a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council. He said that on the fringes of the Nordic Council session he had had talks on Monday [25 February] with representatives of the three countries.

On the possibility of diplomatic ties Ellemann-Jensen said that this presupposes Soviet acceptance.

"This presupposes agreements between the government in Moscow and the three Baltic countries. That is why we are applying constant pressure to the government in Moscow for it to start serious negotiations with the three Baltic countries on all the practical things which will make their formal independence a fact," the foreign minister said.

He also pointed to the fact that so far Iceland has only decided to investigate when it would be practicable to establish diplomatic relations.

He described as an "empty gesture" the appointment of an ambassador unable to function in practice.

Ellemann-Jensen asked the journalists present to ask their editors whether there is a newspaper which has a spare printing press. NAESTVED TIDENDE has just donated its old printing equipment to Lithuania. But now Latvia also needs printing equipment, because Soviet troops have confiscated existing equipment, he said.

Prime Minister Poul Schluter (Conservative) joked that it might be possible to send the press from the now sadly departed LAND OG FOLK [Communist Party newspaper].

Existence of Lithuanian Salvation Committee Denied

LD0503234291 Vilnius International Service in English 2300 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] An officer of the Lithuanian branch of the KGB, who asked to remain anonymous, claims that the National Salvation Committee of Lithuania never existed.

As you may know, on 13 January and the following days various documents, including the appeal to the military to storm key installations in Vilnius, were proclaimed in the name of the National Salvation Committee, whose personal composition was never made public, and which eventually declared it was suspending its activity.

In the Vilnius-published newspaper FORUMAS the anonymous senior officer of the KGB asserts that a

National Salvation Committee had to be formed only after seizing power in Lithuania. A number of people enjoying considerable prestige among the population, but actually working for the KGB, had been expected to gradually form the National Salvation Committee, consisting mainly of Lithuanians.

In the opinion of the KGB officer, there ought to be no new bloodshed in Lithuania, because after the January failure the KGB was changing its tactics. The main pressure now is expected to be put on the parliament and the Lithuanian nation with a view of dividing them and setting one section against another.

The KGB officer, whose identity is known to the FORUMAS newspaper editorial staff, claims that already back in September 1989 an order was received from Moscow to draft a plan of future mass actions in Lithuania. The plan was approved by the then KGB chief in Lithuania General Eismuntas. It is not known who gave the final approval in Moscow, but Soviet KGB Chief Kryuchkov is believed to have been aware of the plan.

The anonymous KGB officer was very critical about the activity of the state security department of the Republic of Lithuania, both during the January crisis and on the whole.

Lithuanian Civic Committee Urges Pro-Union Vote

LD0503154291 Moscow TASS in English 1518 GMT 5 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius March 5 TASS—Work collectives of enterprises in Lithuania managed by central agencies and a number of public organisations representing mainly the non-native population are preparing for the all-Union referendum on the future of the USSR.

The Lithuanian Civic Committee called on citizens of the republic to show maturity and responsibility for Lithuania's destiny and to declare for the preservation of the Soviet Union during the referendum on March 17.

The committee's appeal circulated here says that "leaders of the Lithuanian parliament and government grossly misrepresenting Lithuania's position within the Soviet Union in its statement of February 22, 1991 try to prevent residents of the republic from participating in the referendum. National-separatists try to tear the republic away from the Soviet Union behind people's backs and to restore an exploiter regime. Because of this policy, Lithuania may lose its independence and territorial integrity."

The Lithuanian Civic Committee emphasises in the appeal that participation in the referendum and declaration in favour of the union will mean "national rebirth in conditions of self-determination, deepening of democracy and glasnost, social peace and inter-ethnic accord, the Soviet Union's guarantees for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lithuania and normal functioning of the economy. [no closing quote as received]

Lithuanian CP Rejects Registration Denial

91UN0978A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Stroganov: "Extremism Has Gone on the Attack"]

[Text] Vilnius—*The decision adopted by the Administration for Press Control of the Lithuanian Republic MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] shocked many representatives of the intelligentsia, but it did not surprise those it affects directly. They were well aware of the peculiarities of the local "democracy." What happened? This is what the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat said in a statement on this subject.*

The statement says that the Administration for Press Control under the Lithuanian Republic MVD, guided by the recommendations of a Lithuanian Government commission and approved by the Government of the Lithuanian Republic, published Order No. 3 on the cessation of publication of all newspapers of the Lithuanian Communist Party and of radio Taribu Letuva. The reason for such an order, according to a statement by its authors, is the assertion that the aforementioned mass media organs allegedly belong to "an organization that is not properly registered in Lithuania."

The Central Committee Secretariat resolutely rejects the argument that the Lithuanian Communist Party allegedly is not registered in the republic.

It is well known that the Communist Party of Lithuania, which was created in October 1918, was registered at the Lithuanian Republic MVD on 25 June 1940 under no. 9726, says the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat. The act of registration was confirmed by a decree of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet dated 7 December 1989 "Concerning Political Parties," in which the Lithuanian Communist Party is recognized as the legal successor of the Lithuanian Communist Party that was registered in the Ministry of Internal Affairs on 25 June 1940.

Moreover, the statement says that in March 1990 the chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers once again confirmed that the question of the registration of the Lithuanian Communist Party is resolved on the basis of registration in the Lithuanian Republic MVD of 25 June 1940. The groundlessness of the arguments of the latter-day suppressors of free speech is obvious from their actions, the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee believes. It was the Administration for Press Control under the Lithuanian MVD that issued founding certificates to the aforementioned

newspapers of the Lithuanian Communist Party on 4 June, 23 July, 29 August, 13 September, and 10 October 1990.

It is perfectly obvious, the statement says further, that the only "violation" by the Lithuanian Communist Party newspapers lies in the fact that their pages bring the truth to the Lithuanian people, uncover the true face of the current regime and its danger for the fate of Lithuania, and defend the interests of the worker.

...I will add that, with the birth of the "Sajudis" movement, hundreds of its publications congested the kiosks of the republic, and some of the former party newspapers were reoriented; however, none of the authorities at that time—neither republic nor Union—placed obstacles in the path, as it seemed, of developing pluralism. But the Lithuanian Communist Party newspapers that did not break ties with the CPSU continuously experienced difficulties. They were prevented from printing in the republic, obstacles were put in the way of dissemination, and even the path to registration ran into all kinds of impediments. And so—the end.

RSFSR

Left-Center Bloc Nominates Yeltsin for President

LD0603091191 Moscow TASS in English 0856 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 6 TASS—Without waiting for the results of a republican-wide plebiscite on whether to introduce an executive presidency in Russia, the left-centre bloc of political parties has nominated Boris Yeltsin for the Russian Presidency.

The bloc also decided to ask the Russian parliament to introduce the "symbolic status of the Russian tsar" and grant it to "Grand Duke Vladimir, who is now living abroad. [no end quotation marks as received]

Leaders Warn of Yeltsin 'Personality Cult'

LD0503172591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1530 GMT 5 Mar 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov and Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Mar (TASS)—The group of leaders of the Russian Federation's legislature and its chambers who on 21 February came out with sharp criticism of Boris Yeltsin, leader of the Russian legislature, has rejected accusations in the press to the effect that their political statement was allegedly part "of a scenario prepared in the CPSU Central Committee."

"Our political statement was not directed against anyone personally; rather, it made an assessment of the current situation in the republic," Ramazan Abdulatipov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Russian Supreme Soviet, said at a meeting with journalists, which took place today.

The statement made by the group at a session of the Russian Supreme Soviet on 21 February contained a demand to immediately convene an extraordinary congress of people's deputies of Russia. As is known, the Supreme Soviet later decided to convene a congress in Moscow on 28 March.

The speaker of the Soviet of Nationalities stressed that both the people and Russia's corps of deputies "pinned enormous hopes on Boris Yeltsin." He added that "gradually we came to understand that policy is being increasingly diverted elsewhere, and that we are increasingly becoming hostages of a personality cult." The premise that there are signs of "Boris Yeltsin's personality cult" was seconded by Vladimir Isakov, head of the Soviet of the republic, the other chamber of the legislature.

According to Boris Isayev, deputy leader of the legislature, the authors of the political statement "did not pursue the goal of raising the issue of Boris Yeltsin's resignation." It was a question of giving an evaluation to the situation that had come about in Russia. Svetlana Goryacheva, his colleague, added that their political statement "must not be regarded as an ultimatum."

At the same time Vladimir Isakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Republic, admitted the political statement by six Russian figures "has been perceived extremely ambiguously." "We are aware of Boris Yeltsin's enormous popularity", he said, "and if the chairman of Russia's Supreme Soviet expresses readiness to act within the framework of law, we are prepared to cooperate with him."

Among the reasons which prompted the political statement, its authors named a sharp deterioration of the economic situation in Russia. Vitaliy Syrovatko, deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, named the supremacy of republican laws over Union laws on RSFSR territory proclaimed by Russian legislators among the causes of that deterioration.

Participants in the meeting with journalists evaluated Boris Yeltsin's 19 February interview with USSR Central Television negatively. In the interview, Yeltsin demanded that Mikhail Gorbachev, the country's president, resign. Having touched upon the premise of bad relations between Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, Ramazan Abdulatipov pointed out that "we do not want to be hostages of individuals and relations between them."

Russian Leaders Hold News Conference 5 Mar

LD0603005791

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1830 GMT on 5 March broadcasts a 14-minute recorded news conference at the USSR Ministry of

Foreign Affairs Press Center with Comrades Goryacheva, Isayev, Abdulatipov, Isakov, Vishnyakov, and Syrovatko, representatives of the leadership of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet who signed a political statement demanding the convocation of an extraordinary republican congress of people's deputies in Moscow on 5 March. The deputies are not individually identified.

In reply to a question from correspondent Zherebkin on whether a person such as Yeltsin, given his position and influence, may express his personal opinion, knowing that it may lead to confrontation, and if Yeltsin's address is an expression of the designs of political forces which want the real power enjoyed by the president, implying that Yeltsin acted as executor of these designs, an unidentified deputy answers: "I would like us not simply to speak of the statements, including the addresses. I think it is a wider question—of the political situation. If an answer is to be given, then I think that when the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia speaks on Central Television then, naturally, people expect his address not to be the personal opinion of the chairman, but in this instance the opinion of the head of the leadership of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic.

"A small detail here. It is often asked of us today how can it be that you did not consult beforehand with the Presidium, with the leadership, with a certain leadership, but went ahead and spoke right away? But we spoke addressing the Supreme Soviet of Russia, speaking to the people's deputies of Russia, who entrusted us with these duties and posts which we hold. Boris Nikolayevich, unfortunately, at the Presidium on Monday, did not say a word about his speech and statement, and the next day it was cleared up—but on the 19th, on the screen of central television. Concerning the fact that some kind of political structures, as it were, are behind us—and in particular concerning the hints at the CPSU Central Committee—we are people of completely different views, also as far as the political situation goes. But we are united in what we said. Beside me sit non-party members. I am a member of the CPSU. There were also among us representatives of Communists of Russia—in my opinion, Vitaliy Grigoriyev Syrovatko, unless I am mistaken. The others, on the whole, do not belong any bloc at all. What we said, what we stated, was said namely on the strength of our internal convictions, of, our, well, as Svetlana Petrovna said when these questions were stated, according to our conscience, which prompted the necessity of such a step."

An unidentified correspondent then asks if they will try to bring about the resignation of Yeltsin at the third RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies.

An unidentifed deputy answers: "We have not set such an aim for ourselves. At the beginning of my speech, I said our main aim at this congress is to find our position, and to find ways out of the crisis gripping our society, the Russian Federation. Therefore, it is not a question of obtaining the resignation of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin at that congress."

A second unidentified deputy adds that "it is a question of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the Congress of People's Deputies defining that policy—and the chairman, regardless of who the chairman will be, is to implement that policy. It is not the chairman who should foist his policy upon the supreme body, but the supreme body should ask the chairman how he is implementing that policy. Therefore we think that everything will depend upon how that political situation is seen by the chairman himself, by his entourage, and so forth. That is to say, the congress will show everything."

A third unidentified deputy then says: "Esteemed gentlemen and Comrades, you should note that so far, at the present stage, now that the agenda of the extraordinary congress has been determined, it can be seen already that we have made a compromise, that we are seeking ways to cooperate in that responsible activity—if only by defining an agenda differing from that set down in our political statement. It bears the character not of an account by the president, but of a report by the president on the political situation, and on the procedure for getting out of the crisis situation."

An EL PAIS correspondent then notes that the tone of the six has become milder, and that they seem to have changed their position. She asks them what has happened since the statement read out at the Supreme Soviet by Goryacheva to make them mitigate their position.

Goryacheva replies: "I would like to answer that question rather briefly. In our political statement we raised the question of the convocation of an extraordinary congress. I think that the main questions of our political and economic life must be decided at it. The question of the resignation of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet was not raised in our statement. Moreover, we did not name a specific date for the congress, and agreed with the date set by the Supreme Soviet. Therefore, that statement should not be regarded as our ultimatum."

An unidentified deputy then says: "You all probably know the huge popularity of the personality of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, and we know it, too. Of course in this situation, well, our statement—and that can be seen from letters, from telegrams—has been received in an extremely unequivocal way. Therefore in thinking about the future of Russia, we do not raise the question that we are completely irreconcilable. If the president expresses the readiness to act on the basis of the law, within the course defined by the Supreme Soviet and the congress, we are ready to cooperate with everyone. If he implements his policy for confrontation, there cannot be any cooperation."

A Sodruzhestvo television correspondent then asks if they think there is any way for Yeltsin to resolve the conflict that had come to a head other than by appearing on television.

An unidentified deputy replies: "The political statement is not linked at all with the address by Boris Nikolayevich on central television. The statement was prepared by the time that Boris Nikolayevich appeared on Central Television. Perhaps we just supplemented that paragraph, which also concerns the speech on central television. It is question of the policy which is being carried out in fact without consulting with—without conforming to—the position of the Presidium, and in particular with the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. It is a question of us, on the one hand, as plenipotentiary representatives...[changes thought] Let us say that Isakov and I are sitting in Morozovka, working on the Union treaty, thinking that we are plenipotentiary representatives, and on the other hand a completely different policy is being carried out with respect to the Union and the Union treaty. Some like the fact that the struggle against the Union is allegedly the struggle against Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. I stress once again that Gorbachev and Yeltsin will be on the political arena another five or ten years at most, but the homeland, the Union and Russia, will exist for centuries still. Therefore one must think not of them, but of the fate of the homeland."

An unidentified correspondent asks if the six are experiencing any kind of pressure from the Supreme Soviet.

An unidentified deputy replies: "There was a reaction when Svetlana Petrovna read out the statement. But now there is great pressure on the part of the leadership of the Supreme Soviet. I personally am not experiencing any. I do not think that any of those who signed the political statement are experiencing such a thing."

Goryacheva then says: "As you know from the mass media, 11 members of the Presidium out of 31 did not support us: that is to say, the others, at least, are keeping silent. When we were holding such a dialogue yesterday, at a closed sitting of the Presidium, so to speak, a great many expressed reproaches—also those directed at Boris Nikolayevich—in connection with the fact that many do not understand, members of the Presidium do not understand, their role in the Presidium. It turns out that we all bear some kind of decorative character, and it was a question of that yesterday. Unfortunately, Boris Nikolayevich was not present at the Presidium, although he went to work—but it was explained to us that it was in connection with the state of his health. That is possible."

An unidentified deputy then says: "It is worth noting that a member of the Presidium said in particular that unfortunately, we did not elect a tsar: we elected a chairman."

Another unidentified deputy then says: "But there is great pressure. I would like to say that there is great pressure from the masses—let us put it like that. I do not know how to say that better, in French or in English, but there is pressure under way, in the sense that one gets calls at home. For instance, I in particular have been obliged to have my telephone number changed. Well, then there is the same thing in the entry hall—the old women who meet one fanatically, time and again. But well, Boris Nikolayevich and Khasbulatov have bodyguards. In this sense, of course, it is very difficult for us, and on the whole we thought, the people as a whole think, of the leadership in stereotypes. Policy is not being thought about at a broad level yet."

A Moscow Radio correspondent asks the representatives to name laws adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet that have helped to make the situation worse.

An unidentified deputy replies: "I would take a political look at the first document that we adopted—adopted in a state of patriotic arousal—when the declaration of sovereignty was adopted. True, I have to say that there was unanimity: 1,004 deputies voted. True, paragraph five of that document should be analyzed and looked at critically, first of all. It was a question there of the priority of the Constitution, of the mechanism of the laws, and of the priority of Russian laws over Union ones—and that led to the war of laws."

A SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent then asks Isakov to name specific examples of violation by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of the existing legislation.

Isakov replies: "One of the first laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation was the standing orders of the Supreme Soviet itself determining the procedure for deciding these—well—any questions of the life and activity of the parliament. Now, tens of examples may be given of the most blatant violation of the standing orders, and of the approval of structures, staff, estimates of the expenditure of the Supreme Soviet, already now. It has begun—it may be said that it has just begun—and already now it can been seen at certain levels that estimates of the expenditure of the Supreme Soviet will be exceeded by almost twofold. More serious examples may be given not only concerning the policy or activities of the Supreme Soviet. In my point of view, the law on property adopted by the Supreme Soviet is at variance with the Constitution—in particular in those paragraphs which concern the equality of all forms of ownership."

Commission Discusses Future USSR Organization

LD0503210891 Moscow TASS in English 1936 GMT 5 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Kozmin]

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—A draft Union treaty, approved on March 1 by representatives of 27 Soviet republics, including eight Union republics, will be submitted to the Third Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation that will open in Moscow on March 28.

The decision was made today at a meeting of the congress commission for the working out of amendments to the draft Union treaty.

The day-long meeting was chaired by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Vice President Ruslan Khasbulatov.

A press release about the meeting says that its participants discussed the future of the Soviet Union, ways to organise activities of its bodies of power and administration and the separation of powers between the centre and Union republics.

North Ossetia To Abstain From 17 Mar Referendum

LD0603074191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2100 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] A TASS correspondent reports from Vladikavkaz that the referendum of the Russian Federation will not be held in the territory of the North Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic on 17 March. In the view of the majority of deputies of the republic's Supreme Soviet, simultaneous holding of two referenda on one day will complicate an already tense situation in the republic.

Silayev on Media Efforts To Undermine Government

PM0503165891 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 7, 17-24 Feb 91 p 1

[Interview with RSFSR Prime Minister Ivan Silayev by Lyudmila Telen; place and date not given: "Mistake, Crime or Political Game?"]

[Text] Q.: The scandal around the "case of 140 billion roubles" is swelling. And the impression is that the investigation is being conducted more by the press than by the Procurator's Office or the KGB. The number of people being implicated is growing with each publication: first British businessman Paul Pearson was detained at Customs. Then the assistant Prime Minister Gennadiy Filshin was accused. The newspaper Glasnost published by the CPSU Central Committee, says: "I'm not sure what the foreign firm did after the draft contract was approved, we all know well what the Russian government did-it prepared a new packet of economic laws to provide a legal basis for the coming 'deal of the century'." As the head of Russia's government, what do you think of this development?

A.: I have to admit, the way events developed put me immediately on my guard. The KGB had discoverd what it considered to be a suspicious document signed by my deputy. It would have been sensible had the KGB let me know at once. Instead, I learned about if from the evening TV news Vremya. The next day many newspapers were pointing an accusing finger at Filshin. But there's more to it. Hardly had the Procurator's Office instituted a legal procedure when the press equated Filshin's transactions as actions performed by the government of the Russian Republic. This let burst a storm of indignation against the Russian cabinet. Perhaps this is why the Procurator's Office and the KGB avoid contact with us. There is no logic, to put it mildly, not to mention a moral side to the affair. There needs to be certain ethics in relations between heads of government institutions.

Q.: Especially when they are partners in the public arena. But is this the case here? Do you feel perhaps that your accusers-those in the media and in the government-are steering, intentionally or otherwise, towards a political scandal?

A.: Yes, it looks that way. Otherwise how can you account for the attempts to predate the investigator's conclusions? In addition, the commission of deputies set up by the Supreme Soviet of Russia still has not drawn its own conclusions. Concern for objectivity and the law mandate that one should not go ahead of events. But no, the newspapers Sovetskaya Rossiya, Rabochaya Tribuna and the already mentioned Glasnost have blown everything out of proportion and are out to try to discredit Russia's government.

Q.: As I see it, this suggests only one conclusion: those opposing your government aren't looking for the truth. They're seeking to tarnish the reputations of Russia's leaders. And perhaps that's why they've turned to muckraking. At first the project was called a "contract". Then a "deal". Next, the "deal of the century". Now I've heard it called the "swindle of the century"! But perhaps you'd do better to more quickly give your assessment of this transaction. As I see it, Russia's government and parliament are not denying their involvement.

A.: We still don't have the whole truth about the deal. I can only repeat that we're waiting for the results of the investigation and the parliamentary inquiry. How can anyone draw conclusions in advance? I'm convinced that the whole affair is perfectly legal.

Yeltsin-Gorbachev Conflict Viewed

91UN0989A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Sergey Kozheurov: "Has Boris Nikolayevich Really Fallen Out With Mikhail Sergeyevich?"]

[Text] It has been 10 days since B. Yeltsin, in a television appearance, demanded the USSR president's resignation; the world, judging by all signs, is still the same. We know from well-informed sources that the president continues to carry out his duties.

There is no question that B. Yeltsin's statement during the last minutes of his television interview has produced a lot of noise in both parliaments, pulled citizens tired of politics back to their televisions sets, created an additional volume of work for telegraph employees, and in general made our bland life somewhat livelier—especially in those places where, according to spiteful critics, even salt is already rationed. Not to mention multi-thousand-strong rallies at Manezhnaya Square.

If this is the effect the chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet wanted; if he was counting, again, on "rousing Russia," and, with its citizens' support, "putting pressure" on his political opponents and vacillating people's deputies, he may be congratulated for having achieved a smashing success. Just compare: Even the unprecedented (let us refrain from other value judgments) attack on the Russian chairman that unfolded in mass media "close to the center" immediately after the Baltic conflict has not caused the same reaction as his direct appeal to the people demanding the president's resignation.

The inverse is also true: If, by accusing B. Yeltsin once again of inordinate personal ambition, confrontational style, and a "struggle for power" his opponents thus intended to discredit the Russian leader, I dare say they achieved exactly the opposite result. (By the way, one of the deputies called B. Yeltsin's censure in the Union parliament a 1987-style "persecution." I think he is "off" by exactly 50 years. History repeats itself, usually turning tragedy into farce, but unfortunately it does not teach us anything.)

By his statement B. Yeltsin, I think, has destroyed the last illusions of those citizens who still believe that the destiny of our country depends on the relationship between our two acknowledged leaders. The personal relations factor has always been present in their actions. But I for one agree with M. Gorbachev. Everything would have been simple if the problem was only in the personal relationship...

Let us accept it as an axiom that any statement by any politician (and Yeltsin is a politician), no matter how subjective it may be, does not reflect ambitions alone. The clash between political leaders is the clash between two different goals, different approaches, different political lines. Above everything else.

Having agreed on that, it will be easier for us to give a direct answer to a direct question: Can politicians be accused of confrontation if there is no objective basis for unity (or, as they say now, consolidation)? Does somebody really think such a basis may be provided by the "sovereignty war," "the war of laws," "the war of banks," or any other "wars" invisible to the world that are being conducted on one-sixth of the world's territory? One need only recall the 500 days program, first supported by the president and then safely buried, not without his own participation, to spare the reader a long list of presidential decrees and Union laws and resolutions that block or freeze almost all economic initiatives of the Russian government. Thus Yeltsin, having ostensibly announced the war on the center, in reality only belatedly acknowledged its existence on his own territory. Although I want for objectivity's sake to give each his due, I am not able to apportion the responsibility equally between the center and the republic. By the way, it is not entirely clear what flag the Russian ship is flying now. Is it "Attack Imminent" or "Better Perish Than Surrender"?

A politician is best judged by his actions. We are forced to do it by his intentions. Look at the Russian Constitution (the one currently in force, of course): Does the chairman have many rights? This is de jure. And de facto? A politician with his hands tied—is there anything more incongruous?

Therefore, for me personally the key word in B. Yeltsin's statement was not "resignation." Remember! "I disassociate myself from the president's policy." Only then: "I call for his immediate resignation."

"Disassociate myself!" From the economic policy of the center that has for a long time caused only distress among the people. What else can one do if the Russian economic policy does not cause anything at all—it simply does not exist.

I can understand those who criticize Yeltsin for throwing his challenge to the center at this moment—not the most propitious in our history. I can understand Yeltsin's own logic, too. To disassociate himself? Precisely now, on the eve of the referendum to strengthen the center; then, for sure, it will not let the republic "take its own steps." On the eve of presidential election in Russia itself. To free himself of the burden of errors and unpopular decisions of the Union government; and simultaneously, to free himself of the opponents in his own parliament, headed by the "Russian communists," who some time ago—together with supporters of Democratic Russia—voted for Russian sovereignty but, as it turned out, put a somewhat different meaning in it, and now, it seems, would not mind getting rid of Yeltsin himself.

It seems that we are destined to live through another period of "all-out disassociation." Yeltsin disassociates himself from Gorbachev, Yeltsin's deputies disassociate themselves from him... When politicians make their choices, it is normal. They are supposed to. What are all of us to do? Also choose? What if we do not want to?

Our people already made their choice once—the socialist one. Then, they say, we chose collectivization. Then something else. Or somebody else. In 1985 the people again all of a sudden decided to choose—they chose perestroyka. And now, here we go again: Are you for Yeltsin or for Gorbachev?

In the beginning of the century, in a similar watershed moment, one statesman also defined his choice: "You want great cataclysms; we want a great Russia." At the end of the century, unless I am mistaken, we do not even have that choice. Because, it seems, the only road to a great Russia is through great cataclysms.

I wish so much it could be otherwise!

Goryacheva Explains Stance on Yeltsin

91UN0981C Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 9, Mar 91 p 5

[Interview with S. Goryacheva, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent A. Uglanov; place and date not given: "Positions Clarified"]

[Text] *As we know, a group of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies made a political statement against Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet B. Yeltsin.*

This statement, which was published in a situation that was charged to begin with, poured oil on the fire and widened the split both among the deputies and in society. We offer for your attention a conversation between our correspondent and Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet S. Goryacheva.

[Uglanov] Svetlana Petrovna, when did you come to understand that the chairman's position did not coincide with yours? As I recall, several months ago when B. Yeltsin arrived in the Far East you, like tens and hundreds of Far Easterners, your constituents, demonstrated your support for him.

[Goryacheva] I wish to say that right after B. Yeltsin was elected I thought it was a good thing. He had a credit of confidence among the people. And what we proclaimed at the first congress was a worthy life for Russians. Our strategy was quite correct. The chairman's activity during the first months of his work, in my opinion, was progressive. But the tactic of confrontation and endless ultimatums to the center divided us. Opposition was introduced into society as into the parliament.

The first alarm "bell" was sounded at the second extraordinary congress when V. Isakov, chairman of the chamber of the Soviet of the Republic of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, made a negative statement. The chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, R. Abdulatipov, also stated that B. Yeltsin was surrounded by people who are "high-class con artists" and not by those who could suggest the correct path. I thought that the criticism would be accepted correctly, but this is not what happened.

Even in January when I spent some time at home in the Far East, saw the empty shelves and the growing waiting lines, and spoke with the people, they told me right out: "Stop playing politics! Direct your efforts toward solving economic problems. Otherwise we will soon lose our faith in you." After that I spoke with B. Yeltsin, but we did not reach an understanding.

Then there were the events in the Baltics, and there was an unexpected attitude toward them in the Presidium. In particular, I was against convening the session early, and from my conversations with the chairmen of the chambers I understood that we thought the same way regarding this issue—there was no point in taking hasty political steps.

But I was literally bowled over by what happened next—I have in mind the price policy proposed by Pavlov's Cabinet of Ministers. I myself was present at the meeting of the RSFSR Federation Council. With the exception perhaps of G. Popov (true, A. Sobchak and V. Makharadze expressed doubts), everyone asked B. Yeltsin to take this unpopular measure since we have no other way out!

[Uglanov] You have in mind the price increases planned by Pavlov's cabinet?

[Goryacheva] Yes. It seemed to me that members of the Federation Council could have convinced him. But in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, in violation of its regulations, he put the question to a vote: Who was for and who against agreeing to the proposed price reform and ordering the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to sign this resolution? Before posing this question he declared his negative attitude toward these measures. There was pressure on the deputies, since according to the regulations he was not supposed to have made any comments.

As we know, this decision did not receive a majority of votes. The next day I found out that even before the voting, B. Yeltsin had already given an answer to Pavlov in which he categorically refused to sign the agreement for the price reform.

For me this was like a bolt out of the blue, I was simply in shock, and I told him right out that I could not understand his policy.

The next thing was his speech on Central Television.

All six of the people who signed the statement belong to different political schools. V. Isakov and A. Veshnyakov were initially in the Democratic Russia bloc and V. Isakov even withdrew from the CPSU. Ya.R. Abdulatipov and B. Isayev were not a part of any movement. I consider my position to be in the center. So this was not a conspiracy of party forces or anyone else.

[Uglanov] While condemning B. Yeltsin for the unpredictability of his decisions, you nonetheless made a political statement without first consulting with all the members of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and in the absence of the chairman himself. What was the reason for such haste?

[Goryacheva] According to the RSFSR Constitution, we are elected as the highest leaders of the republic: the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the chairmen of the chambers, and their deputies. As of today we are just as responsible for policy as B. Yeltsin is.

This being the case, we thought that many questions of political policy should have been decided initially in this

narrow group and then in the Presidium, which will consist of 31 deputies. I think the main thing is the essence of the position we have presented.

[Uglanov] Just before meeting with you I asked A. Veshnyakov, deputy chairman of the Soviet of the Republic, if his viewpoint is a reflection of the position of the voters, and he answered in the affirmative. Can you say the same thing about yourself?

[Goryacheva] In the first place, I have not yet been back to my electoral district in the Far East. But I intend to go there in the very near future in order to clarify my position.

In this situation, if the voters do not understand me they have the right to recall me or I myself can resign from my position as deputy chairman or even as people's deputy. This is my right.

I wish to say this. I was nominated by the kray committee for radio and television. I am answerable mainly to this collective. We know from the press that 20 of them have already demanded my recall, but that is by no means all of them—more than 300 people work there. I know that the labor collective has postponed discussion of this issue until I return and justify my actions.

I will not avoid any meetings. If they do not understand me, at least I will know that my conscience is clear.

[Uglanov] Svetlana Petrovna, many people think that the statement you signed was inspired by the Russian Communist Party and the CPSU Central Committee. They offered as evidence the facts that it was broadcast repeatedly, that the text was published in the CPSU press, and that a number of the people who signed it live in the hotel of the CPSU Central Committee; and there are rumors about your telephone conversation with USSR President M. Gorbachev.

[Goryacheva] From the very beginning, like all RSFSR people's deputies, we lived in the Rossiya Hotel. Subsequently, after we were elected deputies, R. Khasbulatov offered to let the leaders of the Supreme Soviet move into a hotel closer to where we work in the Arbat. I do not know who has jurisdiction over this small, quiet hotel, but it is not the immense building of the Oktyabrskaya Hotel which was built by the CPSU Central Committee not far from the Kremlin.

I also wish to repeat once again that I have neither met nor spoken with either M. Gorbachev or I. Polozkov. But if I were to meet with M. Gorbachev I would tell him a great deal about the fate of our Union, including some things about himself which are not very flattering.

In conclusion, speaking of convening an extraordinary RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, we had in mind that because of the split our work has reached a critical condition and this problem must be resolved. That is the main thing.

The political statement did not raise the question of B.N. Yeltsin's retirement. We just said that a congress was necessary in order to hear him and perhaps to tell him where he was wrong. Perhaps the majority of votes at the congress would support his position, we do not know yet! But a congress is necessary—for everyone equally, especially under the conditions of such an economic and political crisis in Russia.

Polozkov Attends Party Secretaries' Seminar

PM0503095991 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report under the general heading: "Party Members' Tasks"]

[Text] The sociopolitical situation in the country and the tasks of party organizations are being discussed at a zonal seminar-conference of secretaries of city and rayon committees of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party, which has opened in Novosibirsk.

The participants in the meeting, representing regions of West Siberia, will examine Russia's draft constitution and other legislative initiatives from the republic's Communist people's deputies. The party's agrarian policy at the contemporary stage and problems of cadre training will be at the center of the primary organization secretaries' attention.

Participating in the conference-seminar are I.K. Polozkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee; and I.I. Antonovich and V.I. Kashin, secretaries of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee.

Polozkov Calls for Union of Patriotic Forces

PM0503113191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Speech by I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, at 27 February Moscow conference of sociopolitical and national patriotic associations]

[Text] Esteemed compatriots!

Our forum has met under conditions of the danger of a national-state catastrophe. This obliges us all to earnestly interpret the situation, to rally, and to work together.

Destructive antistate and antinational forces—many have only quite recently constituted an ideological-apologetic elite, participated in the breakdown of the country during the period of so-called stagnation, and amassed wealth and scientific titles from that—have changed into radical-democratic uniforms, seized the mass media, and begun vigorous activity to turn a great power into a raw-materials appendage of multinational corporations. Within a short time pluralism has turned

into radical-democratic diktat, and emulation of U.S.-style democracy has become a means of destroying the USSR's integrity in order then to dismember Russia too into appanage principalities, sovereign republics, federal districts, and free economic zones.

The crisis has embraced the entire system of social and economic ties, political life, and spirituality. It has painfully penetrated all the pores of national-cultural life. The property stratification of society is growing. The material position of broad sections of the population, particularly working sections, is becoming poorer, while that of other categories—members of the shadow economy and of cooperatives—is growing sharply.

This gloomy prospect for Russia, for the great Russian people, and for the other peoples of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] prompts us Russian Communists to take a new and more ciritical look at perestroyka and to make a sober analysis of the mistakes and miscalculations made during it. We believe that the causes which have brought the country to the brink of disaster lie not only in past defects, not only in the mistakes made during the years of perestroyka, not only in the raging of separatism and nationalism. The all-embracing crisis which has erupted in the country is linked, above all, with a crisis of competence, a crisis of political will, a crisis of the morality of culture. Democratization is increasingly degenerating into ochlocracy and total license; the rule-of-law state into the mass denial of rights to our citizens; humanism into the raging of crime, vulgarity, and cynicism; glasnost into an information war against our own people and the constitutional system.

The tremendous hopes pinned on certain democratically elected soviets of people's deputies during the first years of perestroyka have largely not been justified, for many of them have been unable to arrange mutual feedback between the corps of deputies and the voters. Individual soviets have turned into a bridgehead for antinational and antistate forces, have actively joined in the laws war, which is destructive to the prospects for a rule-of-law state, and have made their territories and establishments available for many irresponsible experiments.

The emasculation of democracy in the lawmaking of some of our republican parliaments is akin only to their slide toward overt dictatorship and authoritarianism. What other assessment can one make of a number of draconian laws adopted in the Baltic republics which grossly flout the Declaration of Human Rights, discriminate overtly against the Russian-speaking population, and in Lithuania even allow reprisals against activists of Soviet power.

It is with deep pain that we watch the country literally shuddering at the interethnic conflicts tearing it apart. Society is tossing in agony. In some places Russians are becoming superfluous people in their own country. Particularly tragic is the fate of millions of Russians living not in the RSFSR but in other union republics. These "occupiers"—descendants of Russians who have lived on these lands for decades and even centuries—are being frightened and driven out of the Baltic region, the Transcaucasus, Moldova, and Central Asia. We already have 600,000 Russian-speaking refugees—our brothers and sisters forced to move to their historical motherland because of the raging of nationalism.

The expectations of "Russian-speaking" citizens prompted by the RSFSR Declaration of State Sovereignty, adopted approximately six months ago and one of whose points guarantees protection of the rights of Russians living outside Russia, have been disappointed. Unless you count one or two documents of a declarative nature, no concrete steps have been taken in this direction. What is more, with a stroke of the pen by the leadership of the Russian Parliament, Russia has now pledged to defend the sovereignty of the Baltic republics, whose governments are grossly flouting human rights and overtly discriminating against the Russian-speaking population.

This is the general situation taking shape in the USSR and Russia today. There is no need to lay it on thick, just as there are no grounds for joyous statements that everything is taking its normal course. Any other country would call it extremely dangerous for its national interests and for the aims of survival and would do everything in its power to avert from itself the deadly threat. It is time we all stopped taking things easy. The time has come for decisions and actions in the name of national salvation and the preservation of statehood.

"Radical" mass media suggest to people the idea that Russia's Communists want to turn the country toward totalitarianism. In history there is no going back to the past, and we Communists believe that the country must only go forward. But we are firmly convinced that the state-political system cannot develop under conditions of anarchy, regional egoism, and political adventurers' playing on the people's legitimate desire for democracy.

What is needed under crisis conditions is firm state power and strict fulfillment of the constitution. We are the party of legality and order, and it is only through this that we see the possibility of stabilizing state life. It is for this, not to restore the so-called "party's diktat," that we have created groups of Communists in soviets at various levels and are ready for any cooperation on any problems with all political trends, if this helps to preserve statehood and to fulfill the law.

We do not conceal the ideological disagreements with our current political opponents in the persons of the so-called "democrats" and "radicals." However, the situation in the country and the republic is such that the stoking of political passions does not help us to emerge from the crisis or to seek common constructive ends. Therefore, advocating an open dialogue with all public associations and parties, back at our November plenum we proposed declaring a kind of moratorium in the political struggle and beginning a search for sensible

compromises in the name of a reborn and renewed Russia and the preservation of the unified Soviet state.

Without civil peace and concord Russia does not have a future. Antagonisms which go right back to the time of the October revolution and the civil war and which still divide some of us, mutual intolerance, and the thirst for vengeance must be overcome.

Our Russia has taken shape and developed as a multinational state. It is natural that even now the multinational nature of the state demands a most attentive attitude to the conditions of existence, traditions, language, and culture of every people. We Communists favor the development of the national self-awareness and national originality of all the peoples of our multinational Russia. But we are convinced that the flowering of the nations is possible only in a unified Russia, where the dignity of every nation and ethnic group is confirmed by mutual respect and mutual understanding in interethnic relations.

Russia has always been a polyconfessional state. Modern religious trends and organizations are, at last, acquiring the freedom which previously was only declared. At the same time contradictory processes leading to the peoples' disunity have already become apparent in the life of confessions. We also cannot overlook the fact that religious trends which oppose the traditional confessions and undermine the foundations of morality and human spirituality are invading the life of Russia's peoples. Upholding freedom of conscience in principle, we Communists are ready to cooperate with Russia's traditional confessions and with all religious associations which make it their aim to revive national spirituality and to restore the uniqueness of the individual as an organic component of the national-state organism.

Anti-culture now rules the roost in our country. Commercial market relations, spreading to the sphere of spirituality, are emasculating its creative principle. Cold reckoning destroys the lofty impulses and flights of the spirit. We will never reconcile ourselves to culture becoming an object to be bought and sold, and we attach great significance to supporting and finding a common program of action with all organizations and associations defending national cultural-historical traditions.

The present state of Russia's culture insistently demands the elaboration of a new cultural policy in the republic. We urge the representatives of various creative unions participating in the conference to advance an initiative to prepare a draft law regulating and encouraging the preservation of the cultural heritage and the development of modern Russian culture.

We realize that each political movement pursues its own ends and seeks to express the interests of certain sections of society. We realize that each organization and association has its own specific problems and tasks. But we are also convinced that the preservation of Russia is now the most important thing for every citizen, every patriot, and every organization that do not tear themselves away from the history and fate of a great power.

The cohesion of all of society's healthy forces has today assumed truly fateful significance for the motherland's salvation. Russia's pain is our common pain and concern. We representatives of various peoples, parties, public movements, and faiths, who have gathered at this conference, can do a great deal. Russia's peoples must hear our voice, while we must hear the people's call. Rejecting everything that di.unites us and that allows our common home to be pulled down, we must use our forces to organize an all-Russian patriotic movement—the Union of Patriotic Forces.

At this historically crucial hour we must urge all Russians and all parties and associations to consolidate and to deal a resolute rebuff to antistate and antinational forces.

Let us reckon that our conference has been a first trial of strength. Let us gather, consult, and act in the name of Russia, in the name of the historical perspective of the country and the people.

Moscow's Popov Comments on U.S. Trip

PM0503163691 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 8, 24 Feb-3 Mar 91 p 10

[Interview with Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov by Yegor Yakovlev; place and date not given: "The Times, They Are a-Changin', And So Are Opinions"]

[Text] Yegor Yakovlev: Newspapers, like Sovetskaya Rossiya and Glasnost, are keeping a close tab on all foreign trips by representatives of the "so-called democratic forces", to borrow their phrase. Maybe they think it's handy information for any bookkeeper, or an agent of our Economic Crime Squad. So, for their sake, what was the real purpose of your visit to the US?

Gavriil Popov: Initially, I was just to go as Moscow's mayor. But because of the situation in the country's democratic forces and all of us have suddenly found ourselves is radically new, my trip took on broader meaning.

I met with a lot of politicians. State Secretary Baker was one. I talked to his aides and some top people in the US who specialize in the USSR. These included people from the Defence Department, the State Department, the CIA - all of them being policy shapers. I had meetings with Richard Gephardt, the House majority leader, Henry Kissinger, the former State Secretary, and Sen. Edward Kennedy, of course. I talked to the mayors of New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco, business people, university students and public figures.

Evidently, cooperation with the West is crucial to our progress. I think our democrats have underestimated this factor. This recent trip has strengthened that belief.

Yakovlev: Western ambassadors, politicians, journalists and business people are frequent guests at our editorial office. Many of them tend to ask the same question: What can we do to help the Soviet Union given the present circumstances? I always answer: You're not putting the question quite correctly. It would be better to ask yourself: What is the West's opinion of the Soviet Union, given the present circumstances?

Popov: Right. Significantly, for the first time in the past six years, Western politicians are thinking of a special policy vis-a- vis our democratic forces. President Gorbachev used to be in the focus, while our democratic forces were seen by some Western politicians as hindering his plans.

Yakovlev: The times, as they are a-changin', and "Life has created new songs", to quote a poet. Not only the Soviet Union is changing. The United States seems to be ripe for changes, too. Presumably, one can analyze the changes and predict the two countries' interaction.

Popov: I think the democratic forces should realize that the crux of the latest changes is this: any coalition between the Centre is not who we wanted to establish relations with. It is no longer what it used to be. Gorbachev is the only old figure on the board, so the alignment of forces has been changed. Second, Gorbachev has resumed his alliance with the apparat. Let's not specify the reasons why: everybody knows why.

In any case, the conservative forces were the strongest when the massive attack was launched against the 500-day economic rehabilitation programme last September. The nascent coalition with the democrats was tossed aside. What was Gorbachev to do? Restore a right-centrist coalition - a very unpopular move. Yet is was restored, in the guise of the presidency, a semblance of progress. Yet, in actual fact, the presidency was the power of the apparat, where the President himself was not the key man. Two factors are crucial in understanding today's situation: first, the apparat is in power, and second, the President can't control it.

Some people point to the army and the KGB as the forces standing in the way of progress. This is a bad delusion. The motivating force of the current regime is the rejuvenated apparat of the Soviet Communist Party. There are no mystical "national salvation committees" - there is the Lithuanian Communist Party and the Latvian Communist Party. The committees are their creations.

Yakovlev: Until recently, the party and state apparat was viewed as a single conservative force. Today it looks like you have solely the top crust of the CPSU in mind.

Popov: Right. I mean primarily the party apparat in the Centre, the nucleus that seemed to be dying only six months ago, when every apparatchik of the CPSU Central Committee was only thinking of finding a new job. Today, they want the same old functions and the same old authority. They are mostly young people, totally unconnected to the Brezhnevite epoch. They are determined to get everything back. In truth, neither the army, nor the KGB, has lost its power. It was the party apparat that had lost power. Today, it wants to regain the command of science and journalism, the factories and theatres, the shops and the distribution centres. But to regain the command of distribution and posh apartments, they have to control a lot of other things first.

Yakovlev: Let's say the internal situation in the Soviet Union is as you're describing it. What's happening in the USA?

Popov: I have the impression that the USA, just like us, was not ready for military conversion or detente. For years, the Americans were engaged in in-depth military research, launching satellites and producing missiles. Technological scraps were then fed to Japan and other countries to tie their consumer sectors hand and foot. The USA always had its finger in the pie and knew it could always turn off the technological tap. Today the situation is different. The USA has to restructure and compete on a par with Japan and Germany. As I see it, the USA is not yet ready. It is sure of itself, of course, but it needs time, and is playing for time. It needs two or three years to restructure. Meanwhile, it has to control competitors by non-economic methods. The Americans have realized they can beat their competitors by controlling the flow of oil. In this sense, the crisis in the Gulf is threatening not only the means of supplying oil to the USA. The question is whether the USA will be able to continue to use oil to retain its control over Japan and Western Europe.

Yakovlev: How will this affect the flow of American capital to the Soviet economy? Is America reviewing the volume and direction of its potential help to the Soviet Union?

Popov: Under the circumstances, the USA will be using its loans as a mighty leverage. It can freeze its aid to the Soviet Union, and then ration it out if relations worsen. The Americans needed a pretext. And they had it in the form of the tragic events in the Baltics. Hence, its reaction was so radical.

I told the Americans: with the current alignment of forces, any curtailment of aid will only help Soviet conservatives. President Gorbachev's rating will plummet both in the eyes of our general public and the conservatives. Yet the democrats will also suffer. At the same time, any blanket aid through the central authorities will strengthen the conservatives.

The situation is so paradoxial that it calls for untraditional solutions. One, as I see it, is as follows: state-to-state relations are carried out by the countries' two leaders. It can't be otherwise. And only the presidents can sign international agreements between the two governments. But why can't the USA specify the projects it wants its multibillion loans to be spent for? Incidentally, American corporations are all for this approach. They want to go to the USSR and consider all projects in

question before they provide the money. This isn't interference in our internal affairs: it's a common way of protecting one's money.

Ideally, the money should be spent to help raise the new non-state sectors of the Soviet economy—co-ops, joint ventrues, leaseholders, private farmers, etc. This is difficult to attain. I told the Americans: You want it cheap, you want to throw dollars into the Soviet furnace in the hope that the heat will go to where it's needed, but you are wrong. Also, they should concentrate on those regions that are controlled by the democratic forces to make aid more efficient.

I discussed conversion and cooperation in the field. The USSR has failed to propose a viable model. The defence industry got worried, because it can't convert on its own, and has to be included in transnational corporations, in the global market. Only then will it lose its conservative political tinge. Therefore, I think all American corporations that conclude deals with our defence industry should get tax cuts by the US government.

The US aid will be instrumental if three conditions are added: it should be funneled into non-state sectors, the conversion drive should be mutual, and the democratically-controlled regions should be given preference.

On the other hand, the traditional forms of intercourse between Western governments and the Soviet Centre are not nearly enough. New forms should be sought. The USA still views the Soviet Union as a great power, ruled by an emperor of sorts. I told the Americans: If you want solid relations with the USSR, you should streamline your relations with all Soviet strata.

Yakovlev: Yet the latest presidential decrees and the latest moves by the Soviet Cabinet seem to disprove your words. What we see is the striving to strengthen the power of the Centre without any regard for the other strata.

Popov: The Americans were non-plussed by Gorbachev's latest decrees. Take the one on economic sabotage. American businessmen told me: A company's success hinges on its scientific potential. We're willing to bring in the latest technologies, but we're not going to have them distributed via the KGB or the Economic Crime Squad.

Yaklovev: As I see it, you wanted the Americans to understand that they would benefit if they launched broader cooperation with the USSR's democratic forces. But our democrats should be united and better organized. The situation is new, and we're back to square one: the need to better organize all our democratic forces.

Popov: Yes, that's vital. It needs to be done now.

Moscow Paper Apologizes for Slander

PM0403093091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Feb 91 Second Edition p 3

[A. Golovenko report under the "Echo" rubric, as part of "Discussion Sheet No. 82" page: "VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA Explains..."]

[Text] The last issue of the "Discussion Sheet" reported, in a sketch entitled "Watch Out, GLASNOST!", how the independent people's newspaper VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA and KURANTY had slightly slandered the CPSU Central Committee weekly GLASNOST. Specifically, that it had written about a trip to E. Kennedy's villa by G.Kh. Popov during his visit to the United States, a trip that did not in fact take place. Why bother to accuse the weekly of "lying" on such a trivial matter? Whether he went to the villa or not, what's the difference? But Moscow City Soviet, attributing someone's fabrication to GLASNOST, demanded that in future the CPSU Central Committee draw the attention of its publications' editors to their responsibility for "disinformation," under threat of a distribution ban. The GLASNOST leadership also made a polite request to the VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA editorial office to retract the slander.

Now, in Friday's issue, a "clarification" has appeared in VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA. An editorial item reports that "the author of the piece in VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA was drawing on an information bulletin that had been issued to journalists," and therefore "unwittingly misled the readers." One can only sympathize with the independent newspaper's journalist, who so willingly trusted an "information bulletin" prepared, incidentally, by nobody knows whom. KURANTY also apologized. Well done, colleagues!

But who were these persons unknown who inspired the printing of a calumny against a rival weekly? Will they be called to account for the disinformation—after all, that is how Moscow City Soviet saw the matter with regard to the CPSU Central Committee newspapers.

RSFSR Supreme Soviet on Media Problems

91UN0988A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[Article by I. Demchenko: "What Russian Newspapers and Television Have"]

[Text]**On 27 February the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet adopted a decree "On the Condition and Prospects for the Development of a Material and Technical Base for the Mass Media."**

The minister of the press and mass media, M. Poltoranin, called the present situation with the republic's printing base critical. All 1,200 of the Russian printing facilities are worn out, the equipment in 60 percent of them is absolutely obsolete, and, in the minister's words,

no newspapers will be printed in them regardless of whose they are—party, Soviet, or independent. The printing base for producing textbooks (all textbooks in the Russian language in our country are printed in publishing houses under Russian jurisdiction), and also notebooks and children's literature is in the same situation. There are practically no machine-building capacities for printing equipment in the republic and there is no hard currency for buying new printing equipment abroad.

The situation is no better in the area of television and radio broadcasting. The minister for communications, information science, and space, V. Bulgak, speaking before the deputies, reported that the creation of a republic communications network that is adequate to the Union one will take a good deal of time and large investments of hard currency. The attempt to reach an agreement to divide up the spheres of influence with the USSR Ministry of Communications, in the minister's words, has led nowhere so far, since the leadership of the Union ministry, while agreeing to technical cooperation, categorically refuses to participate in the political problems that include this question.

During the course of the discussion of the decree a large argument was evoked by the problem of the independence of local television companies, that today are receiving financial subsidies for their maintenance from the RSFSR Ministry of the Press. It was here, in the subsidies, that certain deputies saw an encroachment on the sovereignty of the local committees, mainly those representing the group "Communists of Russia." But workers of local television and radio companies—and there are many of them in the Russian parliament—on the contrary, asserted that the existing system suits them completely and they do not feel any pressure. Incidentally, the newspapers published by the local organs are also subsidized and receive a quota of paper through the Ministry of the Press, and not a single one of them complained about encroachment on their rights, regardless of the position the editors held with respect to Russian leadership.

The decree that was adopted envisions measures for preserving the independence of local television and radio companies and preventing monopolization of the air waves by the Russian television and radio company, which is operating as their equal competitor. It is interesting that this point was supported by president of the Russian television and radio company, RSFSR People's Deputy O. Poptsov. Moreover, it was decided to continue negotiations to transfer the second Union television channel for use free of charge by the All-Russian State Television and Radio Company. Now, as we know, they have reached an agreement to transfer six hours of broadcast time on this channel, which reaches 92.5 percent of the territory of the RSFSR. The RSFSR Council of Ministers has been instructed to determine the procedure for providing material and technical support for media organs and also local radio and television.

On the morning of 28 February, at a session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, two basic questions were resolved. RSFSR People's Deputy S. Stepashin, a colonel in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for 39 years, was elected chairman of the parliamentary committee for security and 40-year-old People's Deputy V. Stepankov, who has been performing the duties of RSFSR Procurator up to this point, was assigned to this post permanently.

When this issue was signed to press, a discussion of the draft law "On the Procedure for Recalling a RSFSR People's Deputy" was beginning. The very first speaker stated that "if this law were adopted, not a single one of the present deputies would still be in the hall in a year." Apparently the discussion will last a long time and the agenda is crammed full. On 4 March the Russian parliament will take two weeks off.

'Independent' Television Company Established

LD2802225491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1545 GMT 28 Feb 91

[Text] From today onwards many inhabitants of Petropavlovsk- Kamchatskiy will be able to receive a significant portion of television information earlier than the Vremya program. TVK or Kamchatka television, an independent television company, has begun broadcasting in the oblast center. It will make extensive use of teleprinter links with leading Soviet news agencies and satellite television systems to pick up international news. The company has been set up by the [word indistinct] joint stock company. It is not dependent on state television, either materially or organizationally. TVK has its own premises, housing studios, equipment, and transmitters. The programs will consist mainly of music, advertisements, and news.

Western Republics

Belorussian Peasants Party Created in Minsk

PM0503151191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Nikolay Matukovskiy: "Belorussian Peasants Party Created"]

[Text] Minsk—For several months a question has been keenly debated in the pages of the republican newspapers—whether or not there should be a peasants party in Belorussia. The first congress replied unanimously that this party is simply essential.

The Belorussian Peasants Party congress adopted statutes and a policy statement that says in particular that the Belorussian Peasants Party is a party of the parliamentary type (incidentally, several Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic people's deputies took part in the congress' work) of a centrist nature and is being created to defend the peasantry's political rights and economic

interests. The party will seek these aims by parliamentary means, cooperating with all groups, factions, and parties, including the CPSU, and it will avoid confrontation and promote the consolidation of society.

The Belorussian Peasants Party considers its main tasks at the present stage to be the implementation of land reform and the revival of the peasants by returning to them the right to own the means of production, including agricultural land, and the rights to free, guaranteed choice of forms of economic management and the sale of the products of their labor.

During the reform the party will seek to eliminate the administrative-edict system in agriculture.

The congress elected the party's council, the party chairman, and his two deputies.

Belorussian Social Domocratic Party Founded

LD0503151991 Moscow TASS in English 1444 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Vladimir Glod report]

[Text] Minsk March 5 TASS—Shortly after an Agrarian Party was founded in Belorussia, the republic witnessed the founding congress of another political organisation—the Belorussia Social Democratic Gramada.

"The Belorussian word in the name was chosen to show that our party is the legal successor of the Belorussian Socialist Gramada which existed in Belorussia at the beginning of this century," Professor Mikhas Tkachev, chairman of the new party, told TASS.

"The main principles our party adheres to are freedom, fraternity, solidarity and the supremacy of law. We want to create a social and economic system based on these principles, a system capable of ensuring a high standard of living to each person."

The policy statement of the Belorussian Social Democratic Gramada says that it is a parliamentary party and will pursue its policy strictly on a constitutional basis.

Belorussia Stops Live Broadcasts From Legislature

LD0503073991 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] The Belorussian legislature has made a decision that immediately drew attention and provoked a wave of the broadest possible range of contradictory arguments. The legislature has adopted a decision to stop live radio and television broadcasts from its sessions. Henceforth there will only be short reports giving an account of the work of the Supreme Soviet of Belorussia after the event, plus reports by newspaper correspondents.

Belorussian CP Objects To Yeltsin Speech

91UN0972A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 26 Feb 91 p 3

[V. Legankov article: "Statement of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] Minsk, 25 February—The press of the republic has published the statement issued by the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party. It expresses the serious concern caused by Boris N. Yeltsin's speech on Central Television. "In both its manner and its contents," the document states, "the speech serves to heat up the already explosive situation in the country and aims to stir up separatist trends. We strongly object to its irresponsible call for open confrontation and breaking away from the center, its call for a hasty change in the state government system, and the effort to use our existing difficulties to realize personal and group ambitions and claims. Instead of a constructive program, the people are being offered a road that leads objectively to the destruction of a great country, economic chaos, and social disturbances."

The statement also mentions that categorical and intolerant stances by politicians always bring dangerous consequences for society. Political extremes are especially dangerous now, during this most serious crisis when the country is standing at a critical threshold. Today, as never before, we need civil peace and national accord; we need the wise and balanced decisions and conclusions of those whom the people have entrusted with their destiny.

"At this decisive moment," the statement runs, "we have no other choice than to conduct mutual practical actions to save everything that has been created by the toil of many generations. Traditional ties of brotherhood and friendship and of generous mutual assistance always came to the rescue of our multiethnic motherland in hard times. Those who attempt to encroach on these priceless assets cannot expect any popular support." The Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party called upon Communists and all citizens to provide concrete support for the measures taken by the president and the political leadership of our country to stabilize the social and economic situation, install order, and preserve the renewed Union, which will ensure that every sovereign republic and every individual is guaranteed free development.

Moldovan President Rejects Draft Union Treaty

LD0503212191 Moscow TASS in English 2056 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Text] Kishinev March 5 TASS—Moldavian President Mircha Snegur rejected the draft of a new Union treaty here today.

The MOLDOVA-PRESS news agency reports that he alleged in his televised speech that "the idea of dual

citizenship and the proclamation of the Russian language [as the] tongue for relations between republics and the state language in the Soviet Union are incompatible with the charter of sovereign states".

Snegur said that "Moldavia has no legal obligations to the present Union". He recalled his position: "Moldavian lands on the Prut left bank were incorporated in the Union as a result of an additional protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact".

According to Snegur, Moldavia's position compiling the draft of a new Union treaty radically differs from that of the centre: "We advocated a voluntary union of states established by parties to the Union".

Military Call-Up Plan in Moldova Completed

LD0503042191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1255 GMT 4 Mar 91

[MOLDOVA-PRES correspondent Aleksandr Tanas report]

[Text] Kishinev, 4 Mar (TASS)—"The military service call-up plan for filling ranks in the Soviet Army has been completed 100 percent in the left bank of the Dnestr and southern Moldova, and just over two-thirds in the rest of the republic," said Ivan Morozov, USSR people's deputy and commander of the troops of the Red-Banner Odessa Okruga.

There have been no problems with the call-up in the Gagauz and Pridnestrovye republics. The executive bodies of these areas are opposed to creating national military units.

"The situation was difficult in regions where representatives of the People's Front of Moldova have been active," Morozov said. "Their appeals to the young men to boycott the call-up for the USSR Armed Forces have led to desertion in some cases. We think the main thing is not to condemn these young men, but to help them see their errors," the commander of the Odessa military okrug said.

Ukraine's Zlenko Discusses Future Foreign Policy

LD0403163291 Moscow TASS in English 1528 GMT 4 Mar 91

[UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Stanislav Volnyansky report]

[Text] Kiev March 4 TASS—"The Ukraine will shape its foreign policy in keeping with the declaration on its state sovereignty. This policy will ensure the republic's national interests in the political, economic, ecological, informational, scientific, technological and cultural spheres," Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko told UKRINFORM-TASS. He said a renovated Union should be based on more active foreign relations, promoted by the sovereign republics that will voluntarily join it.

"All the countries of the world," Zlenko noted, "irrespective of their size or strength, are striving to expand their foreign relations in various areas. This is done to ensure their national interests more effectively. This is what guides the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet in its legislative efforts, and this is the purpose pursued by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. But the republic is yet unable to exercise all its sovereign rights in the international arena. This requires money and scientifically corroborated concepts.

"This is why it is still the duty of the federal government to tackle certain important international problems. They include strategic armaments, disarmament, regional conflicts, space research, global ecologial programmes and projects, the world ocean," the minister noted.

Zlenko stressed that the Ukraine, as a member of the United Nations, will not be excluded from the process of decision-making concerning these problems. But a council of foreign ministers, which will include both Union and republican diplomats, could be a more efficient and effective instrument. The recent Moscow meeting of foreign ministers from the Union republics and the USSR has discussed the formation of such a council.

"Its functions could include also the coordination of the republics' foreign policies, the elaboration of common stands on bilateral relations and vis-a-vis economic organisations, affecting the interests of all the republics. It could also discuss the candidatures of ambassadors to major countries, questions related to the territorial intergrity of the Soviet Union. All other problems will be within the competence of the republics," Zlenko said.

"The Ukraine's external policy is determined by its Constitution which says that the republic is entitled to establish relations with foreign states, to conclude agreements with them, to exchange diplomatic and consular missions, and to take part in the work of international organisations," the minister stressed.

Zlenko also noted that the meeting of diplomatic representatives in Moscow was marked by an atmosphere of mutual understanding. The proposals advanced by republican foreign ministers were supported by the USSR Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh.

"It was recognised that the republics should engage in broad and active international relations, that only equitable cooperation could provide the basis for a union of sovereign states," Zlenko stressed.

Ukrainian Legislature Debates Poll, Banking Issues

PM0503123191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Sergey Tsikora under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Referendum and Poll on the Same Day"]

[Text] Kiev—There was heated discussion at the Ukrainian legislature's session on holding the 17 March referendum.

The republic Supreme Soviet decided not to enter into conflict with the center and to vote on the future of the Union in accordance with the rules drafted by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Holding a republic poll of the population on Ukrainian territory, for which an additional ballot is being introduced, will mark a divergence from the Union scenario. This is how the question on the ballot is worded: "Do you agree that the Ukraine should be part of a Union of Soviet Sovereign States based on the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine?"

Some deputies fought desperately for the republic poll not to be held on the same day as the Union referendum, claiming that this might confuse people as to what they should opt for—a renewed federation (Union referendum) or a Union of Sovereign States (republic poll). But their arguments did not receive support.

After the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet adopted the resolution to hold the Union referendum and the republic poll simultaneously, the political alignment in the Ukraine looks as follows: The recent Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum urged a vote in favor of a renewed federation. All the other parties and Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] are urging a "no" vote to the renewed federation and support the idea of a "Union of Sovereign States."

Debate on the Law on Banks and Banking in the Ukrainian SSR, the draft of which was submitted for the deputies' discussion, essentially served as a further development of the theme of the republic's sovereignty. The republic is starting to create its own banking system, to organize money circulation on its own territory, and to form its own credit resources.

"We intend to create a Ukrainian national bank, a bank to support foreign economic activity, and a savings bank," V. Buryak, who now heads the Bank of the Ukraine, which is under the control of the USSR Gosbank [State Bank], told the session. "The Ukrainian national bank will be subordinate solely to the republic Supreme Soviet. Many of the powers of the USSR Gosbank are being transferred to it. The national bank is being granted the exclusive right to put money into circulation and to issue national banknotes by decision of the republic legislature. It is also intended to create a gold repository under the national bank's aegis."

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet passed the law on creating a banking system in the republic on its first reading.

Ukrainian Coal Unions Form National Organization

LD0403231191 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 1615 GMT 2 Mar 91

[Text] The primary trade union organizations of the Ukrainian coal industry have united into the republican Organization of Trade Union Coal Industry Workers. It was created at their constituent conference in Donetsk.

The new organization, as is noted in the declaration of its formation, has a mission to express and defend the social, economic and professional interests of working people and to actively cooperate with trade unions of other republics. Delegates at the constituent conference adopted a program and statute for the trade union organization, formed its elective bodies and elected its leaders. Kostyantyn Fesenko, a master of demolition at the Artemugol Industrial Association's Kochegarka mine, was elected chairman of the council of the organization. Fokin, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, took part in the constituent conference and delivered a speech.

Caucasus

Federation Council To Discuss South Ossetia

LD0603094391 Moscow World Service in English 0900 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] The USSR Federation Council today decided to discuss the situation in South Ossetia and consider ways of settling the ethnic conflict in the region by political means.

This was announced by Vice President Gennadiy Yanayev at the morning session of the Soviet parliament. Yanayev informed lawmakers that (?there) was now a chance to reconcile the Georgians and Ossetians but this opportunity was not being used to the full by both sides. There are Georgian and Ossetian militants deployed around Tskhinvali, South Ossetia's main city and a regional center. Both sides are armed with guns and even armored vehicles, noted the vice president. Since the start of the bloodshed, 37 people have already died and the number of refugees of both ethnic groups from the region is about 21,000. In South Ossetia, which has been stripped of autonomy by the Georgian parliament, industry is unoperational and electricity and water supply has been irregular.

The parliament accepted the vice president's proposal to wait for the outcome of the session of the Federation Council comprising the republics' leaders and not to hold a discussion on the South Ossetian problem at this stage.

Lawmakers then discussed a bill on Soviet law enforcement troops.

PRAVDA Views Role of Army in South Ossetia

PM0603095891 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Mar 91 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Report by special correspondents G. Ovcharenko and S. Cheremin under the "Letters From Georgia" rubric: "Not 'Occupying Forces'—Defenders"]

[Text] Tbilisi, Tskhinvali—We should have transmitted this report from Tskhinvali four days ago. But the capital of South Ossetia is blockaded. There is no telephone link not only with Moscow and Tbilisi, but even with rayons in the autonomous oblast. As always happens in such cases, the Army came to our aid. First an MI-8 military helicopter took us to Tskhinvali, then Army people helped us to contact PRAVDA by telephone.

Our first reportage is about them, about the "occupying forces"—that is what the officers and men of the Soviet Army and the USSR Internal Troops are called nowadays in Georgia, even from the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet.

The lieutenant, a recent military school graduate, was surrounded by similarly young and cheerful Georgians. Jibes and insults were raining down, the mildest of them being the wish for the "occupying soldier to get out of our land" quickly. In the end the lieutenant could not stand it:

"If I was an occupying soldier, I would be in your house now, and you would be bringing me snacks and brandy!"

This incident could have ended badly for the officer, but two hitherto silent elderly Georgians pacified the guys... They paint red stars on the buildings where military men live, they scratch crosses on the apartment doors—what is the purpose of these signs? At the post office they do not accept money transfers or telegrams from soldiers and officers, and in the stores they drive them out of the waiting lines. They are simply wearing down the military and threatening their families. In the Transcaucasus Military District alone there are 1,500 servicemen without housing, and there is no prospect of any, judging by a statement by the local authorities.

Echoes of 9 April 1989? But the situation is the same in Armenia, Moldavia, the Baltic republics, and Azerbaijan. The rejoinder comes: In all the "hot spots" the populations have complaints, to put it mildly, about the Army. Hence, so it is said, the opposition. But in that case, the question is: Who is opposing whom?

During the last three years, when there have been outbreaks of interethnic fighting, one of us has visited virtually every location where intolerance, chauvinism, and political ambitions have ruled the bloodthirsty show. Every time, it was soldiers, quite young guys, who stood in the path of this rampant nationalism.

"Of course, it is not for the Army to sort out interethnic conflicts," Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, told us. "But there are emergencies when thousands of lives are threatened. Then the Army receives orders, and fulfills them. An army that does not obey orders is not an army. So why do we shift the burden of the decisions of statesmen, politicians, and politickers seeking power and the fulfillment of their own ambition, why do we shift our own dissatisfaction with our living standard and quality of life, onto the young shoulders of soldiers, onto the Army?"

Those who want to pull the Union apart into national compartments and divide it into princedoms, khanates, and so forth to hold single-handed sway over their own patrimonies, would very much like to cause a rift between the Army and the people. We need not look far for illustrations, there are plenty of them today in both Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. Here is an extract from an interview with Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, in which he is explaining the leadership's negative attitude toward the troop units stationed in Tskhinvali: "They are frankly waging war on our population, together with the Ossetian extremists. There are a great many Ossetian officers there, who are equipping them with ammunition, weapons, even missiles. These are frankly hostile actions against the Georgian people."

Zviad Konstantinovich cited no evidence to confirm his statement. But the evidence appears in Georgian newspapers and on republic television. It is reported, for instance, that the helicopter regiment stationed in Tskhinvali supposedly shipped guerrillas to the Ossetian village of Dmenisi and supplied them with weapons, including unguided missiles.

"Rubbish, disinformation," A. Vostrikov, commander of the helicopter regiment, said. "We shipped food to the village, and took out sick women and children."

We flew to Dmenisi. Omar Bibilov, chairman of a local kolkhoz, confirmed it:

"The helicopter brought us 600 kg of rice, wheat, and other food, including 15 boxes of cakes. It took out to Tskhinvali the pregnant F. Tomayeva, our animal specialist, and three sick children and their mothers."

Incidentally, when we returned from Dmenisi, we took on board a woman who had been sick with appendicitis for three days already. The village is completely blockaded, and if we had not flown in, it is hard to say what would have happened to the sick woman.

And all the fuss about the "redheads" [ryzhiye]—that is what they call the helicopters of the Tbilisi Georgian Civil Aviation Administration, which fly illegally to Georgian villages in South Ossetia! What are they carrying?

"It was suspected that they were indeed shipping in guerrillas and weapons," A. Vostrikov told us. "We have no right to intervene in these affairs. But the 'redheads' represent a real danger to our airmen, they are basically

violating the airspace. We have repeatedly warned them that such flights are impermissible..."

Once the regimental commander received permission to force a "redhead" to land. He carried out this task personally. In the civilian MI-8, No. 22676, under the command of D. Dolinzashvili, they found, in addition to civilians, seven guerrillas with hunting rifles, pistols, and carbines, 40 kg of ammonal, and 120 meters of Bickford fuse.

The mass media immediately rounded on the military, saying that they had acted unlawfully, that it was a routine flight, and so forth. Meanwhile the "redhead" is at the military airfield to this day...

So some people are trying to set the Georgians against the helicoptermen by misrepresenting the facts. It must be said that they are achieving their goals. Among the Georgian section of the population of South Ossetia many people regard the military helicoptermen as "enemy number one." That is how one militia lieutenant colonel (he did not give his name) put it.

They deal with the "enemy" correspondingly. There was an attack on an ammunition dump and a helicopter pad, when guerrillas fired on A. Vostrikov's unit with automatic weapons and machine guns from two cars. Virtually every night the helicoptermen's residential camp comes under fire. We are not saying this on the basis of rumors—we lived in that camp, where there are more than 400 children.

So who is attacking whom, who is occupying whom?

Yet life for the military and their families is hard enough even without that. They do not enjoy any special privileges, although they are in a state of emergency zone. For instance, for them, a month's service counts as a month, like everywhere else, and not as six weeks, and their salary is the normal salary, not 50 percent higher. Such privileges exist only for those serving in a state of emergency zone declared by the USSR Supreme Soviet or president. But in Tskhinvali it was the republic authorities that imposed the state of emergency. There are no privileges, but being shot at is the same as anywhere else, and the danger to life is the same.

Any discussion of service in state of emergency zones should be special, with regard to not only the warrant officers and officers, but the soldiers too. There is a view that they should come here voluntarily, knowing, for instance, that their term of service will be six months shorter and their material well-being considerably higher...

But let us come back to the Tskhinvali helicoptermen's camp. Here no one is surprised at the rattle of automatic gunfire and the rumble of heavy machine guns. Many housing blocks bear the marks of the guerrillas' undeclared war. We are deliberately not specifying their nationality, because common gangster formations should not be confused with two nations who have never in living memory compromised themselves through cruelty or violence. All the same, sticking to the facts, the fire comes from the direction of the Georgian village of Tamarasheni, which is next to the military camp, from vineyards controlled by Georgian informal groups. And indeed, the Ossetians are not likely to shell the territory of a military unit where their own mothers, sisters, and children took refuge during the most dangerous days.

The Army has strict orders not to interfere in ethnic conflict. But people's patience is limited.

"Formerly, when they heard the sounds of gunfire, the children playing in the yard used to run home at breakneck speed, crying," G. Tivonchik, chairman of the regiment women's council, says. "Now they are used to it, and they can distinguish different types of weapons from the noise."

But that is just one of the problems. People are acutely worried about the continuing blockade of Tskhinvali, as a result of which there is no milk in the city, the market is not operating, and children are without fruit and vitamins. You can't raise a healthy child on canned meat and pasta alone. There are about 400 children in the camp, they are young families. What about those who have grown-up children? It will soon be time for the entrance examinations for the institutes, but here there is a war on and the schools are empty. You could send them to their grandparents, but there is a war on there too, a war of sovereignties: rationing, residence permits... They are outcasts, what else can you call it. People keep telling them that they are "occupying forces," and if they want to buy candy for their children, they have to take a warrant officer who speaks Georgian with them, otherwise they won't give them candy in Gori: They are "occupying forces." The whole regiment went without their allowance for two days in order to collect food for the residents of the old people's home, who were dying of cold and hunger—so much for "occupying forces"...

Let us be frank: Today the Army is indeed the only obstacle in the path to power for forces operating under the banner of national exclusivity. It is the last structure where some kind of order is still maintained. But how long can it last? After all, the Army is part of society, and sooner or later it will succumb to society's ills. And then—total collapse, anarchy, civil war?

In the Tskhinvali garrison we met with Igor Bukanov, an armored carrier driver. He is small, with a crew cut and freckles—still a boy. He comes from Orenburg Oblast, from the "Rubezhenskiy" Sovkhoz, and before the Army he worked as a tractor driver, and now, in his armored carrier, he has to rescue hostages, breaking through barricades made of plows and concrete posts.

"I have come across various kinds of guerrillas, there are so many informal organizations everywhere that I can't remember them all," Igor says. "Recently we rescued a warrant officer, with the special forces. They were keeping him in a village school which had become the informal group's headquarters."

You could not help thinking: They should give this guy one of the plows he crushes beneath the wheels of his combat vehicles, and send him home to his sovkhoz. How ever hard you looked at his face, you could not find a single trait characteristic of an "occupier"...

Another episode sticks in the mind. Col. Gen. V. Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, has read the fable "The Crane and the Goose" in Georgian. Another "occupier"?...

...In the early hours of this morning once again we sprang out of bed at the sound of automatic fire. Once again the guerrillas were firing on the military camp—on women and children—from a nearby knoll. In the morning, in the club, the guys were practising the polka to the accompaniment of the piano—soon it will be 8 March, time to greet their mothers on Women's Day.

TASS Reports More Casualties in South Ossetia

LD0503195991 Moscow TASS in English 1947 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Valeriy Shanayev report]

[Text] Vladikavkaz March 5 TASS—The situation in South Ossetia remains extremely tense. A spokesman for the extraordinary committee under the chairman of the North Ossetian parliament told TASS that machine-gun fire is repeatedly opened at Tskhinvali every night. Four houses have burnt down in the city.

One man was killed and several wounded in a shoot-out near the village of Khelchua of the Tskhinvali district.

The economic blockade of South Ossetia continues. Two bridges and road covering have been damaged by explosions near the village of Kehvi. All roads leading to Tskhinvali have been effectively blocked, making the delivery of food supplies to the city a problem.

Industrial enterprises, shops, schools, every day service establishments are closed down. Electricity, water and gas supplies are highly irregular. Telephone and telegraph communication have been cut off.

According to North Ossetian Interior Ministry, a great deal of Georgian militants, well provided with all kinds of military hardware have accumulated in villages of Tskhinvali and Kareli districts.

The flow of refugees from South Ossetia is creating problems for North Ossetia. Children, women and elderly people keep arriving every day. More than 12,000 refugees have been registered to date, including over 6,000 children. Urgent measures are being taken to accommodate them.

Georgia's Gamsakhurdia Talks About Moscow Ties

AU0403110391 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 4 Mar 91 p 5

[Report on interview with Republic of Georgia President Zviad Gamsakhurdia by Manfred Rowold in Tbilisi; date not given: "Moscow Wants To Provoke Georgia"]

[Text] Over the massive legislature building on Rustaveli Boulevard in Tbilisi, the old flag of the Republic of Georgia is flying again: black and white on dark red. Below it, in a stone relief, there is the coat of arms of the Soviet Republic with hammer and sickle. An image full of symbols for the transitional period declared by the legislature, which was freely elected in October-November, until Georgia achieved true independence from the Soviet Union.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the president of this legislature, has been repeatedly compared with Vaclav Havel: Like Havel, he is a writer, philosopher and philologist; like Havel, Gamsakhurdia was imprisoned as a human rights activist and founder of the Georgian Helsinki Group in the 1970's; like Havel, he is now head of state.

In Georgia, the first free elections with multiparty competition in the Soviet Union last autumn resulted in an overwhelming victory of the "Roundtable—Free Georgia" party alliance headed by Gamsakhurdia, which won 155 of the 246 seats. But the Communists, who were left clearly behind with 63 seats and have severed their ties with the CPSU, and the People's Front with 12 seats also support Gamsakhurdia and the course of independence.

Even Sunday is a working day for Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The tall, gray-haired, 51-year-old man gives his interview in his moderately furnished reception room. He speaks German as a matter of course. The first question refers to those extralegislative forces which have been fanning the atmosphere despite the agreement in the legislature. Gamsakhurdia: "These forces are criminal, terrorist organizations which are struggling against the state. They are political organizations which joined with criminal ones." Gamsakhurdia refers to an alliance of illegal armed groups, the "Georgian Army" (Sakartvelos Mkhedrioni), with the—at first glance—radically anti-Soviet "National Independence Party of Georgia." On 19 February, 87 members of the armed opposition, including its 64-year-old leader Dzhaba Ioseliani, were arrested. Since then, the pressure on the street has been increasing in order to force their release. How strong are Ioseliani's units? [Gamsakhurdia:] "Very strong: 5,000 men in Georgia. They rob, they are thieves. Criminals have joined in an army. They attack police stations and rob arms. They have also attacked government buildings in various regions."

The opposition loudly claims that Gamsakhurdia is an "agent of Moscow" because he does not take a sufficiently massive stand against the Kremlin. "This is nonsense," the president says, above whose desk the new coat of arms of the republic, St. George, in enamel, hangs

on the wall. "We are struggling for Georgia's independence, but these people are agents of Moscow. Moscow wants to provoke an armed uprising here and then bring further military forces into the republic and introduce a military regime." There are clear signs of the Kremlin's intention to put Georgia under a presidential regime. Gorbachev has threatened this also in a letter to him, Gamsakhurdia says.

Is there, like in the Baltic states, in Georgia, too, a so-called "Committee for National Salvation," which calls into question the elected state organs? Yes, Gamsakhurdia says, there is such a committee in Moscow. Members are, among others, former Georgian Communist Party Chiefs Shevardnadze and Gumbaridze: "It is a secret committee, which has its agents here. This committee struggles to bring about an uprising here and to destroy the government." There are very clear findings proving that Ioseliani is an agent of this committee.

The central government also exerts pressure in the economic area: "Moscow puts up a blockade against us, and an energy blockade. Since the elections, gas deliveries have been reduced by 7 million cubic meters; there is also less electricity being delivered. Most power plants have been closed." This has led to serious consequences. Even television can be received only five hours per day. "This is Moscow's punishment. The war in South Ossetia is also such a punishment." The issue there is not a nationality conflict but a "war by Moscow, the center, against Georgia," "an alliance by Moscow with Ossetian separatists and terrorists": "The Soviet Interior Ministry troops and the Army—both help Ossetian terrorists. They give them weapons, bombs, missiles—everything." Despite some weak militia forces on site, Georgia no longer has any control over South Ossetia.

Gamsakhurdia also sees political initiatives for the establishment of a Caucasus republic, including the Ossetians as a means of pressure by Moscow: "It is a punishment for our policy of independence." This policy consists of creating new legal bases; there is no need for a formal proclamation of independence, because the Declaration of Independence of 1918 continues to be legally effective. On 31 March the people will, however, be able to decide once again on independence in a referendum. The Soviet referendum of 17 March on the continued existence of the Union will not be held in Georgia; the protracted process envisaged by a Union law for a republic's secession from the Soviet Union is not acceptable for Gamsakhurdia, because Tbilisi has not recognized the annexation of 1921.

The task the new leadership faces is: Creating real independence. The establishment of a national guard as an internal protective power is only at its beginning. According to Gamsakhurdia, the National Guard has only 300 men at the moment and serves, above all, to protect the government building in Tbilisi. In economic and political terms, the Georgian head of state places great hopes on the West, but Gamsakhurdia is very worried. It will be "very, very difficult": "In economic terms because of the blockade against us. And also because of the difficulties in so-called South Ossetia. The terrorist gangs and terrorist parties are also against us. Moscow is guiding this process against our legislature." Does he not see any approach to a political solution? "No, if the Western countries do not help us, it will be very difficult for us." What could this help be like? "Political pressure on Moscow," says Gamsakhurdia, who recently told a Soviet newspaper that he will cross the threshold of the Kremlin only as a citizen of a free Georgia.

'Unclear' if Referendum Will Be Held in NKAO

LD0503214591 Moscow TASS in English 2125 GMT 5 Mar 91

[Vadim Byrkin report]

[Text] Stepanakert March 6 TASS—Despite the aggravated situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region [NKAO], people display keen interest in the forthcoming all-Union referendum.

The press service of the coordination centre to realise economic programmes in the region held a telephone poll among the Armenian population in Stepanakert.

Every nine out of ten people expressed desire to participate in the referendum on March 17 and to vote for the preservation of a revitalised Soviet Union where the Nagorno-Karabakh region will be an equal party to the federation.

However, it is unclear whether the referendum will be held in the autonomous region.

Nobody knows who will hold the plebiscite in the region: The Presidium of the Soviet parliament suspended the operation of the regional council since January 1989. On the other hand, the Azerbaijani Organising Committee on the Nagorno-Karabakh region was not recognised by Armenians and has not expressed its attitude to the referendum.

There is no documentation in the region to hold the referendum, and there is no mechanism to carry it out in the state of emergency conditions.

Only the troops of the Soviet Interior Ministry and the Soviet Army, stationed in the autonomous region, are preparing for the referendum. In compliance with a decision by the Soviet parliament, polling stations and appropriate documentation are being prepared.

Armenia Decides To Hold Republican Referendum

NC0503160591 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 4 Mar 91

["The Decision of the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet on Holding a Referendum on the Territory of the

Armenian Republic in Connection With the Secession From the Structure of the Soviet Union"; place and date not given]

[Text] Proceeding from the principles and objectives found in the declaration on Armenia's independence, and, drawing upon Point 5 of Article 98 of the Armenian Republic's Constitution, the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet decides:

1. To hold a referendum on the territory of the Armenian Republic in connection with the secession from the structure of the Soviet Union. The following question should be put to vote: Do you agree that the Armenian Republic should become an independent democratic state outside the structure of the Soviet Union?

2. To hold the referendum on 21 September 1991.

3. To empower the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium to bring forward the date of the referendum in case of a sharp change in the situation.

4. To cover the expenses for the referendum from the state budget of the Armenian Republic.

Azerbaijan Party Secretaries Debate Union Accord

NC0603120491 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 4 Mar 91

[Text] The secretaries of the primary party organizations of the republic's ideological establishments and main administrations have held a meeting at the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. How should the Union agreement be drawn up? What would this agreement provide for Azerbaijan politically and economically and on matters related to the question of state administration? What should be the direction of the explanatory work the party organizations must carry out in order for the people to be assisted in the assessment of the draft of the new Union agreement, which has been freely debated and published in the press? The participants in the meeting held a businesslike exchange of views on these matters.

It was noted that the matter to be discussed was not the question of whether the Union should exist. A number of serious views and proposals were put forward in connection with the draft of the new Union agreement. Agayev, chief of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Ideology Department, drew the attention of the participants on the need to strengthen the draft of the new Union agreement with convincing [words indistinct]. It was noted that the mass media organs, primarily the party's press organs, have particular responsibility in this regard. The disruptive forces must not be allowed to provoke the people and turn them away from the nature of the matter that has been discussed.

Central Asia

Kazakh President on Union Treaty, Yeltsin

91US0332A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No. 9, Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, by correspondent I. Kabak in Alma-Ata; date not given: "More Than 80 Percent of the Population of Kazakhstan Is for the Market—Only Together!"]

[Text] [Kabak] Nursultan Abishevich, Kazakhstan has just signed a treaty with the Ukraine. Is this one further step toward a Union treaty?

[Nazarbayev] We realize that we have to have a Union treaty. If anyone says that the republics can survive alone in the situation which has taken shape in the country it is petty politicking! Only together! Only given a common currency and a common economic space: After all, joint labor in the country has reached 70 percent. And it is not our fault that the structure of the economy in the regions has become so distorted. The major republics—Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan—could be the sponsors and guarantors of the preservation of the Union. A renewed Union of sovereign states, of course. Incidentally, M.S. Gorbachev himself was the first to formulate it thus.

We suggested that the president of the USSR head this powerful group and approached him with this idea, together with B.N. Yeltsin. However, speculation surrounding the initiative began: We virtually wished to create a second center, it was said. An appeal of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, in which our proposals were heard distinctly, then emerged.

[Kabak] What is the center's attitude toward treaties between the republics?

[Nazarbayev] Through the fault of the Union Government we greeted 1991 without a budget. We were forced to sign a provisional agreement. Are we once again returning to strict centralization, to the diktat of the center? We are opposed to this!

The center initially approached economic agreements between the republics airily, I would say, although once again the center itself was calling on us for horizontal relations. But when they saw that we had gone as far as a rolling mill, the range of metal products, and determination of the partners of just about every factory, they said: "Bu-u-t!" Why can we indeed not create joint ventures with Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia without the dictating mediation of the center?

A meeting of the Federation Council was held on 16 February. There were two items on the agenda: common approaches to pricing and a draft law on the ministerial cabinet. We had our say on the first item, but did not discuss the second because a ministerial cabinet needs to

be formed for specific functions, but it is not yet clear what the sovereign republics will hand over as functions of the center. We conferred and held consultations outside of the meeting hall.

We were reproved here for operating wrongly: They have gone off somewhere, they have been negotiating somewhere. It would be better for everyone to discuss things individually.

But why should we discuss things the way some people want? What's the point of this virtual shadowing? I don't like this.

[Kabak] Generally, the center does not like you. And, evidently, sees the behavior of the leaders of the "big republics" as a mutiny. Do you like the center?

[Nazarbayev] We do not conceal our critical attitude toward the center. Why hide it? We are jointly opposed to a return to the former diktat because individually we would be oppressed. Contacts of the major republics are an alternative to the diktat of the center. And, then, if we recall history, the USSR started out with a union of four republics. Others became affiliated subsequently.

[Kabak] Speaking of dictatorial rule, do you have anyone in mind? Gorbachev?

[Nazarbayev] In today's situation, to be frank, Gorbachev, as an individual, is not leading us to dictatorship. His character and frame of mind are not oriented toward this. I am sure that he is devoted to democratic transformations and reform in the economy. But forces which are pushing him into some tough methods are now grouping around him. Those who had oriented him otherwise are, as we can see, leaving. Others, who think differently, are coming.

[Kabak] Evidently it is not without the participation of these forces unknown that the national salvation committees are being formed....

[Nazarbayev] I do not accept them, when there are legitimately elected governments. I believe that their creation in the Baltic means the insinuation of some structures of the center. We must not be taken for simpletons: No commander of a garrison or commander of a district even can commit tanks to cities on his own initiative or at the requests of anonymous persons. Of course, this was a command from above, and it would have been better had whoever had given the command said honestly: Yes, I assumed the responsibility to avoid bloodshed. But there was no straight answer, as in the Tbilisi events.

We big republics, without which there can be no union, are a counterweight to dictatorship.

[Kabak] How do you evaluate B. Yeltsin's television speech?

[Nazarbayev] We also have complaints about the head of our state. I spoke clearly about this at the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies and I stand behind the content of this speech. But posing now the question of retiring by some method or other the constitutionally elected head of our state, when we are on the verge of a major crisis and beginning the switch to a market economy and when negotiations on a new Union treaty are under way—this is simply an unacceptable venture.

I have respect for Boris Nikolayevich. He is the constitutionally elected head of the biggest republic. And we are bound to Russia historically.

I respect him further because he is defending the sovereignty of Russia, whose laws are being enacted by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] legislature, and is firmly upholding the interests of the republic before the center.

But I saw nothing constructive in Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's speech. What is he proposing? That the country be headed by the Federation Council, to which the Constitution has not given this authority—this is the first thing. Second, there would be no leader of the state, there would be no center at all. Then what, is he proposing that all republics become part of a Russian empire? This also is unacceptable for the republic. I therefore believe that his speech cannot be supported in Kazakhstan in this respect.

And I would like to say generally, and I believe I express the opinion of many people in saying this, that everyone is thoroughly fed up with the political dissension and that we are particularly angry at the lack of responsibility for the fate of the country, when the top political leaders cannot find a common language. It is evidently time to call a halt here and switch all forces into an improvement in people's life and a restoration of the order which is lacking. There is the piece of Kazakh wisdom: "When camels fight, flies get killed".

[Kabak] You know M.S. Gorbachev's first reaction to Yeltsin's speech?

[Nazarbayev] He called me and was, it seems to me, depressed.

[Kabak] Nursultan Abishevich, Kazakhstan is now considered, not without reason, evidently, one of the most stable republics. What has brought this about?

[Nazarbayev] I will cite a few figures. In five years national revenue grew by a factor of 1.4. Some 86 percent of national revenue was spent on consumption (79 percent in the last five-year plan). In the social sphere, R6 billion more than in the previous five-year plan. More housing, hospitals, and schools were built. The production of consumer goods grew by a factor of 1.5, meat by 27 percent, and milk by 16 percent. The average annual grain increase was 22 percent. There has been a growth in food production. And at the same time, however, the store shelves are empty. What's wrong? The country's government has permitted individuals' monetary income to grow unchecked. Some 75 percent of

customers argue in worldly fashion: Buy today, this will not be here tomorrow. This is why we were forced to impose a coupon system.

Purchase prices were raised, retail prices had to be raised simultaneously also. We put it to M.S. Gorbachev and V.S. Pavlov thus: The population should be 100 percent compensated for the increase in the price of food.

[Kabak] To judge by everything, people believe you. But far from everything depends on you, on the republic.... There is the president of the USSR, the government.... There is, finally, the military, which has long and firmly been established on the expanses of Kazakhstan.

[Nazarbayev] Truly, not everything depends on us as yet. The republics have enacted a sovereignty declaration. And this is a reality of life, not the personal ambitions of individual leaders. The country's government should finally understand this and work in the interests of the republics. There would then be mutual understanding. Meanwhile...the enterprises are prohibited even from making barter deals.

We are trying to find a common language with the military. The extensive public movement and the work of members of parliament and the government are producing tangible results. People have started to listen to us. Much has already been said about the test range. And what does the Baykonur Cosmodrome do for Kazakhstan? It has been closed to the republic for over 30 years. Sovereign Kazakhstan is not comfortable with such a situation. We have made arrangements with the military about the cosmodrome helping us double the size of the telephone system and providing the republic with remote special satellite broadcasts. Kazakh cosmonauts are in flight training. The Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences Space Research Institute is opening. The cosmodrome will be opened for visits by Kazakhstanis. We will, of course, monitor environmental issues associated with Baykonur. So there has been some progress.

[Kabak] It has become known that a Supreme Economic Council has been formed under the president of the Kazakh SSR. The news of the participation in this of the prominent economists Grigoriy Yavlinskiy (RSFSR) and Dr. Chang Yang Beng and Prof. Aksel Leonhuvud [names as transliterated] (United States) has evoked great interest. What was the reason for the enlistment of people from outside?

[Nazarbayev] The council's work is connected primarily with the transition to the market, and questions of promoting and elaborating market economy programs require a very skilled approach in all respects. The council is to elaborate and promote the introduction of a mechanism for the development of market relations in the republic, make an expert evaluation of the laws, and organize the training of personnel. And people who know the market not just from textbooks are needed for this. But this does not mean that we will transfer everything from the West on a one-for-one basis.

[Kabak] The market is inconceivable without new forms of ownership, without privatization. But Kazakhstan is considered quite a conservative republic.

[Nazarbayev] More than 80 percent of the population of the "conservative" republic has advocated a market, incidentally.

The first thing people are asking about is how privatization will be effected. It is thought that an individual with a thick wallet will come along and start buying up state-owned enterprises. No, we explain, no way. Some property will be made available to the people working at these enterprises free of charge. The rest, thanks to enterprise resources and loans. We are talking about the privatization of small enterprises, bakeries, stores, and restaurants.

Privatization will be effected by the State Property Committee, and fairness should be observed, therefore.

[Kabak] Kazakhstan is a multinational republic. Are there problems in interethnic relations?

[Nazarbayev] These problems cannot be solved all at once. We recorded in our declaration that all people, regardless of national affiliation, religious belief, and party membership, are equal. This is international law, and we will hold it sacred.

Correction to Nazarbayev Interview on Unity

WA0603164091

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Kazakh President Nazarbayev Interviewed on Unity," published in the 5 March Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 83:

Column two, last paragraph, sentence three, should read: "...a renewed Union of sovereign states? This formulation is in line with the formulation contained in the declaration of soveriegnty of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. With the text we are fully answering the question put by the Union referendum. So the Union referendum will be held..." (supplying indistinct words)

Clash 'Unavoidable' in Kirghizia

91US0330A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 8, 27 Feb 91 pp 1-2

[Article by special correspondent A. Ivanov: "EKHO LITVY in Kirghizia?"]

[Text] Kirghizia—From the troubled, fragmentary conversations that one hears on the bus, at the marketplace, or at the factory entrance, one catches the disturbing sense of the talk: Preparations are being made in the capital of Kyrgyzstan for the creation of a national salvation committee.

Some talk about it with alarm and perplexity, while others see it as almost the sole way out of the impasse. The shadow of the Vilnius and Riga events, which

caused a commotion all over the world, insatiably overclouds a life that is mundane and yet tense even without this.

What is the cause of such talk?

When Absamat Masaliyev, first secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, suffered defeat at the end of last year in a campaign for the post of president and later resigned from the post of chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet under pressure from society, it seemed to everyone that political passions would subside. It was believed that the man whose name was tied to the Osh tragedy was gradually withdrawing from the game himself. Unfortunately... Some assert that he was mortally offended, while others believe that ambition played a part. I will not try to judge. However it is clear that he immediately began to attack President Askar Akayev, skillfully using any pretext at hand. Masaliyev frames his condemnations in such a way that it seems as though both the party and the workers are standing behind him in closed ranks. His intention is to show what a strong leader the parliament has lost in him.

In all times, the struggle for power has been accompanied by intrigues and violence. What is so dangerous about the current situation? The fact, in my opinion, is that intentionally or unintentionally there is a play for ethnic sentiments under way. At times it is through hints, at times it is more direct. This slender thread has been stretched to the limit. It will snap at the slightest touch. Unfortunately, they tug on it every time they need to give their opponents a scare.

The democratic movement "Kyrgyzstan" [Kirghizia], which at the present consists almost solely of Kirghizia, was conducting a rally near the building of the Central Committee, demanding the resignation of Masaliyev. The latter came out and said to one of the leaders of the movement, "And what will happen if I summon the factory workers onto the square right now?" (For your information, the factories are manned for the most part by Russians and Ukrainians.) I hardly need to report the content of the threatening reply. And although these threats were not carried out, the foundation was laid in the consciousness of those at the rally: If he is counting on the factory workers, it means that they are behind him. It means that sooner or later a clash is unavoidable. It only remains to prepare oneself... It is enough to send a chill up one's spine.

During the presidential elections a group of the members of "Kyrgyzstan" declared a hunger strike in protest. Masaliyev was unacceptable to them in every way. He did not have a ray of hope. Naturally, the deputies doubted whether there was any sense in counting on him. Sometimes high-ranking messengers are sent around to the factories to request that his opponents be rebuffed and that they organize support for him. At a session Masaliyev himself, speaking scornfully of the hunger strikers, did not fail to remind people that he has solid support: The factory collectives. To their old placard saying "Down with Masaliyev!" the hunger strikers added a new one: "Stop playing our nations off against one another!"

It should be said that ever since that day this slogan appears wherever the DDK [Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement] conducts its activities.

And what about the factories? Do they really feel such irresistible sympathy toward the party leader that they are prepared to follow him through fire and water if he gives the signal? In this instance there is no single answer—a portion of the Russian- speaking population connects the name of Masaliyev with the old approaches to ethnic relations. The Russian remains the "elder brother," with everything it entails. Such an approach suits those who openly fear that a wave of ethnic self-awareness of the Kirghiz will drive the Russian-speaking population outside the borders of the republic. They see the desire for linguistic and other types of priorities as an infringement on their civil dignity. All the more so because in the general commotion small conflicts are hardly a rarity. There are more than enough nationalists and chauvinists to go around. Some light a spark on one side, and others do it on the other side.

The first secretary of the Central Committee asserts that he is a true internationalist and, together with the party he leads, is not offending anyone. Naturally this entices and incites his opponents against him. In the struggle for the survival small shades of difference are indistinguishable, and what is desired is easily taken for what is real. One forgets under whose leadership the republic reached the point of crisis.

President Askar Akayev, fighting for real sovereignty of the republic, does not conceive of the republic outside the borders of the Union. The parliament reinforced this position with a declaration of its own. Among the laws adopted by the elected representatives, I do not know of a single one that subjects ethnic minorities to discrimination.

The president is attempting sober politics without any ideological mirages. The word "socialist" has been excluded from the name of the republic of Kyrgyzstan. "It is too sacred," explained Akayev, "to be used undeservedly." Masaliyev attacks the president, accusing him of undermining the foundation: He says that the president has declared a complete repudiation of the principles of internationalism. Today, he says, the democrats are repudiating their affiliation with socialism, and tomorrow they will raise the question of secession from the Union and take the Lithuanian course. The allusion is transparent: Ethnic minorities, save yourselves! If you are too late and do not champion us, you will be in difficult straits.

The telephone at the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA office has been overworked with the calls of alarmed readers. "Masaliyev's speech is pure provocation," believes Melis Ibrayev from Koytash. "He is sowing enmity between the nations. I am quitting the party that

has such a leader." There is no keeping count of similar views. But there were different ones as well. Calmly and with a faint note of harshness in their voices, they explained to me that the first secretary of the Central Committee is planning several steps in the future. It is time to create a national salvation committee and act more decisively than in Vilnius and Riga.

I was interested in the republic's KGB and whether they had received any information about contacts between the party apparatus and the military. They answered me that they had no such information.

In the meantime talk about the notorious "committee" increases...

Tajik Supreme Soviet 'Categorically' Favors Union

LD0303001591 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1545 GMT 2 Mar 91

[Report by correspondent M. Madzhidov; from the "Vremya" program]

[Text] The debates in the Tajik legislature lasted eight days as the deputies strove to resolve a whole package of problems that were of concern to the people of the republic.

[Begin recording] [K. Aslonov, chairman of the Tajik Supreme Soviet] We consider one important issue to be the Supreme Soviet's attitude to the forthcoming referendum on preserving the Union. Just as at previous sessions, the MP's expressed the will of the whole of the Tajik people by coming down categorically in favor of preserving the Union and holding a referendum on the issue.

Aside from this, the session debated and passed seven very important laws, which generally will facilitate the Republic's transition to market-based relations. [end recording]

There was heated debate during the session over the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers. It was only after two days of discussion that that legislature backed the package of proposals put forward by President Makhkamov on how to make the best use of the structure and management of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic's national economy. The final point on the agenda was the question of outlawing public-catering cooperatives. They were not outlawed. Instead, the cooperatives were given the chance of survival on the sole condition that they use their own raw materials.